MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL OF REFUGEE STUDIES
Cilt/Volume: 2 ▪ Sayı/Number: 1 ▪ Kış/Winter 2017
ISSN: 2149-4398 • eISSN: 2458-8962 • DOI: 10.12738/mejrs

Akademik İçerik Danışmanlığı/Content Advisor
EDAM (Eğitim Danışmanlığı ve Araştırmaları Merkezi)
Telefon: +90 (216) 481-3023 **Web:** www.edam.com.tr **Elektronik posta:** edam@edam.com.tr

Tasarım ve Uygulama/Graphic Design
Ahmet Karataş
Semih Edis

Baskı Öncesi Hazırlık/Prepress
EDAM (Eğitim Danışmanlığı ve Araştırmaları Merkezi)

Yayın Türü/Type of Publication
Yerel Süreli Yayın/International Periodical

Yayın Türü/Type of Publication
Türkçe ve İngilizce/Turkish and English

Yayın Periyodu/Publishing Period
Altı ayda bir Ocak ve Haziran aylarında yayımlanır/Biannual (January & June)

Baskı ve Cilt/Press
Pelikan Basım
Adres: Gümüşsuyu Cad. Odin İş Merkerzi No: 28-1 Topkapı İstanbul
Telefon: +90 (212) 613-7955 **Web:** www.pelikanbasim.com **Elektronik posta:** info@pelikanbasim.com
Basım Tarihi: Temmuz 2017

İletişim/Correspondence
Uluslararası Mülteci Hakları Derneği
Ali Kuşçu Mah. Büyük Karaman Cad. Taylasan Sok. Toprak Apt. K: 1 Fatih İstanbul
Telefon: +90 (212) 531-2025 **Web:** http://mejrs.com/ **Elektronik posta:** admin@mejrs.com

İçindekiler Table of Contents

ISSN 2149-4398 • **eISSN** 2458-8962
DOI 10.12738/mejrs.2017.2.1.0001 • Kış 2017 • 2(1)

Editörden

Doğu Akdeniz'de Mülteciler Arasında Geçmiş ve Şimdi: Zorunlu Göç Araştırmalarında Kavramsal ve Metodolojik Sorunlar

Sürgün Çağı mı?

Yaşadığımız dönemi tek bir cümle ile nasıl tanımlardık? Arjantinli-Şilili-Amerikalı edebiyat profesörü ve insan hakları savunucusu Vladimiro Ariel Dorfman bunu şu şekilde ifade ediyor: "Mültecilik çağında, sürgün çağında yaşıyoruz." Gerçekten de bugün haberleri dinleyen, gazete okuyan herhangi birinin Dorfman'a hak vermek dışında bir seçeneği var mıdır? Kesin olan şu ki bu çağda çok sayıda insan, istedikleri için değil, zorunda kaldıkları için göç etmektedir. Yoksulluk, savaşlar ve baskılar insanları canlarını riske atarak mahrumiyet ve zulümden kaçmaya yöneltiyor. Bu kaçışların pek çoğu, mülteci kamplarında veya şehirlerin gittikçe yayılan gettolarında sonlanırken küçük bir şanslı azınlık için müreffeh bir ülkede daha iyi bir hayat imkânı doğuyor. Esas itibarıyla farklı şekillerde de olsa, bu insanların hepsi kontrollerinin ötesindeki ekonomik ve siyasi güçlerin merhametine kalmış durumdadır. XXI. yüzyılın ilk çeyreğinin ortalarını geride bıraktığımız bu dönemde, kaçarken denizde boğulan yetişkinlerin ve çocukların Avrupa kıyılarına vuran cesetlerinin hazin görüntüleri, gazetelerin ilk sayfalarında, televizyon haberlerinin ilk sırasında yer almaya başladı. Her ne kadar zorunlu göçe karşı uzun vadede sürdürülebilir çözümler bulma ihtiyacı da hiç bu kadar aciliyet kesbetmemişse de, gerek Avrupa ülkelerinin gerekse de diğer ülkelerin hükûmetlerinin "mülteci krizine" insani bir çözüm üretememe acziyetleri, çoğunlukla da isteksizlikleri, apaçık olmanın ötesinde ümitleri de kırmaktadır.

Zorunlu göç olgusu, sebepleriyle ve sonuçlarıyla çok boyutlu bir sorun görünümündedir. Zorlayıcı etkenler insanları ulusal sınırlar içerisinde yer değiştirmeye ittiğinde göç "iç", kendi ülkeleri dışına çıkmaya sevk ettiğinde ise "dış" diye tanımlanabilir.[1] Zorunlu göç, iklim değişikliğinin etkileri ile sayıları artan seller, kuraklık veya kasırgalar gibi doğal felaketlerin neticesinde yaşanabilir. Ayrıca depremler, tsunamiler veya volkanik

1 Araştırmacılar kendi ülkesi dışına çıkmamış kişiler için "ülkesinde yerinden edilmiş kişi" (IDPs [internally displaced people]), sınır geçip başka bir ülkeye giden kişiler için de mülteci (refugee) veya sığınmacı (asylum seeker) ifadelerini kullanmaktadırlar.

aktiviteler gibi jeofizik olaylardan ya da Ebola benzeri tedavi edilemez hastalıkların salgınları gibi biyolojik faktörlerden ötürü de ortaya çıkabilir. Bununla birlikte, zorunlu göç artık ağırlıklı şekilde siyasi istikrarsızlık, sosyal ve ekonomik eşitsizlik, iç savaşlar, doğal kaynaklar üzerindeki rekabetin yol açtığı askerî müdahaleler yanında azınlıklar ile ekseriyet arasındaki gerginlikler ile bölgesel veya ideolojik (dinî, ulusal vb.) bakış açılarının karşı karşıya gelmesi gibi insan kaynaklı sebepler dolayısıyla gerçekleşmektedir. Irak'ta Kürtler ile Süryaniler arasında ya da Kürtlerle Yezidiler arasında son dönemlerde yaşananlar bu ihtilafa güzel bir örnek teşkil eder.

Gönüllü yapılan ile zorunlu göç arasındaki farklar da, silahlı çatışmalarla ya da siyasi zulümle ilişkili ekonomik nedenli göç ile mecburi yerinden edilme arasındaki farklar da muğlaktır ve çoğu kez tartışmalıdır (Schuster, 2015; Yarris & Castañeda, 2015). Bunun nedeni, çağdaş göçlerin göç illiyetine katkıda bulunan ekonomik ve sosyopolitik eşitsizlikleri beraberinde getirmesi ve her tür sınır ötesi hareket arasında en sıkıntı verenin kesinlikle "zorunlu göç" olmasıdır. Bundan dolayı insan kaynaklı sebeplerin insanların dolaylı ve kısmi şekilde yerinden edilmelerine yol açtığını kabul etmekle birlikte, bu özel sayıdaki makalelerde bu husus dışarıda bırakılmış; insan kaynaklı sebepler, savaş ve çatışma gibi doğrudan etkenlerle sınırlandırılarak kullanılmıştır.

Zorunlu göçün pek çok tanımı vardır. Örneğin, Bartram, Poros ve Monforte (2014) zorunlu göçü "şiddetli çatışmadan sert ekonomik darlığa kadar uzanan koşullarda ortaya çıkan bir çeşit mecburiyetten ya da iyi oluşa veya hayatta kalmaya yönelik tehditten kaynaklanan" bir hareket türü olarak tanımlarlar (s. 69). Bununla birlikte, zorunlu göçü kavramsallaştırırken *mecburiyet*in ne olduğunun belirlenmesi bir hayli zordur. Göç çalışan uzmanların büyük kısmı, ekonomik nedenlerle göçenler ile mülteciler arasındaki geleneksel ikilemi inandırıcı bulmamaktadır (Bartram ve ark., 2014).

Zorunlu göç olgusunun merkezinde "mülteci" diye adlandırdığımız karakter vardır. En geniş anlamıyla "mülteci": "Koşullar izin verirse dönmeyi uman ama yakın gelecekte dönemeyeceğini ya da dönmemesi gerektiğini düşünen, ülkesini terk etmiş bireydir." (Thielemann, 2006, s. 4). Bu tanımların çoğu, 1951 tarihli Birleşmiş Milletler Mültecilerin Hukuki Statüsüne Dair Cenevre Sözleşmesi'nde (Madde 1, Bölüm A, paragraf 2: 14) belirtilen mültecilerin hukuki tanımına[2] dayanmaktadır. Bu tanıma göre mülteci:

> …ırkı, dini, tabiiyeti, belli bir toplumsal gruba mensubiyeti veya siyasi düşünceleri yüzünden, zulme uğrayacağından haklı sebeplerle korktuğu için vatandaşı olduğu ülkenin dışında bulunan ve bu ülkenin korumasından yararlanamayan, ya da söz konusu korku nedeniyle, yararlanmak istemeyen; yahut tabiiyeti yoksa ve bu tür olaylar sonucu önceden yaşadığı ikamet ülkesinin dışında bulunan, oraya dönemeyen veya söz konusu korku nedeniyle dönmek istemeyen her şahsa uygulanacaktır (UNHCR, t.y).

2 1951 tarihli tanımın daha geniş bir versiyonu 1984 Cartagena Mülteciler Bildirisi'nde önerilmiştir (bk. UNHCR, 2013).

Tanımlar önemlidir; fakat bu özel sayı kapsamında yayımlanan makalelerde yansımaları görülecek ve şimdiden açıkça belirtilmesi gereken bazı mülahazalar bulunmaktadır. Öncelikle; göç konusunu çalışan uzmanlar, mülteciler (sığınmacılar) ile ekonomik göçmenler arasında ikili karşıtlık yerine koşullara bağlı göçlerde *mecburiyetin* daha çok ya da daha az rol oynadığı bir süreklilik görmektedirler. Bartram ve arkadaşlarının (2014) belirttiği üzere, zorunlu göçün ilk örnekleri şiddet içeren çatışmalardan, zulümden ve/veya kasti ülke dışına çıkarma sebepli yerinden edilmelerden kaynaklanan mülteci akımlarıdır. Dolayısıyla, mecburiyet unsuru belirgindir. İkinci olarak, göçün bir *strateji, insan gelişiminin bir parçası* ve yaşam döngüsü rolü de vurgulanmalıdır. Böylece göçmenin ve mültecinin failliğini tanımış oluyoruz. Bu doğrultuda mültecileri sadece kendi kontrolleri dışındaki etkenlerin mağduru gibi görmekten vazgeçiyor, kontrolleri altındaki toplumsal ve kültürel sermayelerine dayanarak son derece zor koşullara tepki gösteren aktörler kabul ediyoruz (Monsutti, 2010). Üçüncüsü, en kırılgan nüfustaki yılmazlığı ve olumsuz koşullar altında yeni yaşamlarında istikrar ve verimlilik kazanmalarına nelerin yardım ettiğini anlamak suretiyle insanın hayatını idame ettirmesinin doğası ve insanların her ne olursa olsun zorlukların üstesinden gelebilecekleri gibi konularda değerli dersler çıkartılabileceğini düşünüyoruz.

Açıkça belirtilecek nedenlerden ötürü bu sayının yazarları, zorunlu göçün ontolojik ve epistemolojik veçhelerini Doğu Akdeniz Bölgesi özelinde ele almışlardır. Her bir yazar bölgedeki zorunlu göçün tarihsel mirasına, politik bağlamına ve arka planına, yerinden olmanın göçmenler ve mülteciler üzerindeki psikolojik etkilerine ve yerinden edilme durumlarının hukuk bakımından nasıl yorumladığı konularına odaklanırken zorunlu göçe yönelik çalışmanın metodolojik boyutlarını ve kavramların sorgulanmasının önemini de hassasiyetle göstermiştir.

Geçmiş ve Şimdi

Akademik araştırmalar genellikle muayyen bir zamanla, belli coğrafi bölgelerle ya da büyük veya küçük sabit bir nüfusla kısıtlandırılır. Bununla birlikte zorunlu yerinden edilme, uygarlık kadar eski bir olgu (McNeil, 1984) olup ulusal veya bölgesel sınır kaydına bağlanamaz. Dolayısıyla bu geniş mekân ve zaman bağlamını akılda tutmak, zorunlu göçün en doğru şekilde çok disiplinli ve çok yöntemli bir perspektiften görülebileceğini hatırlatacağı için önemlidir. Gerçekten zorunlu yer değiştirmeyi tetikleyebilecek çok yönlü ve çok boyutlu küresel süreçler, bu temayı araştırırken bilim adamlarını bir disiplinin sınırlarının ötesine geçmeye mecbur bırakır; çünkü göçün bahsedilen biçimi ne basit nedenlerin bir sonucudur ne de sadece bugünün bir fenomenidir.

Bu noktada öncelikle zaman unsurunu ele alalım. Antik Çağlardan beri geniş coğrafyalar boyunca büyük kitlelerin zorla yerinden edilmeleri, dünyamızı defaatle yeniden şekillendirdi. Bunlardan bazıları nesiller boyu şifahen aktarılarak toplumsal hafızaya kaydedilmiş, ancak yazıdan sonra dünyanın üç büyük tek tanrılı dininin (Yahudilik, Hıristiyanlık ve

İslam) paylaştığı temel mitlerin birer parçası hâline gelmiştir. Adı geçen dinlerin kutsal metinlerinde, bu özel sayının yoğunlaştığı Doğu Akdeniz'de kültürlerin ve toplumların şekillendirilmesinde uzun süreli sürgünlerin ve zorunlu yerinden edilmelerin ne denli önemli olduğu anlatılmaktadır. Kuşkusuz ilahi metinlerin başında da Yahudilerin Tanah'ı (Ahd-i Atik) gelmektedir. Ahd-i Atik'te medeniyetin gelişmesinde yerinden edilmeyi temel bir nosyon olarak anımsatan mitler ve efsaneler yer alır. Bu geleneğe göre kırgın bir Tanrı, ilk insanlar Adem ile Havva'yı cennetten çıkardı; oğulları Kabil de öz kardeşi Habil'i öldürdükten sonra Aden'in doğusundaki Nod diyarına kaçmak zorunda kaldı (Yaratılış 4: 2-16). Daha sonra Nuh Peygamber, Gılgamış Destanı'nda da dile getirilen, Büyük Tufan (Yaratılış 7: 2-12) sebebiyle mecburen memleketini terkedecekti. İlerleyen süreçte Avram, Kenan'da büyük bir kıtlık yaşandığından kendisi ve ailesi için Mısır'dan sığınma talebinde bulunmak üzere ülkesinden ayrılmak durumunda kaldı (Yaratılış 12: 10). Nesiller sonra Mısır'dan çıkış hikâyesinin ana karakteri Musa Peygamber, "vaat edilmiş toprakları" bulmak amacıyla yanındakilerle birlikte Mısır'dan çıkarak "mülteci" olurken "Garibim bu yabancı diyarda" der (Mısır'dan Çıkış 2: 22). Asırlar geçip de Süleyman Mabedi Babil Kralı Nebukadnezar tarafından yok edildiğinde birçokları "tutsak edilmiş" (Mezmurlar 137: 2-3), "oturup ağladıkları" Babil'e uzun süren bir sürgüne gönderilmiştir. Tüm bu anlatılarda erkek egemen bir yaklaşım görülmekle beraber, Yaratılış Kitabı'nda, Hacer ve oğlu İsmail'in çöle gitmeye itilmelerini nakleden hikâyede bir kadın boyutu da bulunur. Ayrıca benzer bir olay Yeni Ahit'te de görülür; annesi ve babasıyla küçük çocuk İsa, kibirli imparatordan uzaklaşmak için Mısır'a iltica etmek zorunluluğu duyarlar. İslam geleneğinde ise "Hicret" olayı 622 yılında İslam peygamberi Muhammed'in Müslümanlarla birlikte Mekke'den Medine'ye gitmesini anlatmaktadır (Shaikh, 2001). Bu anlatılar, temel mitlerinin kalbinde zorunlu göç ve yerinden edilme konusu bulunan Anadolu'nun, Orta Doğu'nun ve Avrupa'nın kadim geleneklerini yaratmıştır. Böyle bakıldığında, zorunlu yerinden edilmenin Bronz Çağı Mezopotamya'sından günümüz Suriye'sine kadar uzanan geniş tarih dönemleri boyunca makes bulan bir olgu rahatlıkla söylenebilir.

Bu özel sayı kapsamında günümüzdeki yerinden edilmelerin tezahürlerine odaklanıldığından XIX. yüzyıl başlangıç kabul edildi. Zira XIX. yüzyıl, küresel sömürge imparatorluklarının yeni bir yönetim sistemine, Birinci Dünya Savaşı'ndan sonra dünya çapında homojen hâle gelen ekonomik ve politik bir sistem olan ulus-devlete geçtiği dönemdir. Uzak geçmişte savaş, açlık, zulüm veya doğal ya da çevresel felaketler yüzünden yerinden edilmiş çok sayıda insan, modern dünyayı sürekli alt üst etti. Gerçekten de XXI. yüzyılın ilk çeyreği sona ererken göçmenleri, sığınmacıları veya mültecileri görmeden geçirdiğimiz bir gün dahi bulunmamaktadır. Modern nüfus sayımı yöntemleri sayesinde, dünya genelinde yerinden edilmiş nüfusun büyüklüğü bir bakışta daha iyi kavranabilmektedir ki bu sayılar çok yüksek düzeylere varmış durumdadır.

Birleşmiş Milletler Mülteciler Yüksek Komiserliğinin (UNHCR) Zorla Yerinden Edilmeye İlişkin Küresel Eğilimler Raporu'na göre, 2015-2016 arasında çatışma ve zulüm sebebiyle çoğunluğu kadın ve çocuklardan ibaret (International Rescue Committee [IRC],

2014; Sherwood, 2014) 65,3 milyon kişi, bir diğer deyişle her 113 kişiden biri yurdundan edildi (UNHCR, 2015). Aynı raporda Suriye'nin, 2015 yılı sonunda 4,9 milyonluk mülteci sayısı ile dünyanın en büyük mülteci kaynağını oluşturduğu (ve ülke içinde 7,6 milyon yerinden edilmiş kişi) ifade edilmektedir. Suriye'ye en yakın ülke ise 2,7 milyonluk mülteci kaynağıyla Afganistan'dır. Ne yazık ki Suriye'de hâlen devam eden uzun ve kanlı çatışmaların ötesinde soruna ilişkin öngörülebilir bir diplomatik çözümün olmayışı nedeniyle mülteci sayısının günden güne katlanarak artması ise kaçınılmaz bir sonuçtur. Uluslararası Yerinden Edilme İzleme Merkezinin (International Displacement Monitoring Centre [IDMC]) Ülke İçinde Yerinden Edilmelerle İlgili Küresel Raporu'na (Global Report on Internal Displacement [GRID]) göre 2015 yılı Aralık ayında dünya çapında çatışmaya bağlı, ülke içinde yerinden edilmiş kişi sayısı 40,8 milyondur (2016). Ayrıca, Asya'da 22 milyon kişi de doğal afetler neticesinde yerinden olmuştur. Hâlihazırda kendi ülkesinde yerinden edilenlerin sayısı tahminen 55 milyon kadardır ve bunların önemli bir kısmı henüz evine dönebilmiş de değildir. Geri dönenler göz önüne alındığında ortalama yerinden edilme süresi 17,5 yıldır. Uluslararası Kızılhaç ve Kızılay Dernekleri Federasyonu verilerine nazaran dünyada yaklaşık 73 milyon insan göç etmek zorunda kalmıştır (2015). Bu sayıların doğru olduğu kabul edilirse bugün dünyadaki her yüz insandan biri ya kendi ülkesinde yerinden edilmiş ya da uluslararası mülteci durumuna düşmüştür. Mültecilerin ekserisi, genelgeçer algının aksine, kamplarda değil şehirlerde yaşamaktadır. Bu kentsel ortamlarda mülteciler; ev kirası ödemek, çocuklarını okula göndermek, iaşelerini karşılamak gibi hayati ihtiyaçlarından kaynaklanan ekonomik sıkıntılarla karşı karşıyadır.

Sayılar, insan acısının boyutunu hiçbir zaman bütünüyle aktaramaz. Bununla birlikte, ilgili istatistiklere bakmanın zorunlu göçün gitgide daha da karmaşıklaşan bir sorun hâline gelişini anlamada faydası açıktır. Zorunlu göç 1989 yılında Soğuk Savaş'ın sona ermesinin akabinde ağırlaşan bir sorundur (Castels, 2003). Bahsettiğimiz karmaşanın bir örneği olarak Yemen'deki son krizi ele alabiliriz. UNHCR, 31 Ocak 2016'dan itibaren "Yemen'de neredeyse her on kişiden birinin ülke içerisinde yerinden edilmiş olduğunu" (yaklaşık 2,4 milyon kişi) (UNHCR, 2016) bildirmiştir. Yemen, sadece 2016 yılı Şubat ayında 7.705 olmak üzere, bu raporun yayımlandığı tarihte Afrika ve Orta Doğu ülkelerinden özellikle Somali, Etiyopya ve Suriye'den 267.675 mülteciyi kabul etmiştir. Sudan'da da 2011 yılında, 4,9 milyon kişi, yani her on kişiden biri ülke içerisinde yerinden edilmiştir.

Zorunlu göçün geçmişteki ve bugünkü ölçeği göz önüne alındığında, zorunlu göç sorununun sosyal bilimlerde önemli bir tartışma alanı hâline gelmesi; sosyologların, antropologların, coğrafyacıların, ekonomistlerin, siyaset bilimcilerin, psikologların, hukukçuların, tarihçilerin ve nüfus bilimcilerin ilgisini çekmesi; belirtmeye gerek yok ama politika yapıcıların, sanat ve kültürle meşgul olan akademisyenlerin bu konuyla meşgul olmaları şaşırtıcı değildir (O'Reilly, 2016). Beşerî ve sosyal bilimlerde zorunlu göçe dair bilimsel çalışmaların uzun bir geleneği bulunsa da, zorunlu göçün meşru bir araştırma alanı olarak tanımlanmasına yönelik çabalar 1980'lerden sonra gerçekleşmiştir. Ancak alanın sınırlarının ne olduğu konusunda hâlâ bir fikir birliği oluşmamıştır (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh,

Loescher, Long & Sigona, 2014; Triandafyllidou, 2015). Çünkü mülteci araştırmaları ve zorunlu göç çalışmalarına ait konuların karmaşıklığı, akademisyenleri kendi disiplinlerinin sınırlarını aşmaya ve konunun kapsamını kavramayı sağlayacak önemli sonuçlar içeren çeşitli metodolojik araçlar kullanmaya itmektedir. Bu nedenle, bu özel sayı, zorunlu göç tartışmalarında disiplinlerarası ve çok yöntemli perspektif uygularken gittikçe büyüyen bir çalışma alanı hâline gelen, tarihsel ve güncel yerinden edilme olaylarını nasıl ele aldığımıza ve kavramsallaştırdığımıza yönelik eleştirel bir gözle bakmaya katkı sağlayacaktır.

Kavramlar ve Metodolojiler

Bu özel sayı kapsamındaki makalelerin –kuşkusuz ontolojik bir tartışma da barındırıyor– öngördüğü sonuçların politika yapıcılar, sivil toplum kuruluşları ve hükûmetler için öncelikli olacağını kabul etmekle birlikte, asıl odak noktamız *kavramlarla* (ör. mülteci, sığınmacı veya göçmen) ve *metodolojilere* (bu tür kavramları araştırmada nasıl kullandığımız) ilişkin epistemolojik kaygılarımıza yöneliktir.

Zorunlu göç konusunda araştırma yapan kişiler, zamanlarını kavramların ve tanımların anlamlarına yoğunlaştırıyorlar. Örneğin; "Mülteci kimdir?", "Başka bir ülkede kimler sığınma hakkı arayabilir?", "Ülke içinde yerinden edilmiş kişiler 'mülteci' olarak görülmeli midir?" "Eğer öyleyse, hakları neler olacaktır?", "Göçü ne zaman 'zorunlu' veya 'gönüllü' şeklinde sınıflandırabiliriz?", "Gerek akademik çalışma yapanlar gerekse de politika yapıcılar için böyle bir sınıflandırmanın faydaları nelerdir?", "Örneğin, 'gerçek' bir sığınmacı ile 'ekonomik nedenlerle göç eden' birisini ayırt edecek kriterler nelerdir?" ve "Bu farklılaştırmalar ne kadar uygun, ahlaki ya da etiktir?"

Başka bir deyişle *kavramlara* ve *metodolojilere* yönelik ilgimiz, değişik ortamlarda gerçekleştirilmiş karma model içeren araştırmalardan tutun da psikolojik travma ve bununla başa çıkma araştırmalarını, arşiv çalışmasını, eski ve yeni mevzuat analizlerini, mültecilere ve sığınmacılara yönelik etnografik vaka incelemelerini kapsayan bir çerçevede yapılmış araştırmaların sonuçlarını tartışırken bütüncül bir perspektif de sunmaya matuftur. Ayrıca, Doğu Akdeniz Bölgesi'nde zorunlu göçün tarihî mirasını, çağdaş mültecilerin deneyimlerini, zorunlu yerinden edilmeyi besleyen politik bağlamı ve arka planı, yerinden edilmenin göçmenler ve mülteciler üzerindeki psikolojik etkilerini ve hukukun yerinden edilme koşullarını nasıl yorumlayacağını ve ahlaki sorumluluk hususunu gündeme dâhil ediyoruz. Katkıda bulunan yazarlar, aynı zamanda yılmazlık ve din meselelerini, toprak reformu ve bunun halk açısından durumunu yerinden edilmiş kişilerle çalışan akıl sağlığı uzmanlarının karşılaştıkları güçlükleri, geriye göç veya kalıcı yerleşim imkânını ve göç politikaları ile politik söylemler arasındaki farkları da ele alıyorlar. Bir kısım yazar ise sınırların dayattığı fiziksel ve zihinsel engellere, dünden bugüne ulaşan tarihsel sürekliliğe, yerinden edilmeyi yaşayan ve yaşatanların yerinden edilme anlatılarını kıyaslamakla açığa çıkardıkları aykırılıklara odaklanmayı tercih etmiştir.

Bir bütün hâlinde görüldüğünde, bu özel sayıyı hazırlamamızın iki boyutu vardır. Öncelikle, zorunlu göç araştırmalarının sunduğu pratik, etik ve epistemolojik zorlukları

ve fırsatları daha iyi anlamaya çalışmaktır. Zorunlu göç alanı kendisini etkileyen akışkan sosyal, kültürel, ekonomik ve siyasi bağlamları kapsayan uzun süreçleri içine alan zaman aralığı düşünüldüğünde güçlüklerle doludur. Birincisi kadar önemli olan diğer boyut ise, yeni araştırma bulgularını ortaya çıkaracak ontolojik soruları vurgulayacak disiplinlerarası bir platform sunmaktır. Her bir yazardan bu iki boyutu akılda tutarak göçmenleri ve mültecileri içeren tarihsel ve çağdaş olaylara nasıl yaklaşacağımızı, bunları nasıl kavramlaştıracağımızı ve çalışacağımızı düşünmelerini; bu doğrultu da hepsinden şu soruları yanıtlamaları istedik: 1) "Bağlam ile araştırma sonucu arasındaki ilişki nedir?" 2) "Metodoloji, deneyim ve uygulama arasında, yani mevcut metotlarımız ile zorunlu göçe ilişkin gerçekler arasında bir boşluk/mesafe var mıdır?" 3) "Metodolojilerimiz, Doğu Akdeniz Bölgesi'nde zorla yerinden edilmeye yol açan karmaşık politik, tarihsel, kültürel, ekonomik ve sosyal boyutları nasıl değerlendirecek, bunlarla nasıl bir etkileşim içinde olacak ve bunları nasıl dikkate alacaktır?"

Belki de kavramların nasıl ve nereden neşet ettiğini, araştırma yöntemlerinin gördüğümüz şeyden anladığımızla ilişkisini ve onu nasıl etkilediğini sorgulamamız, sorunların nereden kaynaklandığı yanında bunları şimdi ve gelecekte nasıl önlenebileceği meselesi için de bir yarar sağlar. Zorunlu göç araştırmalarında bir disipline odaklanma eğilimi bulunması, bu nedenle de disiplinler arasında mukayeseye imkân verecek örnek olay incelemelerinin yapılmayışı noktasında bizim katkımızın değerli olduğuna inanıyoruz (metodoloji sorunuyla ve zorunlu göçle ilgili diğer araştırmalar için bk. Chatty, 2007; Crisp, 1999; Crush & Williams, 2001; Harrell-Bond & Voutira, 2003; Jocabsen & Landau, 2003; Lammers, 2003; Macchiavello, 2003; MacKenzie, McDowell & Pittaway, 2007; McMichael, Nunn, Gilford & Correa-Velez, 2015).

Bizim görüşümüze göre; kavramlar ve metodolojiler hakkında yürütülecek bir tartışma, her ne kadar bunlar politika yapma sürecinde gerekli ve doğrudan uygulanabilir görülmeseler de, akademik bakımdan dikkat çekmelidir. Kuşkusuz, zorunlu göç çalışmalarında "politikayla *ilgili*" ve "politikayla *ilgisiz*" araştırma şeklinde algılanan bir ayrışma vardır. Umarız özgün biçimleriyle bu özel sayıdaki katkılar mevzubahis ikilemi dönüştürecek –en kötü problematik hâle getirecek– nüanslara ve bağlamsallaştırmaya ışık tutar. Zorunlu göç araştırmalarına ait kavramların ve bunların uygulanmalarının, geçerliliği kendinden gelen bir araştırma odağı olduğunu ileri sürüyoruz. Bunun nedeni hem politika yapıcılar, siyasetçiler, akademisyenler ve yasa yorumlayıcılar vasfıyla bizlerin kullandığı kuramsal kavramların hem de sahada bu kavramlarla çalışmanın ve bu kavramları uygulamanın çoğu zaman yerinden edilmiş insanların hayatlarında önemli pratik sonuçları olmasıdır. Zorunlu göç konusuna yönelen/eğilen akademisyenlerin, genellikle ahlaki ya da etik bir sorumluluk taşımamaları gerektiği kanısıyla araştırmacıların adaletsizlik olduğuna inandıkları kırılgan koşullardaki insanlar üzerinde güçlü amillerin yol açtığı durumlarda bile vazife bilinciyle duyarlılık göstermeden araştırma yapmaları beklenir. İşbu önerme doğrultusunda, çoğu zaman kuram ile pratik arasındaki çelişkili ilişkiden kaynaklanan güçlüklere muhataplıkları ve politik formasyonu etkileyebilecek ve ölçülebilecek çalışmalar yürütmelerinden doğan ağır sorumlulukları hasebiyle akademisyenler üzerinde büyüyen baskıyı da özellikle nazarı dikkate almak icap etmektedir.

Doğu Akdeniz Havzası

Bu özel sayının başlığından da açıkça anlaşılacağı üzere, bu metinleri bir araya getirirken zorunlu göç konusunda artan akademik üretime destek vermenin yanı sıra dünyanın yerinden edilmeyle özdeş hâle gelmiş olan bir bölgesine yani Doğu Akdeniz'e odaklanan, çok disiplinli bir sayı oluşturmak hedeflendi. Bu sayıda makalesi yer alan katılımcıların çoğunluğu -Birleşmiş Milletler Mülteciler Yüksek Komiserliği eski sekreteri, şimdi ise BM Genel Sekreteri olan Antonio Guterres tarafından "[UNHCR olarak] bizim şimdiye kadar karşılaştığımız en dramatik insani kriz" diye nitelendirilen- Suriye kriziyle ilgili yazmakla beraber (Chulov, 2013) bu antoloji zorunlu göçe daha genel bir kapsamdan bakmaktadır. Bu antoloji, özellikle geniş Doğu Akdeniz havzasında yaşayan nüfusun tarihsel ve mevcut durumunu ele alan araştırma bulgularını betimleyerek ve tartışarak coğrafi bir yaklaşım benimsemektedir. Bu yaklaşım ulusal, etnik, kültürel, dinî ve siyasi sınırların ötesine geçen ortak ve tarihsel olarak tekrarlanan kaygılar sebebiyle önemlidir.

Bununla birlikte, zorunlu göç olgusunun tarihsel açıdan özellikle XXI. yüzyılda yaygın doğası dikkate alındığında, neden Doğu Akdeniz'e odaklanmaya karar verdiğimizin gerekçesini sunmamız lazımdır. XIX. yüzyıldan itibaren bu bölge çeşitli göç akımları (dışa göç ve içe göç) yaşamıştır. Bu göç süreçleri, hem göç edenler (çoğunlukla mülteciler) hem de onlara ev sahipliği yapan toplumlar bakımından çok yönlü tesirleri içermektedir. Tabiatıyla söz konusu göç hareketlerinin sonuçları, kültürel ürünlerde ve hatıralarda olduğu kadar ev sahibi ülkenin sosyal bağlamında açıkça görülmektedir. Nitekim aynı bölgede, tarihsel suçların halledilmeden bırakıldığını ve ilerleyen dönemlerde benzer veya yeni biçimler ve farklı boyutlara sahip sonuçlarla tekrardan ortaya çıktığı müşahede edilmektedir. Oysaki gerçekçi ve pragmatik çözümler, daha kalıcı bir nitelik gerektirme eğilimindedir. Geçmişin anlaşılması ise, zorunlu göç akımlarının kendilerini nasıl güçlendirdiklerine dair bir rehber sunar. Esas itibarıyla bölgedeki mülteci trafiği, Birleşmiş Milletler gibi kuruluşlar ve ülkeler arasındaki uluslararası ilişkileri (Betts & Loescher, 2011) etkilemek yerine Akdeniz, Avrupa ve Kafkasya'nın yakın bölgelerini etkilemiştir.

Ne yazık ki Doğu Akdeniz, bölgede derin istikrarsızlığa neden olup milyonlarca kişinin yerinden edilmesine yol açan uzun süreli çatışmalara yol açıyor. Arşiv belgelerine dayalı bazı vakalardan bahsetmek gerekirse örneğin zamanında Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun (1915) bugünse Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin yer aldığı bölgede Ermeniler, Asuriler ve diğer Hristiyan azınlıkların yaşadığı köyler ve kentsel yerleşim yerleri tahrip edilmiş, bunların pek azının hayatta kaldığı katliamlar yaşanmıştır. Yine 1923'te Yunanistan ve Türkiye arasında bir "nüfus mübadelesi" yapılmıştır. Bölge ayrıca, İkinci Dünya Savaşı sonrasında bölgenin mandater Fransız ve İngiliz devletleri tarafından bölünmesi ve devam eden süreçte modern İsrail devletinin kurulmasıyla (1948'den bu yana süregelen sorunun ana evresi 1964 ile 1993 arasında yaşanmıştır) alevlenen İsrail-Filistin toprak anlaşmazlığına şahit oldu. Lübnan İç Savaşı (1975-1990) ile 1983'ten beridir devam eden Türkiye Cumhuriyeti ile PKK arasındaki savaş görüldü. Irak güçlerinin Kuveyt'i işgaliyle başlayan Körfez Savaşı (1990-1991) ve bağlamında İngiltere ve diğer Avrupa ülkeleri ile Amerikan birliklerinin

bölgede konuşlanması, sürecin vuku bulduğu ülkelerin halklarınca hâlâ hissedilen yıkım ve yerinden edilmişlik mirası bıraktı, geride. Akabinde Afganistan İç Savaşları (1996-2001)[3] ve New York'taki 11 Eylül saldırılarından sonra Amerika Birleşik Devletleri'nin misilleme iddiasıyla gerçekleştirdiği Irak'ı (2003-2014) ve Afganistan'ı (2001-2014) istilası yaşandı. Aynı dönemde, bölgedeki siyasetin niteliğini geçici olarak değiştiren Arap Baharı'na ve birçok Kuzey Afrika rejiminin çöküşüne tanıklık edildi. Her ne kadar tehdit altındaki hükûmetlerin aşırı şiddet içeren tepkileri arasında popüler isyanlar hızla dağılsalar da, daha sonraki baskılar daha fazla mülteci yarattı. Son olarak bölge, 2011'den beri devam eden ve son derece yıkıcı sonuçları bulunan Suriye Savaşı'ndan mustariptir. Damgalanan ve "yük" gibi görülen Suriyeliler, Iraklılar, Afganistanlılar, Lübnanlılar, Ürdünlüler, Ermeniler, Süryaniler, Yezidiler, Sabiiler, Filistinliler, Yemenliler, Somalililer, Eritreliler, Sudanlılar ve diğer birçok halk, zorunlu göçün baskısının altında kalmalarının ötesine geçen ağırlıklarla da ezildiler. Zira bu mültecilerin insan hakları ihlal edildi, çoğu zaman arazileri ellerinden alındı ve başka bir ülkenin vatandaşlığına kabul edilmediler. Böylece Doğu Akdeniz, XXI. yüzyılda zorla yerinden edilme ile eş anlamlı hâle geldi.

Bölgedeki zorunlu göçün dinamik ve karmaşık doğasına yönelik olarak hazırlanan bu özel sayıda yer bulan anlayışların, yaşanan insani acının boyutuna duyarlı politikalar üretmeye çalışan karar vericilere yarar sağlayacağını umuyoruz. Bu umuda binaen ve özellikle, ulusal ve uluslararası hukukun belli boyutlarına karşı geliştirdiğimiz itirazın yanında antropologların mekânı ve kültürü anlama biçimleriyle belirlediğimiz telakkiye dayanarak yerinden edilmenin sadece psikolojik etkilerini değil aynı zamanda ilgili anlatıları da dikkate alan yöntemler sayesinde insanların özlemlerinin, motivasyonlarının ve başa çıkma mekanizmalarının doğru kavranabileceğine ve bunun çözüm noktasında çok büyük katkı sağlayacağına dair bir farkındalık oluşturmak istiyoruz. Ayrıca, bu sayıda yer verilen makalelerin yalnızca politikaların oluşturulması, korunması ve yeniden üretilmesiyle kendini kısıtlamayıp bunların yerinden edilmiş nüfus üzerindeki etkileriyle de ilgilenen öğrenciler ve alandaki köklü akademisyenlerin çalışmalarına yardım edeceğine inanıyoruz. Nihayet çalışma etiği ve ahlakı içinde zorunlu göç mağdurları hakkındaki çabalarını adalet meselesine odaklayan tartışmalara ilham vermeyi de amaçlıyoruz.

Bu sayıdaki tüm metinler kamu yönetimi ve politika incelemelerinden, tarihî mirasa yönelik araştırmalardan, etnografiden, psikososyal yaklaşımlardan, ulusal ve uluslararası kanunlar nazarından zorunlu göçün hukuki yönlerine ilişkin görüşlere kadar uzanan geniş bir yelpaze içerisinde konumlandırılmıştır.

Şimdi, özel sayıdaki bölümlerin kapsamında yer alan katkıların her birini burada kısaca sunacağım.

3 Sovyetlerin geri çekilmesi bir başlangıç noktası olarak alınırsa Afgan İç Savaşlarının 1979 veya 1992'de başladığı da iddia edilir.

Bölüm I: Antropolojik Yaklaşım

Dawn Chatty'nin makalesi, Suriyeli mültecilerin ve Ürdün, Lübnan ile Türkiye'deki mülteci kamplarının mevcut durumunu değerlendiriyor. Çalışma, Suriyeli mültecilerin, insani yardım uygulayıcılarının ve ev sahibi toplulukların farklı algılarını ve taleplerini niteliksel bir araştırma ile inceliyor. Makalede, koşullar izin verdiği takdirde, çatışma sonrası Suriye toplumunun yeniden bütünleşmesine ve biçimlenmesine katkıda bulunabilecek, ev sahibi topluluklara ilişkin toplumsal faktörler de ele alınmaktadır. Chatty'nin keşif çalışmasının iki amacı vardır: Birincisi, "sürgünde koruma" konusundaki görüş birliğinin kültürel açıdan hassas bir şekilde ifade edip edemeyeceğini araştırmaktır; zira bu da mutlaka kamp alanında çalışma yapmayı gerektirmiyor. İkincisi ise, Suriye ayaklanması çözüldükten sonra ev sahibi topluluktaki kökleşmiş "ortak yaşama girişimlerinin" iyileştirilmiş geri dönüş mekanizmalarını nasıl kolaylaştırabileceğini araştırmaktır.

Annika Rabo, derinlemesine görüşmeye dayalı çalışmasında Suriye'nin Rakka bölgesindeki zorunlu göç hareketlerinin geçmişini ve bugününü konu ediniyor. DEAŞ'ın toprak iddialarının merkezinde yer alan Rakka, Asur ve Babil medeniyetlerinin ve Arap-İslam döneminin doruk noktasına uzandığı eski insan yerleşimlerinin kalıntıları üzerine kurulmuştur. Nüfus burada yüzyıllar boyunca, gönüllü veya zorunlu göç hareketliliği arasında mütemadiyen azalıp yeniden düzenlenmiştir. Rabo'ya göre, Rakka eyaleti de dâhil olmak üzere, insanlar hemen her yerde göç konusunda ve bütün arka plandan gelen insanları etkileyen insan hareketliliği hakkında görüşlerini serdediyor. İnsanların zorunlu veya gönüllü tarihsel mobilite anlatıları ise, ortak hafızayı ve aynı köke ait olma anlatılarını yapılandırır. Rabo bu çerçevede şu soruyu soruyor: Yıllar süren yoğun ve acımasız çatışmalar bittiğinde Rakka bölgesindeki insanlar için nasıl bir/hangi gelecekten söz edilebilir? Rabo, bu soruyu cevaplamaya çalışırken Rakka bölgesinin tarihinde, istikbalde bir arada yaşama tecrübesini destekleyecek uzlaştırıcı süreçleri geliştirecek bir "materyal" olup olmadığını araştırmakla son birkaç yüzyıldır bölgesel hareket tarihini ve gerçekleşen yerleşimlerin altını çiziyor. Rabo'nun vurguladığı bu ilk boyut, şüphesiz, başa çıkma, yılmazlık ve hafıza inşası üzerindeki tartışmalar için önemli bir zemine işaret ediyor.

Son olarak Şam'daki Yermuk Kampı'nda ve Şam'ın 20 kilometre güneyindeki Han Eshieh Kampı'nda doğup büyüyen insanlarla sözlü tarih kayıtlarına dayalı bir çalışma yürüten Mette Lundsfryd, 2012-2014 yılları arasında Suriye'den Lübnan'a kaçan Filistinlilerin sınır geçme deneyimlerine odaklanmıştır. Çalışması, öznelerarası yazarlık yoluyla zorunlu yerinden edilmiş üç neslin öznel hafızayı nasıl etkilediğini ve 67 yıldır devam eden bir "felaketin" nasıl yansıdığını gösteriyor. Bir sözlü tarih yaklaşımı uygulayan Lundsfryd, Suriye coğrafyasının güvenli bölgeye erişimin her daim nadir ya da reddedilen bir durum olduğu "kontrol noktaları dünyası" dediği sınırlar ağı hâline geldiğini belirtiyor. Lundsfryd'in çalışması, geleneksel sınır kavramlarını tartışıp üzerine yeniden düşünmemizi ve kişisel Suriye'den kaçma hatıralarının kolektif kökünü kazıma, yerinden etme ve yılmazlık anılarını birbirine bağladığını bilmemizi sağlıyor.

Bölüm II: Tarihsel Yaklaşım

Ella Fratantuono makalesinde bir başka önemli soruya cevap arıyor: Göçmenler, örneğin, devlet merkezli çözümler için ne zaman elverişli bir toplumsal mesele kabul edilirler? Bu doğrultuda öne çıkan tecrübe; XIX. yüzyılın ikinci yarısında bir yanda Kuzey Kafkasya ve Kırım'da Rus İmparatorluğu'ndan kaçan, diğer yanda Balkanlarda milliyetçi mücadeleler yüzünden yerinden edilen milyonlarca Müslüman'ın Osmanlı topraklarına göç etmesiyle yaşanmıştır. Bilindiği gibi XIX. yüzyılın ortalarında Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'na akan mülteciler, ne devletin başka yerlerden kaçan büyük gruplarla ilk karşılaşmasıdır ne de devletin güvenlik icraatlarına olanak tanıyan ilk "nüfus politikası" girişimidir. Ancak 5 Ocak 1860'ta Muhacirin Komisyonu kuruluncaya kadar göçmen idaresi için bağımsız bir kurum da mevcut değildir. Peki, XIX. yüzyıl mültecileri bir "çözüme" esas olacak bir "sorun" niteliğine nasıl sahip oldular? Fratantuono'nun makalesi, göçmen yerleşimiyle ilgili devlet stratejilerini ve ideallerini değerlendirmek üzere Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'ndaki göçmen idaresinin tarihini ele alıyor. Bu arka planın oluşturulması, mülteciler ile devlet arasındaki ilişkiyi anlamamıza katkı sağlayacaktır. Bunu da devlet görevlilerinin belirtikleri şekliyle Osmanlı kurumunun eksikliklerini, yeni gelenler ile devlet görevlileri arasındaki müzakerelerin şartlarını koyan göç rejimlerini incelemek yoluyla yapacaktır.

Matthew Goldman ise makalesinde, 1858 yılında Osmanlı İmparatorluğu tarafından başlatılan ilk büyük tapu kadastro modernizasyonu projesinden, Dünya Bankası tarafından finanse edilmiş ve son dönemde tamamlanmış tapu kadastro modernizasyonu projesine (2008-2013) değin geçen süre içerisindeki arazi mülkiyeti güvensizliğinin zorunlu göç üzerindeki etkisini ve Güneydoğu Anadolu'daki geri dönüş imkânlarını inceliyor. Goldman Türk basınından derlediği birtakım haberlerle arazi mülkiyet haklarının yönetilmesine ilişkin bu son girişimlerin, "eski sorun" engeline takıldığını gösteriyor. Arazi uzlaşmazlıklarını çözümsüz bırakmak, Türkiye ve müttefik unsurları ile PKK gibi silahlı gruplar arasındaki çatışmanın şiddetlenmesine yarıyor. Çatışmalar sebebiyle yerinden edilmiş olup geri dönmeye teşebbüs edenler, yeni yerleşimcilerin kendilerine ait eski topraklarda hak iddia etmeleri ve genelde de devletten bunun yasal iznini edinmeleriyle karşılaşmakta ve arazi anlaşmazlıklarının çözümü için hukuk sistemine başvurmak yerine çoğunlukla şiddet kullanmayı tercih etmektedirler. Bugün pamuk ipliğine bağlı bir barışın veya kontrollü şiddetin olduğu düşünüldüğünde bölgede çatışmayı körükleyecek parlama noktaları yaratmanın ne kadar riskli olacağı da aşikârdır. Goldman, mevcut tapu kadastro sürecini iyileştirmek, toplumsal barışı ve yerinden edilmiş kişilerin haklarını korumaya matuf bir dizi genel öneriyle makalesini sonlandırmaktadır.

Bölüm III: Hukuk, Politika ve Politik Yaklaşımlar

Umut Korkut, makalesinde kapalı bir mülteci kabul düzeninden seçici açık bir mülteci kabul düzenine evrilme süreci doğrultusunda Suriye mülteci krizinin Türkiye'nin sığınma rejiminin yönetimini ve gelişimini nasıl etkilediğini inceliyor. Korkut'un makalesi, Türkiye mülteci kabul düzeninin kapalı bir sistemden seçici açık bir sisteme dönüşmesinin resmî kurumlar tarafından değil de, mülteci krizi ile ilgilenen kamu görevlilerince

yaygın şekilde paylaşılan söylemlere ve düşünce örüntülerine dayalı olduğu ile başlıyor. Müteakiben makale, Türk hükûmetinin Suriyelilere kıyasla diğer mülteci gruplarına nasıl davrandığını ve Türklerin mültecilere yaptığı insani yardımlarının mültecinin hangi milletten olmasına göre nasıl kapsamlı ve cömert olabildiğini analiz ediyor. Korkut makalesinin odağına 2011'den beri devam eden Suriye'deki iç savaşın yol açtığı ve sürecin tamamına damgasını vuran Suriye mülteci krizini almakla birlikte, Türk hükûmetinin Suriyeli mültecilere nispetle diğer zorunlu göç unsurlarına/mağdurlarına karşı aldığı insani duruşun kapsamını da ayrıntılarıyla anlatıyor. Bu çerçevede Suriyelilerin alımını, Suriye krizinden önce gelen ve bu kriz esnasında Türkiye'de bulunan diğer mülteci gruplarla ve IŞİD'in bölgedeki saldırıları yüzünden 2014 yılının yaz ve güz dönemlerinde göç edenlerle de kıyaslıyor. Korkut, söz konusu grupların kabul edilmesindeki çeşitliliği detaylandırırken ülkede sayıları kabaran Suriyeli sığınmacılara yönelik hükûmetin ve kamuoyunun tutumları arasındaki tutarsızlığın altını da ustalıkla çiziyor.

Lena Karamanidou, kolektif göç deneyimlerini uyaran bir alanı, siyasi söylem alanını, özellikle de Yununistan'da yasamaya ilişkin parlamento tartışmalarını söylem analizi yöntemiyle masaya yatırıyor. Göç ve sığınma hakkındaki sekiz farklı yasayla ilgili parlamentoda yapılan yirmi tartışmayı eleştirel söylem analiziyle ele alarak siyasi aktörlerin sığınma ve göç politikalarını meşrulaştırmak veya gayrimeşrulaştırmak kasdıyla ülke içine göç ve/veya zorunlu göç deneyimini nasıl kullandıklarını inceliyor. Nihayetinde Karamanidou, tıpkı İrlandalıların göç söylemlerinde geçen benzer göç deneyimlerinin analizinde gösterildiği gibi kolektif göç deneyimlerine atıfta bulunmanın sadece daha geniş bir hoşgörü veya kapsayıcılık iddiasında bulunmak için değil aynı zamanda daha büyük bir dışlama ve "bizi" yani ev sahibi toplumu olumlu anlamda resmetmek için de kullanıldığını gösteriyor.

Georgiana Turculet, makalesinde, Suriye krizi kapsamında devletlerin mültecileri geldikleri bölge dâhilinde tutmak amacıyla aldıkları önlemlerin, "tasarlanmış bölgecilik" olgusunun tipik bir örneği olduğunu ileri sürmektedir. Turculet'in görüşüne göre *bütün bu* önlemler, mültecilerin yaşamları üzerinde doğrudan, kendi vatandaşları üzerinde ise dolaylı yoldan olumsuz etkilere sahiptir. Turculet'in normatif analizinin sonucunda, insani krizle uğraşan devletlerin mültecilerin çıkarlarına aykırı icraatlarıyla aslında (potansiyel olarak) kendi vatandaşlarının aleyhine davrandıklarına ikna edilmelerinin gerektiği görünürlük kazanıyor. Zira bu tür politikalar genelde "mülteci krizinin" geçici olduğunu kabul eden ve bu süreci yanlış yönlendiren bir varsayımı izlemektedir. Nitekim çalışmada, kısa vadeli politik hedeflere ve bu bağlamdaki politikalara öncelik veren devletlerin "mülteci konusunu" krizin büyüklüğüne uygun ve *gerçekçi* bir şekilde değerlendirmekten uzak olmalarının muhtemelen bu süreci daha da *bozucu* bir işlev göreceği uyarısı da yapılıyor.

Bu bölümde son olarak Hannibal Travis, zorunlu göç meselesini hukuksal açıdan ele alıyor. Bu kapsamda 1915 Dönemi'nin Ermeni ve Süryanilerini, 1930'lu, 1980'li ve 1990'lı yılların Kürt ve Süryanilerini, 1974-2014 arası sürecin de Kuzey Kıbrıs'taki Süryani ve Yezidilerini karşılaştırıyor. Travis'in makalesi, savaş zamanlarının soykırımcı

niyet uygulamalarına yönelik hukuki yaklaşımı ve ulusal güvenliğe yönelik diğer tehditleri irdelemektedir. Bu çerçevede çalışmasında ceza mahkemelerinin katliam, tecavüz, zorla sürgün, bölge bombardımanı ve mülkten yoksun bırakmaya ait kanıtları inceleyerek soykırımcı niyeti nasıl analiz ettiklerini tartışır. Gerçekten de BM Güvenlik Konseyi, 1993 yılında Bosna'daki, 1999 yılında Kosova'daki mezalimleri görüşürken Yugoslav yöneticilerin ulusal güvenlik esaslı savunularıyla karşı karşıya kaldığında sık sık Müslüman mültecilerin Yugoslav saldırılarından kaçmalarına atıf yaparak uluslararası mahkemelerin soykırım kovuşturmalarına referans vermiştir.

BM Genel Kurulu, Yugoslavya'nın protestolarına rağmen Bosna'daki etnik temizliği soykırım kabul edip şiddetle kınayarak mültecilerin dramını vurgulamıştır. Bu kapsamda bilimsel çalışmalar, soykırımcı niyet ve kontrgerilla harekâtı ya da diğer savunmacı çatışmaları birbirleri ile zorunlu olarak bağdaşmayan unsurlar şeklinde görmezler. Hannibal, çalışmasını, 1993 yılındaki Bosnalı mültecilerin dramını ve Bosnalı Sırpların ve Yugoslav kuvvetlerinin o yıl soykırımdan dolayı kınanmalarını, 2014 yılında IŞİD'in yol açtığı Süryani ve Yezidi mülteci dramı ile mukayese ederek sonuçlandırır.

Bölüm IV: Psikolojik Yaklaşım

Önver A. Cetrez ile Valerie DeMarinis, ortak makalelerinde, zorunlu göçün psikolojik boyutunun yanında Türkiye'deki Hıristiyan Suriyeli mültecilere yönelik çalışırken somut olarak karşılaştıkları kırılgan nüfus içerisinde araştırma yapmanın etik sorunlarını eylem araştırmasıyla ele alıyorlar. Çalışmalarının odağında İstanbul'daki Qnushyo Faaliyet Merkezine devam eden mülteciler yer almaktadır. Bu merkez araştırmacıların, önemli figürlerin ve mültecilerin destekleriyle geliştirilen güvenli bir cennettir.

Çalışmalarında mülteciler, savaştan ve çatışmadan uzak güvenli bir cennete ulaşma çabasındaki kırılgan figürler şeklinde sunulmaktadırlar. Örneğin, vatanları ile zorunlu olarak göçenlerin pek çok sağlık sorunu yaşamalarına yol açan yerleştikleri yerdeki hayalî vatanları arasında, tabiri caizse gitgide ağırlaşan bir belirsizliğe atfen arafta sıkışıp kalmış bir hâlde bulunuyorlar. Suriye'de hâlen devam eden uzun savaş ve Türkiye'deki Suriyelilerin sınırdaki süreğen durumları onların zihinsel ve bedensel sağlığını tehlikeye atmakta; özellikle fiziksel acıyı, algılanan düşük ruh sağlığını ve düşük benlik saygısını kötüleştirmektedir. Bununla birlikte çalışmada, çoğu mültecinin içinde yaşadığı zorlu koşullara rağmen yüksek bir yılmazlık düzeyi sergilediği; ailesini, topluluğunu ve kültürünü yaşamsal anlam kaynaklarına dönüştürerek sağlığa eriştiren bir yol oluşturmaya uğraştığı da vurgulanmaktadır. Sonuçları itibarıyla muhatap kalınan zorluklarla başa çıkmak için sıklıkla kullanılan farklı stratejilerin, yani dinin veya diğer anlam veren sistemlerin, aynı inancı ve/veya umudu paylaşan benzer durumdaki diğer kişilerle bir toplumsallık bilinci oluşturmada da işlev göstereceği açıktır.

J. Eduardo Chemin, makalesinde "korku faktörü" dediği hususu ve bunun, araştırma verilerinin analizini ve uygulanmasını nasıl etkilediğini anlatıyor. Chemin, makalesinde

Türkiye'deki Suriyeli mültecilere yönelik yaptığı çok disiplinli çalışmasının bulgularını paylaşmaktadır. Bu çalışma özellikle Doğu Akdeniz'deki Suriyeliler için önemli iki büyük yerleşim yeri olan Mersin'de ve Adana'da yaşayan mültecileri konu almaktadır. Chemin'in asıl amacı, yerinden edilmiş kişilerin göçe zorlanma travması ile nasıl başa çıktıklarını ve bu yoldaki tecrübelerini; yılmazlık duygusunu nasıl geliştirdiklerini, dinin başa çıkma stratejileri geliştirmede nasıl bir rolü olduğunu ortaya çıkarmaktır. Chemin, zorunlu göçe dair gerçekleştirdiği araştırma esnasında, veri toplamanın gerçekleştiği bağlamla ilişik birçok güçlükle karşılaştığından zorunlu göçün ontolojisine odaklanmanın ötesine geçip (araştırma bulguları) epistemolojik yönüne ağırlık vermeye (bu örnekte metodolojik güçlükler) mecbur kalmıştır. Dolayısıyla da "hiper uçucu" ya da istikrarsız politik bağlamlar kapsamında böylesi araştırmalar yürütmeye ilişkin risk ve etik durumları içeren zorunlu göç analizleri de çalışmaya dâhil edilmiştir.

Son makalede ise, Akar Tamer Aker ile Esra Işık, Türkiye'de zorunlu yerinden edilme konusundaki araştırmalarla ilgili metodolojik güçlükleri tartışmaktadır. Adı geçen yazarlar, son yirmi yılda Türkiye'de psikolojik sağlık alanında çalışan uzmanların, yerinden edilme ve göç çalışmalarına dair iki önemli metodolojik güçlükle karşılaştığını iddia etmektedir. Bu güçlüklerin ilki kendi ülkesinde yerinden edilen Kürtlerle, ikincisi ise Türkiye'ye yönelen Suriyeli mülteci hareketiyle ilgilidir. Her iki olgunun da kendine özgü özellikleri vardır ve bunlar araştırma ve müdahale noktasında farklı güçlükler içermektedir. Aker ve Işık, çalışmalarında zorunlu yerinden edilmenin sadece politik, hukuki ve sosyoekonomik sonuçları olmadığını, bunların yanında yerinden edilmiş kişilerin bedensel ve psikolojik sağlıkları üzerinde olumsuz etkileri bulunduğunu da dile getirmektedir.

J. Eduardo Chemin
Sayı Editörü

ISSN 2149-4398 • **eISSN** 2458-8962
DOI 10.12738/mejrs.2017.2.1.0101 • Winter 2017 • 2(1)

Editorial

Past and Present Amongst Refugees in the Eastern Mediterranean: Conceptual and Methodological Challenges in the Study of Forced Migration

The Age of the Exile?

If we were to describe the times in which we live in a single sentence, how would we phrase it? For Vladimiro Ariel Dorfman, the eminent Argentinian-Chilean-American professor of literature and human rights activist, that sentence would be: "We live in the age of the refugee, the age of the exile." Indeed, any person reading the news today would find it difficult to dispute Dorfman's claim. It is certainly true that in our time, a large number of people migrate, not because they want to, but because they are forced to do so. Uprooted by poverty, wars, and repression, they risk their lives to escape destitution and persecution. Many end up in refugee camps or in the slums of sprawling cities. Some lucky few will find a better life in an affluent country. All, in their different ways, are at the mercy of economic and political forces beyond their control. As we approach the second decade of the twenty-first century, gruesome images of drowned adults and children washed away onto European shores have become common front-pagers in newspapers and television channels. The inability, and often unwillingness, of governments both in Europe and elsewhere to respond to the "refugee crisis" in a humane manner is not only obvious, but also disheartening. Hence, the need to find sustainable, long-term solutions to forced migration has never been more urgent.

The phenomenon of forced migration is a broad problem with many dimensions. Forced migration can be described as "internal" when it displaces people within national borders, or "external" when forcing people out of their own country.[1] Forced migration may be the result of natural disasters, such as floods, droughts, or hurricanes that are intensified by the effects of climate-change. It can also occur because of geophysical phenomena,

1 Researchers generally tend to use the term IDPs (internally displaced people) when displaced people have not crossed a national border and "refugee" or "asylum seeker" if they cross an international border.

such as earthquakes, tsunamis, or volcanic activity, or by biological factors, such as pandemics of such incurable diseases as Ebola. Yet, forced migration often has man-made causes, such as political instability, social and economic inequality, civil wars, and military interventions sprouting not only from contentions over natural resources, but also from differences between minorities and majorities as well as opposing views concerning territory or ideology (including religious and national). The recent case between Kurds and Assyrians in Iraq or Kurds and Yazidi being a good example of such disputes.

Still, the distinctions between voluntary and involuntary migration as well as between migration for economic reasons and forced displacement linked to political persecution or armed conflict are blurred and often controversial (Schuster, 2015; Yarris & Castañeda, 2015). This is because contemporary migration flows entail economic and socio-political inequalities, both of which contribute to migration's causality, and among all types of cross-border movements, "forced migration" is surely the most unsettling. For these reasons, while acknowledging that man-made causes may also refer to man's indirectly and partially producing conditions for displacement, in this issue, we isolate the scope of inquiry to a narrower range of causes (hereafter, man-made direct causes), such as war and conflict.

There are many definitions of forced migration. For example, Bartram, Poros, and Monforte (2014) define it as a type of movement that "results from some sort of compulsion or threat to well-being or survival, emerging in conditions ranging from violent conflict to severe economic hardship" (p. 69). However, when conceptualizing forced migration, the difficulty is in determining what counts as *compulsion*. Many migration scholars no longer believe that a conventional dichotomy between economic migrants and refugees, for example, is cogent or persuasive (Bartram et al., 2014).

At the center of the issue of forced migration is the character we call the "refugee." In its broadest connotation, the term "refugee" refers to "individuals who have left their country in the belief that they cannot or should not return to it in the near future, although they might hope to do so if conditions permit" (Thielemann, 2006, p. 4). Most such definitions rely on the legal definition of refugees[2] as written in the 1951 United Nations multilateral treaty Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (Article 1, section A, paragraph 2: 14), which defines a refugee as someone who

> ...owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it (UNHCR, n.d).

2 An extended version of the 1951 definition was proposed during the 1984 Cartagena Convention (see UNHCR, 2013).

Definitions are important; however, there are some considerations that must be made clear from the beginning and that will set the tone that resonates with the papers in this special issue. First, instead of a binary opposition between refugees (asylum seekers) and economic migrants, scholars of migration now perceive a continuum where *compulsion* plays a greater or lesser role in migration flows depending on the circumstances. The archetypical instance of forced migration, as Bartram et al. (2014) point out, is displacement or refugee flows arising from violent conflicts, persecution, and/or deliberate expulsion. Hence, the element of compulsion is obvious. However, and second, it is also important to highlight the role of migration as a *strategy* and *part of human development* and the cycle of life. Doing so allows us to recognize the *agency* of migrants and refugees. In that way, we cease to see refugees as mere victims of a fate beyond their control, and change our perception of them as actors responding to extremely challenging conditions by relying on the social and cultural resources that remain under their control (Monsutti, 2010). Third, by understanding resilience among the most vulnerable populations and by understanding what helps them to move on and regain stability and productivity in their new lives under adverse conditions, we can learn valuable lessons about the nature of human survival and how people overcome adversity even when all odds are against them.

For reasons that will be made clear, authors focus almost exclusively on the Eastern Mediterranean region whilst discussing both ontological and epistemological aspects of forced migration. That is, while their research focuses on the historical legacies of forced migration in the region, political contexts and backgrounds, the psychological effects of displacement on migrants and refugees, and how the law interprets the conditions of displacement, each author reflects on the methodological aspects of studying forced migration and the importance of questioning concepts.

Past and Present

Scholarly research is often necessarily limited to specific time periods, to strict geographic regions, or to a given population–be it large or small. However, forced displacement is a phenomenon that is as old as civilization itself (McNeil, 1984) and certainly not limited to national borders or regions. Therefore, it is important to keep this broad spatial and temporal context in mind, as this will serve to remind us that forced migration is perhaps best understood from a multidisciplinary and multi-methodological perspective. Indeed, the multifaceted, multidimensional global processes that may trigger forced displacement force scholars to look beyond disciplinary boundaries when researching this topic, since this form of migration neither is the result of simple causes, nor is it a strictly modern-day phenomenon.

Let us take the element of time as a case in point. Since antiquity, forced displacement of large populations across vast geographies has shaped and reshaped our world. Some of these were recorded and then recounted orally for generations before being written down, only then to become part of the foundational myths shared by the three great monotheistic

religions of the world: Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. All of these religions describe in their sacred texts how coerced displacement and long-term exile were pivotal in the shaping of cultures and societies in the Eastern Mediterranean, the region on which we have chosen to focus our attention in this volume. In the earlier of these texts, the Jewish TANAKH (also known as the Hebrew Bible), we see myths and legends that clearly evoke displacement as a core notion in the development of civilization. According to this tradition, a displeased God forced the very first humans, Adam and Eve, out of Eden, while their son Cain became a fugitive after having killed his own brother Abel, and being *forced* to flee to the land of Nod, a place "east of Eden" (Genesis 4: 2–16). Then, Noah is *forced* out of his land by a supposed natural disaster–the great flood story (Genesis 7: 2–12)–in a retelling of the Epic of Gilgamesh. Later, Abraham, the legendary patriarch, was also *forced* out of Canaan as the land experienced a great period of famine that prompted him and his family to seek refuge in Egypt (Genesis 12: 10). Generations later, Moses, Abraham's descendant and the key character in the Exodus story, becomes a "refugee" after he flees Egypt with his companions in search of the "promised land" whilst declaring, "I have been a stranger in a strange land" (Exodus 2: 22). Centuries later, when the Temple of Jerusalem was destroyed by the Babylonian King Nebuchadnezzar, many were forced into a long exile in Babylon where they "sat down and wept" after being "carried away captive" (Psalm 137: 2–3). While all these narratives have a male dominated approach, a female dimension is found in the Book of Genesis, where Hagar and her son Ishmael are forced out into the desert. A later and similar incident occurs in the Christian New Testament when the small child Jesus, with his mother and father, are forced to flee to Egypt, away from a vindictive emperor. In Islamic tradition, the "Hegira" describes the migration of the Islamic prophet Muhammad and his followers from Mecca to Yathrib in 622 (Shaikh, 2001). These narratives forged long-standing traditions that placed forced migration and displacement at the heart of what was to become the foundational myths of Asia Minor, the Middle East, and Europe. From this, we can make the assertion that forced displacement is a phenomenon that resonates throughout vast periods of history, from the Bronze Age Mesopotamia to modern-day Syria.

In the present special issue, our focus is on the modern manifestations of displacement and as such, we begin our work in the nineteenth century, the period when global colonial empires began to give way to a new system of governance, a system of political and economic organization that became homogenous throughout the world after World War I: the nation-state. As in the distant past, great numbers of people displaced by war, famine, persecution, and either natural or environmental disasters have constantly agitated the modern world. Indeed, as the second decade of the twenty-first century ends, hardly a day goes by without us being made aware of those issues involving immigrants, asylum seekers, or refugees. With the advent of modern population surveying, we now have a much better grasp of the size of displaced populations around the globe and at a glance, these numbers are overwhelming.

According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Global Trends Report on Forced Migration, a record high 65.3 million people, or one in 113

persons, were displaced from their homes by conflict and persecution between 2015 and 2016 (UNHCR, 2015), a majority of which are women and children (International Rescue Committee [IRC], 2014; Sherwood, 2014). According to the same report, Syria is the largest source country for refugees, with a total refugee population of 4.9 million (and 7.6 million who are internally displaced persons (IDPs henceforth) at the end of 2015, while Afghanistan was the second-largest source country with 2.7 million refugees. Unfortunately, the signs indicate that these numbers will continue to increase, especially because of the long and bloody conflict in Syria and the lack of a foreseeable diplomatic resolution. According to the International Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) GRID – Global Report on Internal Displacement – the total number of conflict-related IDPs throughout the world as of December 2015 is 40.8 million (2016). Furthermore, another 22 million people in Asia are currently displaced as a direct consequence of natural disasters. The estimated total figure of IDPs around the world is 55 million, of which a significant number will never return home. For those who do return, the average time of displacement is 17.5 years. According to the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Federation, approximately 73 million people in the world are, or have recently been, forced to migrate (2015). If correct, these numbers indicate that one in one hundred individuals in the world today is either an IDP or an international refugee. Contrary to popular perception, most refugees do not live in camps, but rather in inner cities. In these urban environments, refugees face harsh economic hardships, including a lack of money to pay rent, maintain children at school, or even to buy food.

Numbers can never fully convey the scale of human suffering. However, by looking at these statistics, we learn that forced migration is a very complex problem that changes in nature on a daily basis. It is a problem that seems to have intensified since the end of the Cold War in 1989 (Castels, 2003). Take the recent crisis in Yemen as an illustrative example of such complexity. The UNHCR has reported, "Nearly one in every ten persons in Yemen is internally displaced" (or approximately 2.4 million people) as of January 31, 2016 (UNHCR, 2016). However, at the time of the publication of the report, Yemen also hosted 267,675 registered refugees from Somalia, Ethiopia, and Syria, as well as other minority groups from both African and Middle-Eastern countries, with 7,705 new arrivals in February 2016 alone. To mention another case, in Sudan, more than one in ten Sudanese were displaced in 2011, including 4.9 million IDPs.

Given this history and the current scale of forced migration around the globe, it is not surprising that forced migration has become an important discussion topic within the social sciences, attracting the interest of sociologists, anthropologists, geographers, economists, political scientists, psychologists, lawyers, historians, and demographers, as well as scholars interested in culture and the arts, not to mention policy makers (O'Reilly, 2016). Nevertheless, and although there has been a long tradition within the humanities and social sciences of scholarly work concerned with forced migration, it is only since the 1980's that a more concerted effort to define forced migration as a legitimate field of inquiry has taken place. Still, there is no consensus on where the boundaries of the field should be (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, Loescher, Long,

& Sigona, 2014; Triandafyllidou, 2015). This is because the complexity of issues pertaining to the study of forced migration and refugee studies drive scholars to reach out across disciplinary boundaries and to use diverse methodological tools with important consequences for our understanding of the issues involved. As such, this special issue contributes to this growing field by casting a critical eye on how we conceptualize and study historical and contemporary cases of displacement. We do so while simultaneously recognizing the importance of interdisciplinary and multi-methodological perspectives in discussions of forced migration.

Concepts and Methodologies

Although the contributions in this special issue are undoubtedly concerned with engaging in an ontological discussion, that is, the outcomes of research and the potential consequences of our findings for policy makers, civil society, and governments more broadly, the main focus rests on an epistemological preoccupation with *concepts* (i.e., refugees, asylum seekers, or migrants) and *methodologies* (how we put such concepts to use in research) used in the study of forced migration.

Scholars who research and write on forced migration tend to spend their time studying the meanings of concepts and definitions inbuilt in such questions as: Who is a refugee? Who should have the right to seek asylum in another country? Should internally displaced people be classified as "refugees?" If so, then what are their rights? When can we classify migration as either "forced" or "voluntary?" What are the merits of such a classification for both scholarly work and policy makers? What criteria are used to discern, for example, an "economic migrant" from a "genuine" asylum seeker? And how appropriate, ethical, or moral, are such differentiations? In other words, this attention to *concepts* and *methodologies* becomes a framework through which we can discuss the outcome of original research conducted across diverse settings ranging from mixed methodology (quantitative and qualitative) psychosocial studies on trauma and coping, to archival research, analyses of past and present legislation and ethnographic case studies of refugees and asylum seekers. Authors discuss the historical legacies of forced migration in the Eastern Mediterranean region and the experiences of modern-day refugees, the political contexts and backgrounds that favor forced displacement, the psychological effects of displacement on migrants and refugees, and how the law should interpret the conditions of displacement and the case for moral responsibility. Individual contributors also analyze other important themes, such as resilience, religion, land reform and its effects on populations, challenges faced by mental health professionals working with displaced people (in particular IDPs), the possibility of back migration or permanent resettlement, and the differences between migration policies and political discourses. Others focus on the physical and mental barriers imposed by borders, historical continuities between past and present, and the differences between the narratives of displacement offered by those who are displaced and by those who displace.

Taken as a whole, our mission in putting together this special issue is two-fold. First, we seek to better understand the practical, ethical, and epistemological challenges and opportunities presented by research on forced migration, a field of inquiry that is fraught with difficulties given the long-term period that it covers as well as the fluid social, cultural, economic, and political contexts that influence it. Second, and no less important, we aim to offer a cross-disciplinary platform to highlight ontological questions and thus bring forth the findings of this new research. With these two aims in mind, each author was asked to consider how we should conceptualize, approach, and work with historical and contemporary cases involving migrants and refugees? Meanwhile, each author was also asked to answer the following questions: 1) What is the relationship between the context and the research outcome? 2) Are there gaps between methodology, experience, and practice, in sum, between our available methods and the reality of forced migration? 3) How should our methodologies value, engage with, and take into account all the complex political, historical, cultural, economic, and social dimensions contributing to forced displacement in the Eastern Mediterranean region?

One could argue that perhaps by asking how and where concepts originate and how methods of inquiry more closely relate to and influence our understanding of what we see, we will not only be better able to understand whence problems originate, but also how to avoid them in the present and in the future. Hence, the value of the contributions found in this anthology is based on the fact that most studies dealing with the methodologies applied in the study of forced migration tend to focus on one discipline and therefore offer little comparative cases between disciplines (for other studies dealing with the problem of methodology and forced migration see Chatty, 2007; Crisp, 1999; Crush & Williams, 2001; Harrell-Bond & Voutira, 2007; Jocabsen & Landau, 2003; Lammers, 2003; Macchiavello, 2003; MacKenzie, McDowell, & Pittaway, 2007; McMichael, Nunn, Gilford, & Correa-Velez, 2015). Thus, a discussion of concepts and methodologies merit scholarly attention even if these may seem at first not necessarily or directly applicable to policy making. Undoubtedly, there is a perceived division in the study of forced migration regarding "policy *relevant*" and "policy *irrelevant*" research. We hope that in their own distinct ways, the contributions found in this special issue will bring to light nuances and contextualization that will render such dichotomy to be problematic at best. We propose that relevant concepts and their application in the study of forced migration are a legitimate focus of inquiry in their own right. This is because both the theoretical concepts that we as policy makers, politicians, academics, and interpreters of the law produce and how we set about studying and applying these concepts in the field often have important practical consequences in the lives of displaced people. Whilst it is understandable that scholars who study forced migration are often motivated to conduct research out of a sense of ethical or moral responsibility or duty toward what they believe to be the injustices inflicted by powerful agents upon people in vulnerable conditions, one should question and reflect upon the often-conflictual relationship between theory and practice, and the

growing pressure put on academics to produce work that can be *measured* in terms of the impact their research may have on policy formation.

The Eastern Mediterranean Basin

It is evident in the title of this special issue that the purpose in producing this collection of papers is to add to a growing body of academic work on forced migration by offering a multidisciplinary volume focused on one region of the world that has become almost synonymous with displacement: the Eastern Mediterranean. Although our numerous contributors show a preoccupation with the unfolding Syrian crisis, described by Antonio Guterres (the former United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, now UN Secretary-General) as "the most dramatic humanitarian crisis that we [UNHCR] have ever faced" (Chulov, 2013), this anthology looks at forced migration more broadly. Specifically, it adopts a geographical approach by describing and discussing research findings dealing with the historical and contemporary situation of populations living in the wider Eastern Mediterranean basin. This approach is relevant because, clearly, there are common, historically recurrent concerns that transcend national, ethnic, cultural, religious, and political boundaries.

However, considering the widespread nature of the phenomenon of forced migration (in historical terms and in the twenty-first century), a justification of why we have decided to focus on the Eastern Mediterranean is required. During contemporary history from the nineteenth century onward, this region has experienced various streams of migration (immigration and emigration). This history of migration has had diverse implications both for those who have migrated (most of whom were refugees), and for the host societies that have sheltered them. The consequences of this movement are still evident within cultural artifacts and memories as well as within the social contexts of the host country. Here we see historical crimes left untreated only to re-emerge in similar or new forms later with reverberating and multiple consequences. Actual and pragmatic solutions tend to acquire a more permanent character, such as an *ad hoc* approach to refugees. An understanding of the past offers a guide for how streams of forced migration consolidate themselves. Indeed, the refugee traffic in the region has affected the immediate neighborhoods in the Mediterranean, Europe, and the Caucasus, not to mention international relations (Betts & Loescher, 2011) between countries and organizations, such as the United Nations.

Unfortunately, the Eastern Mediterranean has been the setting of a long stream of unsettling conflicts that have caused deep instability in the region and that in turn have left millions of people displaced. To mention only some of the better documented cases, the region has been the stage for widespread massacres and destruction of villages and cities, events which only a minority of affected persons escaped alive and which involved Armenians, Assyrians, and other Christian minorities from what is now the Republic

of Turkey by the Ottoman Empire (1915), and the subsequent "population exchange" between Greece and Turkey that occurred in 1923, known as the *mübâdele*.

The region has also experienced the still-ongoing Israeli-Palestinian territorial dispute that was fueled by the aftermath of World War II when the region was divided by the French and British mandates resulting in the founding of the modern state of Israel (since 1948–the main phase being between 1964 and 1993). Next, came the Lebanese Civil War (1975–1990) and the still-ongoing Kurdish war of independence (since 1983) against the Republic of Turkey. The Gulf War (1990–1991) resultant from the invasion by Iraqi forces into Kuwait and the subsequent deployment of British, other European, and American troops to the region has left a legacy of destruction and displacement still felt by the populations of the countries involved. Next, came the Afghan Civil Wars (1996–2001)[3] and the invasions of Iraq (2003–2014) and Afghanistan (2001–2014), both in retaliation from the United States following the September 11th attacks in New York. During the same period, we witnessed the Arab Spring and the fall of many North African regimes that temporarily changed the character of the politics in the region, although the popular revolts quickly dissipated in the mist of often brutally violent responses from the threatened governments, whilst the repression by the latter in turn resulted in even more refugees. Finally, the region has suffered the consequences of the still-ongoing and highly destructive Syrian civil/military war (since 2011). Stigmatized and considered a "burden," Syrians, Iraqis, Afghanis, Lebanese, Jordanians, Armenians, Assyrians, Yezidis, Mandaeans, Palestinians, Yemenis, Somalians, Eritreans, Sudanese, and many other populations have suffered the double-burden often imposed by forced migration: they have had their human rights violated and their land often taken from them while also not being accepted elsewhere as citizens. For these reasons, the Eastern Mediterranean has become a synonym for forced displacement in the twenty-first century.

Given the scale of human suffering in the region, we hope the insights found in this special issue will be useful for decision makers attempting to produce policies that are sensitive to the dynamic and intricate nature of forced migration in the region. In particular, by challenging certain aspects of national and international law, by paying attention to the way anthropologists understand space and culture, and by developing an awareness not only of the psychological effects of displacement, but of how narrative methods of inquiry may help us better understand people's aspirations, motivations, and coping mechanisms. We also hope that the texts included in this issue will be useful for students and established scholars interested in not only the way in which policy is formed, maintained, and reproduced, but also its effects on displaced populations. Finally, we further aim to inspire fresh discussion on the ethics of studying victims of forced migration and on issues concerning morality and justice. Each contribution is placed

3 It could also be argued that the Afghan civil wars began in either 1979- or 1992, depending on whether it is measured from the stand point of Soviet withdrawal.

within broader themes, ranging from public administration and policy research, historical legacies, ethnographies, and psychosocial approaches for the study of refugees to insights into the juridical aspects of forced migration *vis-à-vis* national and international law.

In the reminder, a short description of each of the sections contained in this special issue and a brief description of each of the contributions found within each section is presented.

Part I–The Anthropological Perspective

Dawn Chatty's paper assesses the current situation of Syrian refugees and the refugee camps in Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey. She bases her analysis on a qualitative study that has sought to explore the different perceptions and aspirations of Syria's refugees, humanitarian assistance practitioners, and their host communities. Her paper probes what social factors within the host community would positively contribute, when circumstances permit, to the reshaping and re-integration of Syrian society post–conflict. Chatty's exploratory study has two aims: first, to explore whether a consensual view on "protection in exile" might be articulated in a culturally-sensitive manner, which does not necessarily require encampment; and second, to probe how grassroots "coexistence initiatives" within the host community might facilitate improved mechanisms for return once the Syrian uprising has been resolved.

In her in-depth study, **Annika Rabo** explores the past and present of forced migratory movements in the Raqqa province, Syria. Infamous as being central to the territorial claims of Da'sh/ISIS today, the Raqqa province is built on and from the ruins of earlier human settlements dating back to the Assyrian and Babylonian civilizations and to the peak of the Arab Islamic era. Throughout the centuries, there has been intermittent depopulation and repopulation along a continuum from forced to voluntary mobility. Rabo argues that everywhere, including the Raqqa province, people voice opinions on migration, and that human mobility affects people of all backgrounds. Moreover, people construct memories and historical accounts of mobility (from forced to voluntary) and rootedness. She then asks the question: What future is there for people in the Raqqa province after years of intense and very brutal armed conflict? In her attempt to answer the question, Rabo wonders if there is "material" in the history of the Raqqa province to develop reconciliatory processes for a future co-existence whilst highlighting the regional history of mobility and settlement over the last few centuries. The latter becomes an important backdrop for the discussion on coping, resilience, and construction of memories.

Last, drawing primarily on oral history recordings with people born and raised in Yarmouk Camp in Damascus and in Khan Eshieh camp 20 km south of Damascus, **Mette Lundsfryd** studied the border-crossing experiences of Palestinians who had escaped Syria into Lebanon between 2012 and 2014. Through inter-subjective authorship, her study shows how three generations of forced displacement affect subjective memories and reflect nearly seventy years of an on going "catastrophe". Applying an oral history

approach, Lundsfryd shows how the geography of Syria has become a network of borders that she calls "a world of checkpoints," where access to safe territory is repeatedly scarce or denied. Her study contests and renegotiates the conventional notions of borders and illuminates how personal memories of escaping from Syria intertwine collective memories of uprooting, displacement, and resilience.

Part II-The Historical Perspective

In her paper, **Ella Fratantuono** asks yet another important question: When, for example, do migrants become a social issue eligible for state-driven solutions? In the second half of the nineteenth century, millions of Muslims migrated from former Ottoman lands, fleeing an encroaching Russian Empire in the North Caucasus and Crimea, on the one hand, and from nationalist struggles in the Balkans, on the other. This mid-nineteenth century influx of refugees into the Ottoman Empire was neither the first time the state had welcomed large groups fleeing from elsewhere, nor the first attempt at Ottoman "population politics" to facilitate state security. Despite these historical precedents, an independent institution for migrant administration did not exist until the formation of an Ottoman migration commission on January 5, 1860. So, how did nineteenth century refugees come "to be constructed as a 'problem' amenable to a 'solution?'" Fratantuono's paper explores the history of migration administration in the Ottoman Empire to evaluate state strategies and ideals regarding migrant settlement. Establishing this background contributes to our understanding of the relationship between the Ottoman state and the refugees through recognizing the shortcomings of Ottoman organization as state officials might have defined them and through providing insight into the very migration regimes that conditioned terms of negotiation among state officials and newcomers.

Matthew Goldman examines the impact of land tenure insecurity on forced migration and the possibilities of return in southeast Anatolia from the first major cadastral modernization project initiated by the Ottoman Empire in 1858 up to the recently completed World Bank-funded cadastral modernization project (2008–2013). He presents preliminary evidence from the Turkish press indicating that the latest attempt to administer property rights for land faces old problems. Leaving land conflicts poorly resolved threatens to exacerbate the on-going conflict between the Turkish state and its allied militias and the Kurdish nationalist armed group, the PKK (*Partiya Karkaren Kurdistan,* or "Workers Party of Kurdistan"). Those displaced by the conflict and who attempt to return, often find that new tenants have claimed their old lands, often having acquired the legal title from the state as well. Rather than entering the legal system for help, many prefer to solve their land disputes themselves through violence. Given the tenuous peace or controlled conflict that prevails in much of the region today, creating flashpoints for conflict is a risky prospect. Goldman concludes with a series of general recommendations to improve the current cadastral process and promote social peace and the rights of displaced people.

Part III–Law, Policy, and Political Perspectives

In his paper, **Umut Korkut,** critically analyzes the political responses of the Turkish Republic when faced with incursions of forced migrants from its neighboring countries. He applies the Theory of Discursive Analysis to what he calls the "governance of forced migration", whilst discussing the plight of Syrians and other groups who have migrated to Turkey as a result of conflicts in the Eastern Mediterranean region. He makes the argument that the restrictive Turkish asylum regime, and aversive Turkish public philosophy to immigration, have led political authorities to continuously resort to discursive rather than institutionalized means to handle the impact of forced migration in the country, with many negative consequences for forced migrants. He compares the reception of Syrians with other refugee groups that have been in the country prior to and during the Syrian crisis. He also compares it with those who migrated during the summer and autumn months of 2014 within the context of the incursions of the Islamic State in the region. He illustrates how the Turkish humanitarian assistance to refugees, although often selective, can be inclusive and generous depending on which nationality a refugee may hold. The differences in the reception of these groups, also reveals the discrepancy between government and public positions regarding the swelling numbers of Syrian refuges in the country.

Lena Karamanidou uses discourse analysis to explore one field that invokes collective experiences of migration: that of political discourse, specifically parliamentary debates on legislation in Greece. Drawing on the critical discourse analysis of 20 parliamentary debates on eight different laws on migration and asylum, she examines how constructions of the experience of emigration and forced migration are employed by political actors to legitimize or delegitimize asylum and migration policies. She demonstrates that references to collective migration experiences are not only employed to argue for greater tolerance or inclusiveness–as has been suggested in a similar analysis of the use of emigration experiences in Irish discourses of migration, but also for greater exclusion and to represent "us," the host society, in a positive manner.

In her paper, **Georgiana Turculet** argues that the Syrian case is a typical situation of "engineered regionalism," according to which states take proactive measures to keep refugees in their region of origin. According to Turculet's argument, *all* such measures have pernicious implications that not only affect the lives of refugees directly, but that also indirectly affect the lives of the citizens of host countries. Her normative inquiry concludes that states addressing the humanitarian crisis ought to be persuaded that by acting against the interests of the refugees, they are also (potentially) acting against the interests of their own citizens. For example, states prioritizing short-sighted political goals, and therefore policies, might be more disruptive than assessing the "refugee issue" *realistically* based on the magnitude of the crisis. Such policies generally follow the underlying and misguiding assumption that the "refugee crisis" is *temporary*.

Lastly, **Hannibal Travis** explores the issue of forced migration from the perspective of international law. He makes the argument that, since the 1980s, it has become increasingly

common for members of the international community to condemn as "genocide" such policies as forcing communities to flee their homes because they are seen as a security risk. He offers a comparison of the Armenians and Assyrians in 1915, the Kurds and Assyrians in the 1930s and 1980s-1990s, northern Cyprus starting in 1974, and the Assyrians and Yezidis in 2014. His work covers the law of genocidal intent during wartime or other threats to national security. Travis also discusses how criminal tribunals analyze genocidal intent by examining evidence of massacres, rapes, forcible deportation, area bombardment, and deprivation of property. For instance, the Security Council, confronted with national-security justifications for alleged atrocities in Bosnia in 1993 and Kosovo in 1999 referred the acts to international tribunals for genocide prosecutions, often pointing to the plight of Muslim refugees from Yugoslav attacks. The UN General Assembly, despite Yugoslavia's protestations, harshly condemned ethnic cleansing as genocide in Bosnia, emphasizing the plight of refugees as well. Treatise writers have also viewed genocidal intent and counterinsurgency or other defensive warfare as not being necessarily irreconcilable. Hannibal concludes with a comparison of the plight of Bosnian refugees in 1993 and the condemnation of the Bosnian Serb and Yugoslav forces for genocide in that year, with the plight of Assyrian and Yezidi refugees from the self-proclaimed Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in 2014.

Part IV-The Psychosocial Perspective

In their joint study, **Önver A. Cetrez** and **Valerie DeMarinis** use action research to describe the psychological dimension of forced migration as well as the ethical challenges in research among vulnerable populations in their quantitative research of Syrian Christian refugees in Turkey. They focus their work on refugees attending the Qnushyo activity center, in Istanbul, a safe heaven developed through the joint collaboration of researchers, refugees and other concerned individuals.

They describe how refugees often find themselves in a vulnerable position as they attempt to reach a safe heaven, away from war and conflict. For instance, the ever-increasing uncertainty associated with an unsettled existence, between what was their home and an imagined home in resettlement brings a variety of health-related risks for those who are forced to migrate. The long drawn war in Syria and the resultant protracted liminal status of Syrians in Turkey often jeopardizes their mental and physical health whilst exacerbating physical pain and causing low levels of mental health and self-esteem. Still, despite these challenging conditions, many refugees also show high levels of resilience often drawn from what the authors describe as "health-sustaining resources", such as family, community, and culture, all of which become eventual sources of meaning-making. Different strategies are often used to cope with the challenges of an unsettled life and to form a sense of community with those in a similar situation and who share similar beliefs and hopes as a result of their religious or other meaning-giving system.

In the same vein, my own paper, describes what I call the "fear factor" and how it influences the implementation and analysis of research data. In my paper, I explore the findings of a multidisciplinary study of Syrian refugees in Turkey. I am particularly concerned with the population of refugees living in Mersin and Adana – two major destinations for Syrians in the East Mediterranean. My original aim was to learn how displaced people experienced and coped with the trauma of being forced to emigrate, how they built resilience and, given their overtly religious background, whether religion had any role in helping them build coping strategies. As my research encountered many difficulties associated with the context in which the data collection took place, I was forced to go beyond a focus on the ontology of forced migration (that is, the research findings) and to give weight to the epistemological aspect (in this case the methodological challenges) in the study of forced migration, including the ethics, and the risks involved in conducting research of this type within the context of "hyper-fluid" or unsettled political contexts.

Finally, **Akar Tamer Aker** and **Esra Isık**, discuss the methodological challenges regarding forced displacement studies in Turkey. They argue that Turkish mental health professionals have faced two major methodological challenges concerning displacement and migration studies in the last two decades. The first refers to internal displacement in Turkey, mainly the Kurdish population. The second relates to the movement of Syrian refugees to that same country. Both movements have their own characteristics whilst presenting different research and intervention difficulties different research and intervention difficulties. For Aker and Isık, forced displacement carries not only political, legal, and socio-economic implications and ramifications, but they also affect the physical and psychological health of those who are displaced.

J. Eduardo Chemin
Guest Editor

References

Bartram, D., Poros, M. V., & Monforte, P. (2014). *Key concepts in migration.* London, UK: Sage.

Betts, A., & Loescher, G. (2011). *Refugees in international relations*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

Castels, S. (2003). Towards a sociology of forced migration and social transformation. *Sociology, 37*(1), 13–34.

Chatty, D. (2007). Researching refugee youth in the Middle East: Reflections on the importance of comparative research. *Journal of Refugee Studies*, *20*(2), 265–280.

Chulov, M. (2013, April 19). Half of Syrian population "will need aid by the end of year." *The Guardian* [online]. Retrieved February 15, 2017 from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/apr/19/half-syrian-population-aid-year

Crisp, J. (1999). *Who has counted the refugees? UNHCR and the politics of numbers, new issues in refugee research* (Working Paper No. 12, June 1999). Retrieved September 12, 2015 from http://www.unhcr.org/cgibin/texis/vtx/home/opendoc.pdf?tbl=RESEARCH&id=3ae6a0c22&page=research

Crush, J., & Williams, V. (2001). *Making up the numbers: Measuring "Illegal Immigration" to South Africa*, *migration policy* (Brief No. 3. Cape Town: Southern African Migration Project, 2001). Retrieved from http://www.queensu.ca/samp/forms/form1.html

Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, E., Loescher, G., Long, K., & Sigona, N. (Eds.). (2014). *The Oxford handbook of refugee and forced migration studies*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

Harrell-Bond, B., & Voutira, E. (2007). In search of 'invisible' actors: Barriers to access in refugee research. *Journal of Refugee Studies*, *20*(2), 281–298.

Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre. (2016). *GRID: Global report on internal displacement*. Retrieved February 22, 2017 from http://www.internal-displacement.org/globalreport2016/#ongrid

International Rescue Committee. (2014). *Are we listening? Acting on our commitments women and girls affected by the SYRIAN conflict*. Retrieved September 12, 2015 from https://www.rescue.org/sites/default/files/resource-file/IRC_WomenInSyria_Report_WEB.pdf

Jacobsen, K., & Landau, L. (2003). *The dual imperative in refugee research: Some methodological and ethical considerations in social science research on forced migration*. Retrieved from http://web.mit.edu/cis/www/migration/pubs/rrwp/19_jacobsen.html

Lammers, E. (2003). *Young, urban refugees in Kampala, Uganda: Some thoughts on the ethics of fieldwork and issues of representation*. Retrieved from http://migration.wits.ac.za/lammerswp.pdf

Macchiavello, M. (2003). *Urban forced migrants in Kampala: Methodologies and ethical and psychological issues*. Forced Migration Studies Programme. Retrieved from http://repository.forcedmigration.org/show_metadata.jsp?pid=fmo:5814

Mackenzie, C., McDowell, C., & Pittaway, E. (2007). Beyond 'do no harm': The challenge of constructing ethical relationships in refugee research. *Journal of Refugee Studies, 20*(2), 299–319.

McMichael, C., Nunn, C., Gilford, S. M., & Correa-Velez, I. (2015). Studying refugee settlement through longitudinal research: Methodological and ethical insights from the good starts study. *Journal of Refugee Studies*, *28*(2), 238–257.

McNeill, W. H. (1984). Human migration in historical perspective. *Population and Development Review, 10*(1), 1–18.

Monsutti, A. (2010). The transnational turn in migration studies and the Afghan social networks. In D. Chatty & B. Finlayson (Eds.), *Dispossession and displacement: Forced migration in the Middle East and North Africa* (pp. 45–68). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press for the British Academy.

O'Reilly, K. (2016). Migration theories: A critical overview. In A. Triandafyllidou (Ed.), *Routledge handbook of immigration and refugee studies* (pp. 25–33). Abingdon and New York, NY: Routledge.

Schuster, L. (2015). Unmixing migrants and refugees. In A. Triandafyllidou (Ed.), *Routledge handbook of immigration and refugee studies* (pp. 297–303). Abingdon and New York, NY: Routledge.

Shaikh, F. R. (2001). *Chronology of prophetic events*. London, UK: Ta-Ha Publishers.

Sherwood, H. (2014). Syria's female refugees facing poverty, harassment and isolation. *The Guardian*. Retrieved September 12, 2015 from http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/08/women-head-quarter-syrian-refugee-families

Thielemann, E. R. (2006). *Burden-sharing: The international politics of refugee protection* (Working Paper 134, March 2006). The Centre for Comparative Immigration Studies.

Triandafyllidou, A. (Ed.). (2015). *Routledge handbook of immigration and refugee studies*. Abingdon and New York, NY: Routledge.

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. (2013). *Summary Conclusions on the interpretation of the extended refugee definition in the 1984 Cartagena Declaration.* Retrieved February 21, 2017 from http://www.unhcr.org/protection/expert/53bd4d0c9/summary-conclusions-interpretation-extended-refugee-definition-1984-cartagena.html?query=definition%20of%20refugee

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. (2015). *Global Trends Report.* Retrieved March 2, 2017 from http://www.unhcr.org/576408cd7.pdf

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. (2016). *Yemen Fact Sheet*. Retrieved February 15, 2017 from http://www.unhcr.org/protection/operations/4c907a4a9/yemen-fact-sheet.html?query =yemen%20IDPs

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. (n.d.). *Convention and protocol relating to the status of refugees*. Retrieved February 21, 2017 from http://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10

Yarris, K., & Castañeda, H. (2015). Special issue discourses of displacement and deservingness: Interrogating distinctions between "economic" and "forced" migration. *International Migration*, *53*(3), 64–69.

MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL OF REFUGEE STUDIES

Araştırma Makalesi

Ürdün'de, Lübnan'da ve Türkiye'de Mültecilerin, Uygulayıcıların ve Ev Sahibi Topluluk Üyelerinin Algılarını, Umutlarını ve Davranışlarını Anlamak için Antropolojik Bir Yaklaşım*

Dawn Chatty[a]

Öz

Modern tarihte Suriye ve Suriye halkları iki kez büyük bir yerinden edilme süreci yaşamıştır. Suriye, ilk olarak, 19. yüzyılın ortalarında ve sonunda, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu sınırlarından gelen birkaç milyonluk zorunlu göçe maruz kaldı. Daha sonra 21. yüzyılın başlarında Suriye yaşanan aşırı şiddet, büyük kitlelerin yerinden edilmelerini başlatan krizi tetiklemiştir. Dünya, ülke nüfusunun neredeyse %10'unun boşalma hızıyla şok oldu ve Suriye sınırındaki büyüyen yerinden edilme krizine müdahale etmek isteyen insani yardım rejimi kargaşa içerisinde kaldı. Türkiye, Lübnan ve Ürdün gibi komşu devletler, iltica talep eden bu insanları etkili bir şekilde nasıl koruyacakları konusunda tereddütte kaldılar. Hiçbir ülke yerinden edilmiş bu kişiler için mülteci statüsü vermedi ve her bir ülke bu krizle başa çıkmak için geçici önlemler aldı. Pek çok durumda, ne yerinden edilmiş kişilere ne de ev sahibi topluluğa danışılmadığından ev sahibi topluluklar, yerinden edilmiş Suriyeliler ve insani yardım politikası yapıcıları ve uygulayıcıları arasında hızla gerginlikler ortaya çıkmıştır. Bu çalışmanın iki amacı vardır: birincisi, son kriz esnasında Suriyeli mültecilerin, insani yardım uygulayıcılarının ve ev sahibi toplulukların birbirinden farklı algılarını ve umutlarını ortaya çıkarmak için nitelikli, yorumlayıcı bir metodolojinin ne kadar etkili bir şekilde uygulanabileceğini ortaya koymaktır. Çalışmanın ikinci amacı ise, koşullar izin verirse, çatışma sonrası Suriyeli toplumunun yeniden bütünleşmesine olumlu anlamda katkıda bulunabilecek ev sahibi topluluklara ilişkin sosyotarihi faktörleri araştırmaktır.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Mülteciler • Ev sahipleri • Uygulayıcılar • İnsani yardım rejimi • Algı • Umut

* Bu çalışma 2014-2015 British Academy Araştırma Projesi kapsamında kısmen desteklenmiştir. Çalışmadaki görüşler yazara aittir ve British Academy'nin resmî görüşlerini yansıtmayabilir.

a (✉)Dawn Chatty (Dr.), Refugee Studies Centre, Department of International Development, University of Oxford, 3 Mansfield Road, Oxford OX1 3TB, United Kingdom. Eposta: dawn.chatty@qeh.ox.ac.uk

Başvuru: 18 Kasım 2016
Revizyon Gönderimi: 26 Aralık 2016
Kabul: 10 Şubat 2017
Online First: 15 Eylül 2017

ISSN 2149-4398 • **eISSN** 2458-8962
DOI 10.12738/mejrs.2017.2.1.0104 • Kış 2017 • 2(1) • 35–49

MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL OF REFUGEE STUDIES

Research Article

An Anthropological Approach to Understanding Perceptions, Aspirations, and Behavior of Refugees, Practitioners, and Host Community Members in Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey*

Dawn Chatty[a]

Abstract

Twice in modern history, Syria and its peoples have experienced massive displacement. First, in the mid- to late 19th century, Syria received several million forced migrants from the frontiers of the Ottoman Empire; then in the early 21st century, Syria disintegrated into extreme violence, triggering a displacement crisis of massive proportions. The speed with which the country emptied of nearly 10% of its population shocked the world and left the humanitarian aid regime in turmoil as agencies struggled to respond to the growing displacement crisis on Syria's borders. The neighboring states of Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan were also left in a quandary regarding how to effectively protect these people who were seeking refuge. No country granted the displaced refugee status; each established temporary measures to deal with this crisis. In many cases, neither the displaced nor the host communities were consulted, and thus, tensions quickly emerged among host communities, displaced Syrians, and humanitarian policy makers and practitioners. This study has two aims: first, it sets out to explore how effectively a qualitative, interpretive methodology can be applied to elicit the different perceptions and aspirations of Syria's refugees, humanitarian assistance practitioners, and host communities during the most recent crisis, and second, it seeks to probe what socio-historical factors related to the host communities might, when circumstances permit, positively contribute to the reintegration of Syrian society post–conflict.

Keywords

Refugees • Host communities • Practitioners • Humanitarian aid regime • Perceptions • Aspirations

* The preparation of this paper was supported in part by a British Academy research grant in 2014-15. The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and not necessarily those of the British Academy.

a (✉) Dawn Chatty (PhD), Refugee Studies Centre, Department of International Development, University of Oxford, 3 Mansfield Road, Oxford OX1 3TB, United Kingdom. Email: dawn.chatty@qeh.ox.ac.uk

Received: November 18, 2016
Revision received: December 26, 2016
Accepted: January 10, 2017
Online First: September 15, 2017

ISSN 2149-4398 • **eISSN** 2458-8962
DOI 10.12738/mejrs.2017.2.1.0104 • Winter 2017 • 2(1) • 35–49

Twice in modern history, Syria and its peoples have experienced massive displacement. First, between approximately 1860 and 1920, Syria received millions of forced migrants from the frontiers of the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman administration, nearly overwhelmed by an excess of 2 million forced migrants from the Crimea, the Caucasus, and the Balkans at the close of the Crimean War (1853–1856) implemented a Refugee Code in 1857 to address the needs of the Tatars, Circassians, Chechnyans, Abkhaza, Abaza, and other ethnic groups who had been forcibly displaced from their homelands. By 1860, the Code had been transformed into a Commission (*Muhacirin Komisyonu*) that set out generous terms for resettling both the refugees and the immigrants pouring into the Empire.[1] The Ottoman Migrant [Forced] and Immigrant Code, which was upgraded to a Commission in 1860 managed the resettlement of over 3 million people in the years between 1860 and the end of the Ottoman Empire in 1918. Incoming migrants were offered agricultural land, draught animals, seeds, and other support in the form of tax relief for a decade, and exemption from military service in far-flung parts of the Empire (Chatty, 2010). All effort was made to see that the settlers became self-sufficient in as short a time as possible. Their integration into local, ethnically mixed settlements was encouraged to promote and preserve the local, cosmopolitan natures of the urban and rural communities.

Then in the early 21st century, Syria disintegrated into extreme violence triggering a displacement crisis of massive proportions. The speed with which the country emptied of nearly 10% of its population shocked the world and left the humanitarian aid regime in turmoil as it struggled to respond to the growing displacement crisis on Syria's border (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR], 2016). Each country bordering on Syria has responded differently to this complex emergency: Turkey rushed to set up its own refugee camps for the most vulnerable groups but generally supported self-settlement; Lebanon refused to allow the international humanitarian aid regime to set up formal refugee camps; and Jordan prevaricated for nearly a year and then insisted on setting up a massive United Nations refugee camp. Turkey and Lebanon have permitted Syrians to enter as temporary "guests," whereas Jordan has refouled some, contrary to international norms. Lebanon and Jordan have not signed the 1951 Refugee Convention, which sets out the principles and responsibilities of states in providing protection and asylum for those deemed to fit the definition of refugee according to the 1951 Statutes and the 1967 Protocol.

1 The translation of *Muhacirin* into English is problematic. Some authors translate the term to mean "refugee" and others "immigrant." The Code is variously translated into English as the Refugee Code or the Immigrant Code. The Ottoman understanding of the term indicates a lack of distinction between the forced and the voluntary migrants as long as the individuals were willing to become subjects of the Ottoman sovereign. Thus, the Code—and later in 1860, the Commission—addressed both forced migrants (refugees, asylum seekers, and internally displaced peoples in contemporary 21st century parlance) and immigrants, who were generally from Europe and seeking to start new lives in the agriculturally underpopulated regions of the Balkans and the southern provinces (see also Chatty, 2010; Kale, 2014).

Additionally, although Turkey has signed the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol, it has reserved its interpretation of the Convention to apply only to Europeans who seek refuge or asylum in Turkey. The United Nations (UN) estimates that over 60% of the Syrian refugee flow across international borders are self-settling in cities, towns, and villages where they have social networks (UNHCR, 2015–2016); in Turkey, most refugees are clustered in the southern region of the country bordering Syria, and circular migration in and out of the country is tolerated. Despite a general rejection of encampment among those who are fleeing, still some 20–25% of the Syrian refugee flow is directed into camps. In Lebanon, informal settlements—often based on preexisting relationships with "gang-master" are proliferating, with accompanying patron-client relationships that outweigh the more participatory and transparent management of humanitarian aid. In Jordan, self-settled refugees from Syria found to be illegally working are deported into the UN refugee camps of Za'tari or Azraq, from which there is no escape other than paying to be "sponsored" by a Jordanian to leave the camp or being smuggled out and reentering the liminal state of irregular status.

Each of these states has established a variety of temporary measures to confront this crisis. Turkey has recently established a domestic regime that provides Syrians with "temporary protection," meaning, theoretically, that Syrians may not be returned to Syria. Registration with Turkish authorities is also meant to provide Syrians with health care and access to education and employment, but these measures have not been fully put into practice. In Lebanon, Syrians are treated as foreign guests; they are allowed to apply for work permits, but many cannot afford the charges, they find themselves in irregular or illegal work situations, and they are not afforded any international humanitarian protection. In Jordan, Syrians are also treated as temporary guests. They are not permitted to work and largely receive basic humanitarian assistance if they live in UNHCR-designated camps. Because fewer than 25% of Syria's refugees[2] in Jordan live in camps, the majority have no legal protection.

Throughout the region, temporary, ad hoc measures are being made by policy makers and practitioners, and in most cases, the displaced Syrians and their hosting communities have not been consulted. Discrepancies are rapidly becoming visible, and tensions and protests have quickly emerged among host communities, displaced Syrians, and humanitarian policy makers. This pilot study explores the perceptions, aspirations, and behaviors of Syria's refugees, their host communities as well as policy makers in addressing the refugees' broad protection needs. It also seeks to probe what social factors within the host communities will, when circumstances permit,

2 The term "Syria's refugees" is used throughout the text to indicate that the sample population includes not only Syrian citizens but also Palestinian refugees, stateless Kurds from Syria, and other ethnic minority groups.

positively contribute to the reshaping and reintegration of Syrian society. This study has two aims: first, to explore the methodological significance of a phenomenological anthropological and qualitative approach to data gathering and second, to examine whether a consensual view on protection in exile might be articulated in a culturally sensitive manner that does not necessarily require encampment.

Research Questions

This article is based on two fundamental research questions, one substantive and the other methodological:

1. What research methodology is most likely to elicit meaningful and reliable findings from among a deeply traumatized population?
2. What understandings exist among the three target communities regarding the basic human right to life (access to health, shelter, protection, and education of children) and survival in dignity?

Methodology and Methods

The academic study of forced migrants and refugees is fairly recent. The 1980s marked the establishment of the first two such centers: at York University in Canada and at the University of Oxford in the United Kingdom (Chatty, 2014). The latter had as its disciplinary focus law and anthropology, both the human rights of refugees and forced migrants as well as the elaboration of the lived experience through the use of anthropological and participatory approaches and tools. In the intervening period, the recognition of the enormous impact which the power differential between the researcher and the forced migrant makes has resulted in some refinement of basic anthropological tools, such as participant observation, key informant interviewing, natural group interviewing, and focus group discussions (Krulfeld & Macdonald, 1998). Efforts to either level or minimize the power differences and the inevitable raised expectations of those interviewed have been key to eliciting replicable responses. Whereas long-term participatory observation has been the foundational element of the anthropological discipline, in forced migration studies, more rapid, short-term interaction and data collection are necessary. With this study, recognizing the shortcomings of rapid research, I set out to overcome some of these concerns by selecting local research assistants and associates who were either themselves exiles or refugees from Syria or local nationals already integrated among the refugee community through nongovernment organizations or other development work. Such an approach meant that the traditional anthropological introduction and integration into the community could be reduced to a few weeks rather than a few months. The task of building trust and confidence rested on the relationships that had already been

established by the research assistants and associates (Bernard, 2006, pp. 210–251). Both key informant and natural group interviews were characterized by relaxed and trusting atmospheres that inspired confidence in the personal narratives, and in the elaboration of perceptions and aspirations (Skinner, 2012). The actions of the refugees and the local community members as well as practitioners were both described and observed using anthropological emic and etic approaches to data collecting by the research team.

Sample selections, locations, timing, and audiences were carefully considered in order to make the interviewees feel relaxed and unthreatened. The interview schedule—the list of key topics for the interviews was also flexible. I did not always cover all topics on the interview schedule with each interviewee because occasionally the interviewee wished to move in a different direction from the topic guide. It was important to conduct these interviews in a sensitive manner that responded to nuanced signals from the interviewees with regard to discussion topics. It was also important to divergence from the interview schedule, and to encourage individuals to reflect back on their histories of forced migration, their past and present social networks, and their plans and hopes for the future in any order they wanted. In most cases, these topics were regarded as nonthreatening, and the interviews took place among the refugee community, a natural group audience. In a few cases, the interviewee felt the need to speak only on a one-to–one basis, and I achieved this by either retreating to a bedroom or asking others to leave a communal living space. Every effort was made to recognize the sensitivity of the situation, the refugees' and forced migrants' feelings of powerlessness in the host countries as temporary guests with no international protection.

This article is based on a multi-site, 12-month, qualitative and participatory study that was conducted between October 2014 and September 2015 in Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan,–where the majority of Syrians fleeing the civil war in their country are located; some estimates indicate that between 4 and 5 million Syrians currently reside in these three countries. Once the initial key informants were selected as described above, a snowballing technique was employed to identify additional participants for interviewing, keeping an eye on representativeness in terms of gender, class, education, ethnicity, and origins. A participant observation strategy also defined this study.

Furthermore, this study also initiated a consultative engagement between practitioners, representatives of hosting communities, and the refugees themselves. It commenced with the in-country recruitment of researchers in collaboration with the facilitating research institutions: the Swedish Institute of Istanbul in Turkey; the American University of Beirut in Lebanon; and the Council for British Research in the Levant in Jordan. The fieldwork was divided into three one-month phases in each

country: October 2014 in Istanbul, Ankara, and Gaziantep, Turkey; December 2014 in Beirut and the Bekaa Valley, Lebanon; and February 2015 in Amman and Irbid, Jordan. Each field trip included exploratory informal and focused discussions as well as semi-structured interviewing with international and national practitioners, self-settled refugees, and host community members as well as refugees in camps.

Preliminary Observations

In Lebanon, I had two local colleagues. The assistant in Beirut was a Lebanese national with long experience working with the Syrian community; the research associate in the Bekaa was a Syrian national in exile who was providing non-formal education to refugee children. Using some of their earlier contacts, we were able to rapidly gain access to a number of Syrians for interviews in the poorer neighborhoods of Beirut as well as the informal settlements in the Western Bekaa near Mar Elias. We also had access to Syrian refugees working with a number of international charities such as CARITAS and World Vision. The interviews with practitioners and policy makers were conducted alone [UNHCR, MSF, and Amel], largely in Beirut and in the Bar Elias/Marj districts of the Western Bekaa.

Anthropological participant observation and a careful review of the semi-structured interviews revealed significant fears, worries, and concerns among our participating interviewees. This level of confidence and openness regarding concerns, fears, and hopes was made possible through careful team ethical procedures and the use of qualitative data gathering.

What emerged from the data was a concern with the high level of social discrimination in Beirut, where Syrians were regarded as the cause [undocumented] of a rise in criminality. Many of the Syrians in Lebanon were not new to the country but had been working for many years in the construction and agriculture sectors of the economy, and the continuing armed conflict in Syria meant that many of the Syrians' wives and children had fled Syria and come to join their husbands/fathers who had already been working in Lebanon for some time. Their movements were largely progressive and in stages: first they arrived in Akkar or the Wadi Khalid region of northern Lebanon, and gradually they were able to join their spouses in the Bekaa, Tripoli, and Beirut. The men with jobs feared losing them once it was known that their families had joined them, contributing to the fear and isolation of many of these Syrians.

> My husband came to Lebanon a long time ago, even before the war in Syria. He used to come over since he was 17; therefore he knows Lebanon very well. He used come and go, stay for a while [working as a carpenter], and then go back to Syria. In 2011, he was in Lebanon came and then the situation was very bad in Syria, so I came to Lebanon twice, The first time to Akkar, my husband's nephew was in Akkar, so we were waiting there for

> two weeks, but my husband didn't find work, so I went back to Syria [with the children]. Then I came back the second time, my husband had a job, and we stayed at people's houses. Back then, I couldn't go back to Hama. My husband had no intention of bringing me to Lebanon; for him it was settled that he worked in Lebanon and I stayed in Syria. But after all the explosions in Hama, I couldn't protect my kids. I decided to come and stay in Lebanon. My husband is always afraid he might be fired [if the children get into any trouble]. (Reem, Beirut, 2014)

Illegal curfews in over 40 municipalities have meant that many Syrians are afraid to go out at night, to work overtime or to mix in any way with the Lebanese population. For many of the skilled and unskilled Syrians in Lebanon, these curfews have meant that older children and adolescents are being pulled out whatever schools they attend to work during daylight hours with their fathers.

> My son should now be in 9th grade, but he works in a supermarket now. But people tell me that it is a waste that my son is not in school. But our situation is very bad; I really want to send him to school, but at the same time we are in deep need of his financial help. (Layla, Beirut, 2014)

In the Bekaa Valley, Syrians with no savings are accepting very low wages in order to provide their families with food. This has raised hostility among local Lebanese who see the Syrian workers as a threat to their own livelihoods, resulting in increased social discrimination and vigilantism.

Many Syrians—despite their decades-long association with Lebanon and often their close kinship ties—feel frightened and cut off from Lebanese society. Although a number of international, national, and local NGOs operate in Beirut and in the Bekaa Valley to provide basic needs, there is little interaction with the Lebanese host community. Very little evidence emerged from the interviews of host community involvement in any survival in dignity activity on an individual basis; NGO activity was limited to more "distant and distancing" charity work or local civil society efforts in Beirut organized by middle-class Lebanese and Syrians who reside in the country. The UNHCR's very slow uptake of cash assistance to the most needy and vulnerable Syrians in Lebanon has resulted in large numbers of women and children being seen on the streets of Beirut begging, something that is generally scorned and regarded with little sympathy by the Lebanese.

> I don't let my children go out on the street; I don't allow them. Only if they want to go out to buy something, but I don't let them just go out to play; I take them out myself. The people in this neighborhood are good, but other people are not so nice, and they get annoyed when they see Syrian children and get aggressive with them. I don't like to put myself or my children in critical situations where someone will curse them. It is not about Lebanon; I used to be like that in Syria as well. (Maria, Beirut 2014)

Qualitative and participatory interviewing alongside participant observation in safe spaces that had already been established for the refugees in Lebanon revealed a high level of confidence between the interviewees and the research team, which was well-situated and integrated into the country's humanitarian aid structure. The interviewees' openness regarding their concerns over the growing vigilantism and increasing social discrimination suggested that the research team had cultivated trust and a nonhierarchical attitude.

In Jordan, one research associate, a skilled Arabic–English interpreter of Iraqi origin, and her assistant, a Syrian refugee, identified possibly key informants for interviews in Amman and its suburbs and in Irbid. These were largely refugees from the Der'aa region of southern Syria, and many had close kinship ties with Jordanians in the northern Irbid governorate. We also interviewed policy makers, practitioners, and senior government economists in Amman.

A review of participant observation notes and the forced migration life histories from the interview transcripts revealed an unusual frankness and willingness to discuss the wide range of positions of government officials, humanitarian aid agency senior officers, and local NGO workers and activists. The disparities in public opinion were also widely recognized and acknowledged in this qualitative interview process.

Jordan's initial response to the flow of Syrians from the Der'aa region into the country was open and generous. Most Syrians had kinship ties in northern Jordan or well-established social networks, and the hosting of this initial influx was positive. However, over time, the Jordanian government has restricted access to the country and actively prevented some (unaccompanied male youth) from entering or actually returned others (Palestinian refugees from Syria):

> At the beginning, you had a refugee crisis with a security component, and it has become a security crisis with a refugee component. So, in the early days, it was "these are our brothers," and so the natural generosity has now given way to more suspicion about who these people are, and the security card is played all the time now. (Senior international practitioner, Amman 2015)

Most interviews with senior officials and practitioners generally acknowledged a discrepancy between what is widely written about in the local press (the burden of Syrians on the Jordanian economy) and what policy makers and practitioners felt was actually occurring; Syrians were understood to be contributing to the Jordanian economy in a greater fashion than was widely being written about in the formal press and circulated in polite society. Many senior practitioners highlighted the International Labour Organization/World Bank reports that suggested that the unemployment rate had dropped by 2% since the start of the Syrian crisis owing to the surge in newly opened Syrian-owned factories (200) and the broad employment of Jordanians (estimated at about 6,000).

The host community in Jordan is bombarded with information regarding the negative influence of Syrian refugees in the country, although this is not backed up by the studies that are emerging. However, at the same time, there is a widespread acknowledgement that Syrians are skilled workmen, especially as carpenters, and employment in the informal sector has created stress even though it brings in much-needed funding. Syrians who are working are fearful of possible arrest because they have no work permits, even though they are largely replacing Egyptians and not Jordanians in the workforce. Those who have received cash assistance from the UN point out that their rents increase by nearly the same amount as the value of their cash transfers:

> Syrian refugees are skilled craftsmen, especially carpenters—we all know that. Jordanians are not skilled carpenters. Syrians are not taking jobs from Jordanians, but they may be taking jobs from Egyptians. They are working informally, but that puts a lot of stress on them because they can be arrested and deported if they are found out. (Senior Jordanian policy maker, 2015)

The interviews clearly reflected the understanding that some social discrimination is leveled at Syrians in Jordan, but the expression is muted compared with that expressed in Lebanon. Even though the majority of Syrians in Irbid and in Amman are tied in "real" rather than fictive kinship, Jordanians keep their negative social attitudes closer to the chest. This may be associated with tribal custom and general conceptual concerns related to the requirement of hospitality toward tribal kin and others in patron/client relationships; many Syrians from the Der'aa region are associated with the Beni Khalid tribal confederation, which is also found in northern Jordan. Jordanians generally do recognize that the country benefits (from international aid) from its expenditures on refugees and that a significant percentage goes into direct government projects to assist Jordanians (e.g., a recent bilateral announcement of $1b over the next three years for Jordanian infrastructure development and the construction of 50 high schools for Jordanians, before any construction may take place for Syrian students).

In Jordan, it was clear from our interviews that refugees were open in discussing their predicament. Many recognized the discrepancies between "official" rules such as no right to work and the reality on the ground that skilled Syrians such as carpenters were highly sought after by Jordanians. However, the constant pressure of working while recognizing that they could become scapegoats if caught and could be sent back across the border or into one of the two main UN refugee camps muted some of their conversations with the research team.

The methodology I employed in Jordan together with the more intimate knowledge of the senior humanitarian aid staff from earlier refugee crises meant that access to senior humanitarian aid officials and Jordanian policy makers was relatively easy to arrange. Furthermore, we were able to rapidly establish trust and confidence, which

permitted a frankness and openness in discussions that would not have been possible with more formal methods of data collection.

In Turkey, I identified a number of research assistants—Syrian academics in exile as well as Turkish researchers—in Istanbul, Ankara, and Gaziantep to assist with interviewing refugees and members of that host community. We also interviewed humanitarian aid practitioners and policy makers in Istanbul and Gaziantep as well as representatives of human rights organizations. I visited the Nizip refugee camp in the company of a number of researchers who were associated with the Directorate General of Migration Management of the Ministry of the Interior. I also held a number of informal discussions in Arabic in the Nizip refugee camp with Syrian refugees and Turkish humanitarian aid workers. A review of these semi-formal and in-depth interviews as well as observations drawn from informal discussions revealed that there was general widespread sympathy for Syrians but not for the gypsies of the region (Nawwar). Some observers, however, had difficulty differentiating between these general Syrian populations and gypsies who may have traveled from Syria but may also have been displaced from Iraq as well as located in Turkey prior to the mass influx of Syrians across to the Hatay and southern parts of Turkey. The interviewees generally recognized the needs of Syria's refugees. They also acknowledged the importance of the third sector— the charitable organizations and religious/Sufi-based associations—in providing assistance. But street begging was widely condemned by both host community members and Syrian refugees themselves: "I don't like to give money to beggars because it just encourages them." (Turkish practitioner, Istanbul, 2014).

Lack of communication and understanding of the situation of Syrians (fear of losing jobs; anger from others that they [Syrians] were being paid salaries) led to demonstrations, arrests, and a dozen or so deaths in October 2014; many felt that more transparency on the part of the government in terms of just what Syrians were entitled to would relieve the critical situation and growing discriminatory attitudes. Many thought that refugees from Syria were being given salaries by the Turkish government; others felt that Syrians were working for lower wages (their Turkish employers did not have to pay taxes) and that this was depriving the unskilled Turkish workers of jobs.

Support from the civil society was especially widespread among established NGOs and religious organizations related to the Islamic Sufi sector of society, that is, civil society, not religious organizations; it was common in Istanbul and in Gaziantep for neighborhood public kitchens to provide free meals and bread to the poor as well as to refugees in the area:

> My husband came first, and then I joined him eight months later with our baby. At first we went to Mersin, but my husband couldn't find a job. When we ran out of money, we came to Gaziantep because the Syrian Interim Government was here; we figured there would be

> more jobs here. So we came here, and two months later, we met this nice man who found a job for my husband and rented us these two rooms. Our neighbors gave us some mattress and a TV to watch Syrian television. There is also a mosque nearby where I go, and people give me diapers for the baby, bread, and daily hot meals as well as supplies of sugar, pasta, and oil. (Hala, Gaziantep, 2014)

Lack of a common language may have been a divide in other times, but in the present crisis, language appeared to be less significant. For professionals and skilled workers, the language barrier has meant the inability to work at their professions (especially among doctors and health care specialists), but in other cases, being very different seems to have bred greater sympathy and general support.

Using a qualitative approach and permitting interviewees to move the discussion in the directions they found most comfortable allowed us gain trust and confidence organically and to collect very interesting and significant data on the perceptions of practitioners as well as refugees and the Turkish hosting communities. These interviews unveiled the complexity of ethnic relations and cross-border identities as well as the variability in the meanings of such common terms as "begging."

Conclusions

Sensitive interviewing as described earlier and an awareness of the region's modern history of displacement and dispossession meant that the interviews were conducted in an atmosphere of trust and confidence; understanding the background of forced migration in the region was particularly important in creating an atmosphere of mutual respect. Elevating the local researchers to co-interviewers and research associates also contributed to building a sense of safety and comfort in the interview contexts, and being able to ask the right questions to open up a topic with a sense of impartiality and neutrality was also important.

Using a qualitative, interpretive, and modified anthropological approach to the fieldwork and drawing the local researchers effectively into the process meant that interviewees were particularly open and trusting, often revealing details of their life experience that would rarely be brought up so early in a research relationship using standardized questionnaires and surveys. The active participation of local researchers in this qualitative and interpretive study was enormously important in creating an early atmosphere of trust and confidence.

Across the board, what emerged was that history matters and historical context matters even more. Disparity in perceptions between policy makers, practitioners, and host communities is widespread, but the disparity is not equal across the three countries, and much of the discrepancy can be linked to historical social ties and political relations between Syria and Turkey, Syria and Lebanon, and Syria and Jordan.

In Lebanon, the consociational shape of governance and the long period of time during this crisis in which there was in effect no government led to a period of paralysis within the UN humanitarian aid system; thus, effective relief programs such as cash transfers were very late in getting started, resulting in an exponential rise in begging and other negative coping strategies (e.g., pulling young children out of school to work, moving into structures unfit for human habitation, and relying on former agricultural "gang" masters [shawish] to be the interface between the UN humanitarian relief system and the refugees themselves). All these factors together with the close ties and often extended family networks across the two countries has resulted in significant social discrimination and an unwillingness at the local level to help Syrians with basic health and education needs.

In Jordan, the majority of Syrian refugees were closely linked to the Jordanian population, especially in northern Jordan, where close tribal ties are pronounced and where original refuge was granted with host families related either by blood or marriage, particularly those fleeing from Der'aa and its surrounding villages. Jordanian sensitivity to the presence of Palestinian refugees from Syria (PRS) has resulted in draconian surveillance to identify such refugees, a dragnet that often pulls in non-Palestinian refugees from Syria. Those found to be "illegally" working are then "deported" across the border (if Palestinians from Syria) or to Azraq or Za'tari camp, creating greater mistrust and suspicion of the host government by refugees from Syria. Many Syrians consider the situation in Jordan so dire that they are preparing to return to Syria rather than face what they consider inhuman conditions any longer.

In Turkey, lessons learned have been more widely implemented in response to critical events such as demonstrations in October 2014 and widespread criticism of the lack of government transparency. The camps set up by the Turkish emergency relief organization beginning in 2012—without the assistance of the UN experts and their camp templates—have rightly been described as five-star. These settlements are open in that the refugees may enter and leave on a daily basis, but absences of more than three weeks at a time are not tolerated because there is a long waiting list of Syrian exiles wishing to have access to these camps.

Although the interviewing in Turkey took place before the announcement of the domestic law that provided Syrians with formal IDs and temporary protection (as well as rights to health and education and permission to apply for work permits) in January 2015, it was clear that Turkey—of all three countries—was far more humane and practical in its approach to the mass influx of refugees from Syria, even despite a language barrier that does not exist in Lebanon or Jordan. Social discrimination was at its least public expression, and Sufi-based organizations were active in providing assistance at the local community level, mainly hot meals and community-supported

accommodation. Many members of such organizations expressed their concerns to provide refuge for the Syrians in their country in terms of obligations both religious and ethical, and much of their activity has permitted a form of local accommodation in Turkey that is not found in Lebanon or Jordan despite the closer linguistic and social ties in the latter two countries. Social cohesion is strong, which bodes well for eventual local integration in Turkey or return to Syria as a friendly and supportive neighboring state whatever political solution may finally emerge.

The disparity in perceptions among refugees, members of local hosting communities, and practitioners is especially pronounced in Lebanon and Jordan, where the international humanitarian aid regime is the most active. The engagement of UN frameworks in creating an architecture of assistance is built upon templates developed over the past few decades largely among poor, agrarian, developing countries, but such policies and practices do not fit easily into the middle-income countries of the Eastern Mediterranean among a refugee population that is largely educated and also middle-class. Without a serious effort to make the humanitarian solutions fit the context of the Middle East, success will continue to be muted at best and damaging at worst.

It is ironic that Turkey, the one country that has not requested assistance from the UN refugee agency, seems to have managed the process of providing assistance without undermining refugee agency and dignity. Largely working alone with local staff drawn from the Turkish civil service as well as the Disaster Management Unit of the Prime Minister's Office (AFAD) and the main quasi-official Turkish NGO (IHH), Turkey has managed the Syrian refugee crisis with sensitivity and concern. The separate histories of Turkey and the countries of the Levant have obviously contributed to the disparities in perceptions, aspirations, and behavior among refugees, host community members, and practitioners in each of the three countries. The moderated engagement of the international humanitarian aid community in Turkey but not in Lebanon and Jordan has also contributed to some of the disparities noted in this study. Global templates for humanitarian assistance built from experiences in very different contexts and among populations of significantly different makeup are not easily integrated into Middle Eastern concepts of refuge, hospitality, and charity. The close social ties and networks of Syrians in Lebanon and Jordan but not in Turkey (with the exception of the Hatay) have meant that the initial generosity of hosting among relatives in a wide social network has more rapidly given way to hostility and discrimination, unlike the situation in Turkey, where fewer Syrians had social networks and the original hosting was based on a religious and ethical sense of duty to the stranger.

References

Bernard, R. (2006). *Research methods in anthropology: Qualitative and quantitative approaches* (4th ed.). Lanham, New York, Toronto and Oxford: Altamira Press.

Chatty, D. (2010). *Displacement and dispossession in the modern Middle East.* Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Chatty, D. (2014). Anthropology and forced migration. In E. Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, G. Loescher, K. Long, & N. Sigona (Eds.), *The Oxford handbook of refugee and forced migration studies* (pp. 74–85). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

Krulfeld, R., & Macdonald, J. (Eds.). (1998). *Power, ethics and human rights: Anthropological studies of refugee research and action*. Boston and Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield.

Skinner, J. (2012). *The interview: An ethnographic approach. ASA monograph 49.* New York and Oxford: Berg Press.

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. (2015-2016). *Regional refugee and resilience plan.* Retrieved April 6, 2016 from www.3rpsyriacrisis.org/wp-content/uploads/.../3RP-Report-Overview.pdf

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. (2016). *Syria regional response plan* (2014). Retrieved April 6, 2016 from http://www.unhcr.org/syriarrp6/

MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL OF REFUGEE STUDIES

Araştırma Makalesi

Antropolojik Yöntemler ve Bir Anı Analizi: Rakka Bölgesi'nde Göç, Geçmiş ve Şimdi*

Annika Rabo[a]

Öz

Bu makale, bir Suriye bölgesindeki materyali hem Suriye'deki hem de başka yerlerdeki daha genel bir sorunu da kapsayan bir örnek olarak kullanmayı amaçlamıştır. Antropolojik yöntemlerin, bu bölgede ve başka yerlerde gelecekteki şenlikli ve birlikte yaşama pratiğinin uzlaşma süreçlerini düşünmeye başlama noktası sunduğunu savunuyorum. Katılımcı gözlem, sosyal antropologların kullandığı yöntemlerin merkezinde yer alır. Bu gözlem, umumiyetle, saha olarak isimlendirilen sınırsız ortamda insanlarla (informant veya kendi eşitimiz [interlocutor]) yoğun bir kişisel bağlantıyı ve etkileşimi zorunlu kılar. Bu bağlantı ve etkileşim katı bir araştırma tasarımı tarafından önceden belirlenmemiştir. Bilakis, beklenmedik şeyleri beklemek için eğitildik. Bu sebeple etnografik saha çalışması evvela serendipe müsaittir; yani kendisini aramadığımız önemli şeyleri veya onları aradığımızın dahi farkında olmadığımız şeyleri bulma sürecimiz.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Rakka Bölgesi • Antropolojik yöntemler • Tarih • Anılar • Göç

* Bu çalışmanın bir kısmı Stockholm Üniversitesi Sosyal Antropoloji Bölümü tarafından desteklenmiştir. Çalışmadaki görüşler yazarındır; destekleyen kurumun görüşünü temsil etmez.

a (✉) Annika Rabo (Dr.), Stockholm University, Department of Social Anthropology, 106 91 Stockholm, Sweden. Eposta: annika.rabo@socant.su.se

Başvuru: 15 Kasım 2016
Revizyon Gönderimi: 20 Aralık 2016
Kabul: 15 Şubat 2017
Online First: 15 Eylül 2017

ISSN 2149-4398 • **eISSN** 2458-8962
DOI 10.12738/mejrs.2017.2.1.0102 • Kış 2017 • 2(1) • 51–72

MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL OF REFUGEE STUDIES

Research Article

Anthropological Methods and an Analysis of Memory: Migration, Past and Present in Raqqa Province, Syria*

Annika Rabo[a]

Abstract

This text is an attempt to use material in one Syrian region as an example that speaks to a more general problem both in Syria and elsewhere. I argue that anthropological methods offer entry points to start thinking about reconciliatory processes for future conviviality and co-existence in this province and elsewhere. Participant observation is central to the methods used by social anthropologists. Such observation typically entails intensive personal engagement and interaction with people – informants or interlocutors – in the often-unbounded setting dubbed the field. This engagement and interaction is not predetermined by a strict research design. Instead, we are trained to expect the unexpected. Ethnographic fieldwork thus allows for serendipity; that process by which we discover important things for which we were not even searching, or were unaware that we were even searching for them, to begin with.

Keywords

Raqqa province • Anthropological methods • History • Memories • Migration

* The preparation of this paper was supported in part by the Department of Social Anthropology, Stockholm University. The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and not necessarily those of the Department of Social Anthropology, Stockholm University.

a (✉) Annika Rabo (PhD), Department of Social Anthropology, Stockholm University, 106 91 Stockholm, Sweden. Email: annika.rabo@socant.su.se

Received: November 15, 2016
Revision received: December 20, 2016
Accepted: January 15, 2017
Online First: September 15, 2017

ISSN 2149-4398 • **eISSN** 2458-8962
DOI 10.12738/mejrs.2017.2.1.0102 • Winter 2017 • 2(1) • 51–72

The modern province of Raqqa in Syria is built on and from the ruins of earlier human settlements dating all the way back to the Assyrian and Babylonian civilizations and continuing up to the peak of the Arab Islamic era. Throughout the centuries, the province has experienced intermittent depopulation and repopulation along a continuum ranging from forced to voluntary mobility. When writing this text it is difficult to think optimistically about the future for those people in and from this region. Is it possible to imagine and even plan for resettlement and reconciliation among people in Raqqa province? As a researcher with both anthropological fieldwork experience in and leisurely visits to Raqqa and its countryside between 1978 and 2011, I am, of course, engaged in these questions. This text is an attempt – an *essay* – to use material in one Syrian region as an example which speaks to a more general problem in Syria and elsewhere. I argue that anthropological methods offer entry points to start thinking about reconciliatory processes for future conviviality and co-existence in this province and elsewhere. Entailing intensive personal engagement and interaction with people; namely informants or interlocutors, in the often unbounded setting dubbed *the field*, participant observation is central to the methods used by social anthropologists. This engagement and interaction is not predetermined by a strict research design. Instead we are trained to expect the unexpected. Ethnographic fieldwork thus allows for serendipity; that process by which we discover important things for which we were not looking and often for which we did not even know that we were looking. The material used in this text has been collected, recorded, and remembered for a period spanning an excess of three decades. This allows us to discern not only an ethnographic present frozen in time, but also both patterns and irregularities occurring in social interaction.

The topic of memory is burgeoning, and in the words of Paul Connerton, "ubiquitous" (2009, p. 1). The very ubiquity of the topic calls for great caution, as David Berliner (2005) writes. When memory is everywhere and everything, the concept may lose its analytical value. Sociological and anthropological discussions on memory owe much to Emile Durkheim's student, Maurice Halbwachs, who was perhaps the first to underline that memory is socially constructed and that we remember as members of various groups. He was also interested in the ways that the past is present in the present. He argued that "collective memory is essentially a reconstruction of the past in the light of the present" (Coser 1992, p. 34). Halbwachs made a distinction between autobiographical and historical memories where the first are memories of what we have experienced whereas the second are not remembered directly, and instead rely on records or ritual enactments and commemorations. In this text, both autobiographical and historical memories are important for how my informants have reasoned about themselves and others in the region, in Syria, and in the world. With this being said however, it is equally important to underline my role in the construction of these memories. As discussed by Johannes Fabian,

"remembering/memory turns out to be involved in almost every imaginable aspect of ethnographic research" (2007, p. 132).

Processes of migration and displacement are today one of the most lively fields of research in the social sciences and the humanities. The importance of not only movements, but also roots, is also heavily discussed outside universities. Everywhere, including in the province of Raqqa, people voice opinions on migration – from forced to voluntary - and people are affected by human mobility in every part of the world. People everywhere, including anthropologists, construct memories and historical accounts of mobility, be they "forced" or "voluntary," as well as rootedness. In this text, the history of mobility and settlement in the province of Raqqa will be used as examples to highlight memories of both conflict and conviviality. In this text, I return to material that I have used in other publications (i.e. Bahous, Nabhani, & Rabo, 2013; Rabo, 1986, 1997, 2010) as well as to field notes and other records.

Settling and Unsettling in the Province of Raqqa

The present-day province of Raqqa was an important and rich region up until the peak of the Arab Islamic era in the ninth century. The Abbasid caliph Haroun al-Rashid, for example, had his summer residence in Raqqa and was said to have travelled to and from Baghdad shaded by trees. Raqqa was sacked and destroyed by Tamerlane in 1371 AD and by the end of that century, the province's population and agricultural production were in decline. From the end of the 14th until the beginning of the 19th century, population fluctuations were great. During the 17th and 18th centuries, Bedouin tribes from the Arabian Peninsula migrated to the Euphrates region (Chatty, 1986, p. 11; Lewis, 1987). In the 19th century, Ottoman authorities attempted to incorporate these tribes into the power structure of the empire not only to make trade routes safe, but also to increase economic and political stability in the region. Peasants from Aleppo and the surrounding area were encouraged to move eastwards and to settle in the Euphrates region.

At the end of the 19th century, Ottoman authorities established a permanent police post in the ruins of Raqqa. By that time, a few Arabic speaking families had already chosen the ruined city as a seasonal base in their yearly migratory movements while grazing their sheep between Urfa, in present day Turkey, and the Euphrates River. Eventually, members of these families stayed in Raqqa, building permanent houses from the building materials found among the ruins. Yet, seasonal migrations were still very common until the 1920's. When I completed my first fieldwork in the city in the late 1970's, those who saw themselves – and were seen by others – as the real natives of Raqqa were the descendants of these early settlers.

After the dismantling of the Ottoman Empire at the end of World War I, Syria became a French mandate. Both the war and the establishment of the mandate had

enormous repercussions on the population in the north and east of Syria. Armenians and Syriac-speaking Christians fled from the massacres carried out in present day Turkey in 1915. Although some did remain, most left the province, Syria, and even the Middle East by way of Aleppo and Beirut. The French opposed the unification of Syria and instead split the country into different "states" (see e.g. White, 2011). The Euphrates region and the Syrian Desert were ruled directly from Paris (Petran, 1972, p. 62). This French policy was probably linked to their difficulty in pacifying this "uncivilized" region.

During the French mandate, the political balance of power in the Raqqa countryside changed. The rural population consisted not only of Bedouins, but also of sheep rearing so called *shawai'a* (s. *shaawi*) who were politically dominated by, and paid tribute to the Bedouins in exchange for protection. The French wanted to stop this practice and supported the political aspirations of the *shawai'a* to forge themselves into distinct tribal groups (Hannoyer, 1980; Khalaf, 1981; Müller, 1931). The French continued the Ottoman policy of land registration, which worked in favor of the tribal sheikhs, both Bedouin and the *shawai'a*, who became owners of huge tracts of land. Initially, this land registration had little or no economic importance because land was still used for collective grazing. Yet, the situation changed dramatically by the end of the 1940's. Irrigated cotton was introduced along the river shores in the region and in the steppe, mechanized rain fed wheat and barley cultivation. Traders from Aleppo leased huge tracts of land from tribal sheikhs along the Euphrates. They installed diesel pumps and started cultivating cotton, often bringing their own workers from the agriculturally more developed Aleppo region. In just a few years, cotton became the most important crop in the Euphrates region. While the tribal leaders became very rich and were nicknamed cotton sheikhs, the ordinary tribesmen remained poor and many migrated from the region to as far as Lebanon and Kuwait (Meyer, 1984, p. 302).

While diesel pumps revolutionized agriculture along the Euphrates, tractors completely changed the steppe south and north of the river. This change was brought about through urban entrepreneurs who leased grazing land from the tribal heads. In the early 1950's, winter rains were plentiful and harvests were very good. The center of the development of mechanized grain cultivation was northeast of the Raqqa province, close to the borders of Turkey and Iraq (Warriner, 1957, p. 71). Yet, fortunes were also to be made (or lost) in the province of Raqqa on grain cultivation and speculation. The city itself grew through the expansion of the agricultural sector. Raqqa, like other towns of the northeast, attracted migrants from other regions. From the small town of Sukhne situated on the old trade route between Palmyra and the Euphrates came a substantial number of families establishing themselves as traders in Raqqa. Fleeing drought in their own regions came small scale farmers from central and southern Syria looking for work in Raqqa in the 1950's. In the countryside, *shawai'a* built more permanent houses and established villages.

The incredible agricultural expansion in northern Syria came about through private initiatives. The state did very little in terms of support or constraints. This changed in the end of the 1950's and the beginning of the 1960's when new national policies were formulated. A big land reform limited the size of land holdings and land was taken from the sheikhs and given to their fellow tribesmen. In an attempt to curtail the power of the urban agricultural entrepreneurs and the sheikhs, the Syrian state formed peasant organizations and agricultural cooperatives. It also took control over all areas that had been used as collective grazing by the Bedouin tribes, making most people living in the Euphrates region to leave Syria (Lewis, 1987, p. 193). Many poor rural families joined the Ba'th party after it came to power in 1963 from which time the state took control of the purchase of cotton and grain. In 1961, Raqqa became the capital of a newly established province. This, of course, signaled the importance of the town and its surrounding countryside. This new status meant that the city needed to recruit administrators for the provincial bureaucracy. Although some native townspeople were employed, many came from other parts of Syria.

The 1970's brought new changes with profound implications for mobility and settlement in the province. Syria's largest development project, the Euphrates Scheme, complete with a dam to be constructed and land to be reclaimed, was launched to enhance both industry and agriculture not only in the province itself, but in the country as a whole. The plan was to develop hydroelectric power and to reclaim and irrigate 640,000 hectares in the four northern Syrian provinces of Aleppo, Raqqa, Deir ez-Zhor, and Hassake. Forty kilometers west of Raqqa lied the small municipality of Tabqa, later renamed Thaura (Revolution), which became the location for a huge earth filled dam. Through the creation of the large artificial Lake Assad, more than sixty thousand people from local *shawai'a* tribes had to be moved and resettled with some being offered land along the border with Turkey. This policy can be seen as a continuation of a 1960's Ba'th policy to settle Arab tribes and clans along the border as a means to make this buffer region less Kurdish (see Gorgas, 2007, p. 122). Other *shawai'a* villagers were offered employment on the new state farms within the so-called Pilot Project in which fifteen experimental agricultural villages were created to spearhead the Euphrates Scheme. Many *shawai'a* simply moved further into the steppe relying on seasonal labor migration, especially to Lebanon and Jordan (Meyer, 1984, p. 299). Some moved to Aleppo or Raqqa, leaving only around 10% of the displaced families took up work on the new state farms (Meyer, 1982, p. 556).

While Thaura became the centre for the dam building and the running of the hydro-electric project, Raqqa became the seat of the headquarters of a new land reclamation and irrigation authority, The General Administration for the Development of the Euphrates Basin (GADEB), from which the 20,000 hectare Pilot Project was administered. GADEB needed agricultural engineers, civil engineers, drivers,

office staff, and laborers. By the end of the 1970s, almost one thousand people were employed by GADEB in Raqqa and another thousand were posted outside the city. There were also all the people who had settled in the Pilot Project as farm laborers. By 1999 about 64,000 people were living in the fifteen villages (Ababsa, 2005, p. 3). While many of the unskilled employees and agricultural workers came from the province, most of the civil and agricultural engineers were recruited from other parts of Syria, often coming while still young, fairly inexperienced, and caught up in a spirit of developmental optimism. Their mission was to make the whole province, even the whole of Syria, blossom.

Those who were forcibly moved due to the construction of the dam and the establishment of the Pilot Project were, of course, dramatically affected by the scheme. The villagers who were living on the land to be reclaimed and irrigated were also touched. They were without income from agriculture and men had to leave their families in search of work elsewhere. The impact of the Euphrates Scheme was also felt in the city of Raqqa. Many among the native families were landowners and some lost land due to the scheme. Between 1960 and 1980, the population of Raqqa grew quicker than all other Syrian towns. In 1930, there were only about five thousand people living in Raqqa, while in 1960, the population had increased to about 15,000 and to about 80,000 in 1980. It was around this time when Raqqa became the 6th largest city in the country and at the turn of the 21st century, had about 250,000 inhabitants.

Life in the countryside changed dramatically in many ways during the 1980's and 1990's. In the early 1980's, electricity was made available in villages and tap water was delivered to each house. Later on, municipal planning arrived with lots, roads, and sewage. Education expanded and girls started to go to school on a regular basis. Families started to buy bread from shops that sprang up in the villages rather than having girls and women bake it. While the standard of living in the countryside was raised, an increased reliance on the market and on cash developed at the same time. Old inequalities also began to return, leading to an intensified reliance on seasonal or more permanent labor migration for many. Agricultural expansion came to a halt and water became an increasingly scarce resource. In late 20th century and early 21st century, the ruling Ba'th party made a number of so called Open Door economic decisions (cf. Aita, 2007; Kienle, p. 1994). Agricultural policies in the province of Raqqa can, in the words of Myriam Ababsa, be seen as a case "of counter-revolution that marks the end of the socialist ba'thist ideology" (2005, p. 1). GADEB, along with its Pilots Project state farms, was to be dismantled and land distributed not only to former landowners and peasants in the region, but also to its employees. Those with economic resources and political connections increased their agricultural ventures while many of the less fortunate leased or sold their land.

After years of limited rainfall, 2008, 2009, and 2010 were years of exceptional drought. Wells became dry and rain-fed agriculture came to a standstill. In the summer of 2010, the World Food Program started helping the Syrian state, providing alimentary support to almost two hundred thousand persons in the whole of the Euphrates region. Prior to the Syrian uprising in 2011, an estimated 300,000 villagers from the northeast provinces left their villages in an attempt to make a living in the cities in the region as well as in Damascus and Aleppo.

Debating Mobility, Migration and Uprooting in Raqqa

In 1978, I came to Raqqa to study the effects of the Euphrates Scheme and to understand the relations between the regional inhabitants and those who came to the region as a result of this enormous development project. During two years of fieldwork, I circulated between living with a native family in Raqqa, with female non-regional employees in the GADEB compound on the outskirts of the city, and with a family 40 km east of Raqqa along the Euphrates. Although the focus of my research was on "development," I could not but take note of debates about migration, migrants, roots, and mobility in every field site. Among the native townspeople, these debates and comments were directly tied into perceptions of regional development. They concerned the increased presence of both rural *shawai'a* and more far away settlers in the city, as well as the pros and cons of uprooting oneself and moving elsewhere, typically outside the country. When the city began to expand and grow, it created new economic opportunities for many natives, but also meant that they no longer dominated public life in the city.

Until the 1960's, villagers from the surrounding countryside did not come to the town in great numbers. Roads were bad and before Raqqa was made into a provincial capital, there were few bureaucracies and services in the town. With the take-over of the Ba'th party, the rural *shawai'a* gained influence and the townsmen lost their positions as patrons and middlemen. The ruling Ba'th party tied the country together through investment in infrastructure and obtaining the support of Syria's rural population by investing in education and by providing new careers for citizens from the countryside. When debating the transformation of the countryside, and of Raqqa itself, the native townspeople talked about the rural *shawai'a* in quite denigrating terms in the late 1970's. They were said to be uneducated, uncultivated, and lacking in religious understanding. Native townspeople would never allow their daughter to marry rural *shawai'a*. Life was just too hard and uncouth in the countryside. Yet, townspeople also underlined that they and the *shawai'a* shared a common provincial culture. They had similar "customs and traditions." They spoke the same dialect and dressed in similar ways. They enjoyed the same kind of food and valued hospitality and generosity. Native townspeople and *shawai'a* were both from the province and

both belonged to it. It was different with all the employees who arrived with the establishment of GADEB and the expansion of other public services in Raqqa.

Initially, I was told, many natives had been quite enthusiastic about the Euphrates Scheme because they thought it would bring about career opportunities. However, soon it became quite clear that the young and well educated native townspeople did not obtain the kind of jobs to which they saw themselves entitled. The character of Raqqa then began to change as newcomers had little or no interest in the customs or traditions of the native lineages. In the central quarters of the city, where most natives lived, many young men also complained about their own relatives. They said that although lineage solidarity was rhetorically lauded, relatives rarely helped each other. By the end of the 1970's, the expansion of the public sector had begun to slow down considerably resulting in many young men with secondary or tertiary education having great difficulties finding suitable employment. Many parents accused their sons of being lazy or of having too high an opinion of themselves by refusing jobs that they did not think were good enough for them. Instead, many young native townswomen accepted the very public sector jobs that had been rejected by their male relatives. For many unmarried women, employment not only offered money, which they could spend – at least partially – on themselves, but also a way to become more independent.

In the late 1970's, there was a great difference in how Raqqa women and men debated mobility and roots. Almost all men left the province during their two-year mandatory military service. Even if no man enjoyed going to the military, it was a welcome change from home for many. Perhaps the first time they were away from the control of their immediate family and their lineage elders. For young people seeking higher education, it was necessary to leave Raqqa. At that time, there was only a small teacher education college in the town, leading many young men and women to study in Aleppo or Damascus, with others even choosing to continue their education abroad. Romania, Bulgaria, the Soviet Union, and Italy were common destinations. There were official educational exchange programs between Syria and the Socialist bloc, with those students from Raqqa who had established themselves in one university often helping others along. The young women who studied abroad typically followed a brother or another close relative who had already established himself as a student. Students from Raqqa studying abroad commonly pursued education in the pharmaceutical, medical, and dental fields. These were studies that were considered to lead to professions with high social standing and with opportunities to earn money.

Many young men among the Raqqa natives saw emigration as the only way to escape political repression. They constantly underlined how they felt trapped and enclosed in Syria. For some, labor migration, especially to the oil rich countries in the Arab Gulf, was a dream. Relatives and friends with work permits and visas were

asked to help those without. Nobody liked the life they had in the Gulf, and labor migrants were only satisfied with the money that they earned. Young women were much more rooted in the city. Their social circles were limited compared to those of their male relatives. They furthermore had more family obligations in the town, such as taking care of the sick or elderly. Young women left Raqqa only to study – as mentioned – or if they married and their husbands moved elsewhere in Syria. In general, the dreams and aspirations of native townswomen were tied to Raqqa and even to their own quarters of the city. For many middle-aged and older women, the dream of going on hajj was their major aspiration of travel.

In the decades since the late 1970's and early 1980's, I have continuously returned to Raqqa and the village east of the town. Sometimes visits have been quite short – just catching up on news – but longer when I would have the chance to stay to collect material on the development of the Euphrates Scheme or on new topics, such as family law. In Raqqa, I have, in particular followed four adult children of my "original" native family as they (and I) have grown older. I have seen their children, in turn, become adults and form families of their own. Talk of, and memories of movement and rootedness have been common. These families have members who have emigrated for good while others have returned from studies or work abroad. "Lutfi[1] will never come back to Raqqa or Syria, not even for a short visit. You know how stubborn he is. And how hot tempered. He says he could not stand having to put up with the injustices here. But he told us that he might go to Turkey for a holiday and that we could meet him in Urfa later this year."

These words were uttered by Amina, a woman in her early 60's in the summer of 2010. She was speaking about one of her brothers who had left Syria in the early 1980's never to return. Amina was the eldest of seven children and, like another of her sisters, already married and a mother when I was first introduced to know her, Lutfi, and the other siblings. Lutfi had finished secondary education, studying in a technical institute in another provincial town before returning to Raqqa to live with his family again. He scorned local employment and had no wish to become a laborer in the Gulf. He wanted to leave the country and go to Western Europe, which he had to do soon before he was forcibly drafted into the army. Somehow, he managed to obtain a passport and an exit visa as a student and left for Italy. In that period, it was very difficult to receive an exit visa from Syria, especially for young men, and particularly if they were public employees or had not done their military service. Lutfi came to visit me in Raqqa before he left and although I was happy for him since he was so excited; I also warned him that life in Italy would not be easy. He replied, "I am ready to work with anything there. All I want is to live in peace and with dignity."

1 All names of informants are ficticious.

Lutfi was not the only young man in his circle of friends who left Raqqa and Syria. A number of his close associates studied abroad and some also married abroad. However, these friends came back and set up offices, clinics, or opened pharmacies in Raqqa. In most cases their foreign born wives did not stay long in Syria. I know of a few cases where the husband has willingly let not only his wife, but also his children, return to Bulgaria, Russia, or Romania. "I cannot deny my children the opportunities offered in the country of their mother," one doctor told me in a sad voice. However, many young men from Raqqa did not go abroad to study, but to work in the Gulf, and most either returned or kept commuting to and from Raqqa. In the late 1970's and early 1980's, Raqqa women were not very enthusiastic when their male relatives dreamed about going abroad. "There are opportunities enough here in their own town or in their own country," Amina used to say. Others said they could not understand why men were willing to go far away to take on work they thought beneath them in their own home town. In the 1990's and onwards, however, many women spoke in a different way.

"There is nothing to come back to. Life has become very expensive here and he has been away too long," Amina stated in 2010 when we talked about her brother in exile. "Work in the Gulf is not as profitable as it used to be," her visiting neighbor added. "People used to be able to save money and come home to invest in houses and other things or even bring along their whole family to the Gulf. Now they can't afford that and life is so expensive back there that saving money is really difficult."

Rural Roots and Uprooting

In 1980, as part of the two-year fieldwork described above, I lived for six months in a village which was fairly close to one of the Pilot Project farms in which a number of the inundated *shawai'a* had been resettled. Their own land along the river had at that time not yet been reclaimed by the Euphrates Scheme, nor had electrical power from the dam reached this village. There was no running water, and girls fetched water from the river of the irrigation ditches. Yet, everyone considered their situation favorably in comparison to that of those working as agricultural laborers in the Euphrates Scheme. The approximately two thousand villagers were divided into 250 households. Almost all claimed to be descendants of the same founding lineage father. The village had been established in the late 1940's during the shift to a more sedentary lifestyle. While irrigated agriculture had become increasingly important, supplemented by rain fed cultivation of wheat and barley, sheep rearing was an important additional income for many families. Still though, many villagers did not have enough land to live on.

In 1980, there were about fifteen male heads of households who were working in Saudi Arabia. A handful had earlier worked in the Jordanian port town of Aqaba. A fairly large group of unmarried young men migrated seasonally to work on building

sites in Damascus or Lebanon. There had been a cooperative founded after the land reform that was no longer in operation. Instead the Aleppo-based entrepreneur who had run and managed the irrigated agriculture venture close to the village had been called in to organize cotton cultivation. The purpose of labor migration, whether inside or outside Syria, was simply to gain cash. Nobody dreamed about settling somewhere else. Both women and men said that while they enjoyed going to Raqqa for a visit to a doctor or for shopping, they were glad to be able to go back to the village. I never talked to those few who had left the countryside permanently. Among the permanent inhabitants and the labor migrants I met now and then, no one said that they wanted to leave and have their family anywhere else. Job opportunities outside the village were limited to menial labor since most adult men could neither read nor write. In the village at that time was a small primary school attended only by boys. Girls started working at home and in the fields at a very early age. Although six years of mandatory schooling for both girls and boys was the law, authorities closed their eyes to the non-schooling of girls in the Raqqa countryside. Parents were divided over the issue of education. Some thought that "too much" education would only make the boys distance themselves from the lifestyle of the village whereas others thought that education was the new ticket to employment in the expanding public sector. Employment in a state bureaucracy could, in their opinion, easily be combined with agricultural or pastoral concerns.

During the next decade and a half, village life changed profoundly when, as noted earlier, electricity became available in the countryside and tap water was delivered to each house and when much of the daily grueling work of the girls disappeared. In other ways, however, the village has remained the same. For instance although some villagers continued to migrate for work, they remained, just as they had been before, tied to village life. Hammoude, a young man with a wife and two children worked as a shepherd in Saudi Arabia. He came back to Syria twice a year during the religious holidays. "His contract does not allow for more," his wife, Najma, once told me, "and he also needs to save money and send back rather than spend it on travel." During one of my visits to the village, Najma told me it could perhaps be possible for her to live with her husband. "He will not get a visa for her," one of her brothers said, "and where is she to stay. With the sheep, like he does? And if that were possible, how would he be able to save money?"

When the Euphrates Scheme started to reclaim land in the village in the early 21st century, agriculture was left at a standstill for three years. Migration then became a necessity for all who had no other assets, like employment or rain fed agriculture. After the reclamation, land holdings were to be consolidated in order to make cultivation more productive, leaving many who had leased small plots from kinsmen without access to land. When I visited during those years I received many requests

to help people find work in Sweden. They were invariably disappointed when I tried to explain the complexity of the job market in Sweden, or that there was no labor migration at the moment. "I am not going to stay forever," one man said, "I only want to make money and then return to my village again."

I have now known this village and many of its inhabitants for more than thirty years and during this period I have never once heard people long for a completely mobile past. Some, like Khadija, whose tent I lived in for a few months in 1980, claim to miss the time when they used to set up camp close to their grazing flock of sheep and goats in the steppe north of the village. "Do you remember those spring days with lots of sheep milk and with yoghurt, cheese, and butter preparations!" she often reminisced during my visits. Yet, not even Khadija ever claimed that she wanted a life without the village with its permanent houses and the conveniences that had come about. However, these conveniences – electricity, running water, new kinds of foodstuff, and consumption goods – had to be paid for in cash. Thus, many became pushed to leave the village in search of a steady income. Since the 1990's and onwards, economic inequalities have more or less returned to the Raqqa countryside, including this particular village. A number of villagers have become agricultural entrepreneurs while also branching off into other kinds of businesses. Still though, many are very land poor and have come to rely on other sources of income, not least because profits in agriculture have decreased since the late 1990's.

Memories of Conflicts and Conviviality

The imprint of movement has, as discussed, deeply affected the province of Raqqa. People have moved from elsewhere to the region and have historical memories of movement and mobility. The same is true for Syria in general. At the same time, settlement and lack of mobility was also a salient feature of life in the province and in the country as a whole before the current crisis. Syria, like many other low-middle income countries, actually had a low level of internal migration before massive displacements started in 2012. Khawaja (2002, p. 21) cites seven different reasons for this. Many rural people still relied on agriculture; most Syrians owned their own house, making them more immobile; rural-urban services were quite similar; wage differences were small in the country; the capital Damascus was a magnet nationally, but also expensive; the country is fairly large; internal migration was not a political priority. The highly important Syrian population registry was, I think, another reason to underline "roots" rather than "mobility." Children were registered as belonging to the location where their fathers were registered. If they moved elsewhere, Syrians were forced to travel to their "origins" in order to obtain papers necessary for a number of official bureaucratic proceedings. In a city like Damascus, perhaps the majority of its inhabitants actually had their population registry somewhere else. They might be the third generation away from a village, which was still considered their "home."

This bureaucratic principle fostered strong both imaginary and practical ties to one's "roots" or to the "homeland" of one's father or grandfather. Many of the employees who moved to Raqqa to work on the Euphrates Scheme, for example, stayed for decades in the province while still being registered in their town or village or origin.

Putting down administrative roots was thus not simple in Syria. There are, however, many examples in Syrian history where groups of people have moved, resettled elsewhere, put down roots, and become "original" inhabitants. Raqqa "native" townspeople are a case in point. The town of Salamiyah, for example, situated in central Syria on the fringe of the desert along an old trade route, was established, or resettled, by a group of Isma'ili Shi'a Muslims in the mid-19th century (Lewis, 1987, p. 58). It is still considered an Isma'ili town today although its non-Isma'ili population constitutes perhaps half of the population. Large numbers of Druze from the Lebanese mountains resettled in southern Syria in the 19th century as a consequence of various internal and sectarian conflicts (Lewis, 1987, p. 78). That part of Syria is now called *Jabal Druze* – the Druze Mountain – and considered as the Syrian homeland of the Druze. The Raqqa province and the whole Euphrates region was – as mentioned above – resettled and economically integrated into the Ottoman Empire and Syria from the late 19th century onward.

The period around World War I was one of tremendous political upheaval with enormous population movements from Ottoman provinces into what soon came to be French and British mandated Syria and Iraq. Kurds, Arabs, Armenians, and other Christians were uprooted and resettled; many more than once (cf. White, 2011). All these historical examples of collective uprooting and resettlement demonstrate the importance of kinship, ethnicity, and religion when people move and settle together. These examples also demonstrate how uprooting and settlement have been carried out, with a tension, between political factors of "push" and "pull". And these patterns have continued until today. Kurds, for example, who settled along the Turkish-Syrian border were forced to move through the creation of the so called "Arab line" after the take-over of the Ba'th party. The *shawai'a* from the Raqqa province who were inundated by the Euphrates Dam were, as mentioned, given an option to resettle in this border region in order to make it more Arab and to make it into a buffer zone against Kurds with possible irredentist ambitions. Yet, this "Arab line" was never fully institutionalized, finally becoming defunct when the exceptional droughts between 2008 and 2010 made out-migration common. At the time of writing, the Kurdishness of that border region is seen by many inside and outside Syria as the only safeguard against the onslaught of ISIS.

Discussions and memories of uprooting, settlement, mobility, and migration in the above examples from Raqqa resonate with issues of conflict between different categories of regional inhabitants; between them and outsiders who have come to settle

or for work. Many of the native townsmen who were young in the 1980's claimed that they were pushed away from Raqqa and Syria because newcomers and outsiders took over the city. The memories and discussions in the village have been different. Settled life came late in the countryside, as noted, and in the 1980's the older generation had personal memories of a mobile or semi-settled lifestyle. They also had memories of land conflicts between different clans and between their own clan and their tribal sheikh. To settle and to obtain a title over land was an important mark of village identity back then. This was a period when the political and economic influence of the *shawai'a* increased as the Bedouins largely left the Euphrates region. From the 1970's onward, the migratory pattern of male villagers was mainly conditioned on the need to earn money. While some left the region permanently, most were strongly tied to their native village through links of kinship. Men who migrated often already had village wives or married in the village on vacations from Damascus, Jordan, or the Gulf. Labor migration was generally seen as temporary, even when it stretched over decades.

The memories of uprooting, settlement, mobility, and migration are, however, not only replete with stories of conflict between categories of people. There are also stories and memories of co-existence and of hospitality toward strangers and outsiders. When I first did fieldwork in Raqqa, I was struck by the way that many native townspeople cultivated memories of hospitality to strangers and refugees, especially to Christians. Armenians who had survived massacres and persecution during the First World War were hidden from Ottoman/Turkish authorities in the houses of Raqqa families. Most Armenians left Raqqa, but I was also told that some Armenian women married into native families. Native Raqqa townsmen voiced that such marriages were acts of charity and protection. I have unfortunately no information on the reactions of the women concerned.

Raqqa natives were proud of these memories and many often underlined that they not only read the Qur'an, but also the Bible. When Raqqa started to expand through developments in agriculture, Christians, mainly from Aleppo and the Hassake province, came to settle, as well. In the 1960's, an Armenian Catholic church was built and was used by all Christian denominations in the city until ISIS closed it down in 2014. This church was unsuccessfully protected by the townspeople as a symbol, I think, of the traditional conviviality in Raqqa between Muslims and Christians. The native Raqqa residents' care for Christians can be understood as part of a tribal ethos where hospitality toward strangers is idealized, but also to a kind of Muslim ethos where Jews and Christians – otherwise known as People of the Book – were seen as powerless and thus in need of Muslim protection.

In the memories of native townsmen, their ingrained hospitality was also extended to the small scale farmers fleeing drought in central and southern Syria who came to

Raqqa looking for work in the 1950's. According to townsmen, traders from Sukhne and Aleppo who settled with their families in Raqqa from the 1960's were also treated with welcoming hospitality although their *'adaat wa taqaliid* ("culture and traditions") differed. Native townspeople underlined that women and men were much more segregated in the social interactions among people from Aleppo and Sukhne. The more free association of women and men among native Raqqa people, as well as among regional villagers, was attributed to their pastoral and mobile past. In the village where I worked, the ideal of hospitality made people underline that women of the household would welcome and invite strangers if their menfolk were not around.

Long Term Research to Analyze Memory

How can the anthropological method of fieldwork with participant observation contribute to the analysis of memories and their role in conflict and conviviality? Analysis of and interest in memories has for a long time been an integral part of psychoanalysis and psychology and is commonly linked to explanations of individual trauma or illness. In these disciplines, as noted by Antze and Lambek (1996, p. xii), the metaphors are visual where "layers are excavated, veils lifted, screens removed." They do not reject such metaphors or the disciplines to which they are linked, but as anthropologists, they are instead interested in discursive aspects of memory. Memories, they underline, "are produced out of experience and in turn, reshape it" (Antze & Lambek, 1996). Memory is intimately connected to identity, but more as understood by modern historians and anthropologists than by psychologists or psychoanalysts. To understand how both autobiographical and historical memories are reproduced and performed, we need, I argue, a long term commitment to our fields and our informants. Memories – the way that the past is in the present and the present in the understanding of the past – need a context that can only be analyzed over time. When returning to people and places, Johannes Fabian notes, "meetings become more productive and enjoyable when they are reunions… Co-presence needs a shared past" (2007, p. 133).

In his influential book written in 1989, *How Societies Remember*, Paul Connerton underlines that the present social order is often legitimized through images of the past that are "conveyed and sustained through more or less ritual performances" (1989, p. 4). In his *How Modernity Forgets* (2009), he stresses that concomitantly to the contemporary culture of *hypermnesia* manifested through a cultural industry of memories and commemoration, we live in a "*post-mnemonic* culture – a modernity which forgets" (2009, p. 147). Forgetting, like remembering, is socially produced and a part of human history. Yet, Connerton argues that there is a particular structural forgetting in modernity (2009, p. 2). We consume collective memories, but forget the social and economic processes that have shaped our societies. His analysis thus underlines how history and memory are used and abused by people in power.

The sacking of land and the expulsion or massacre of people already living there is a well-known aspect of human history and an integral part of the development of human culture and civilization. We are very familiar with that part of our common history through archaeological remains, as well as through manuscripts, myths, literature, songs, and oral history. The history of Middle East and that of the Eastern Mediterranean clearly stand out in this respect. At the time of writing, Russian and the US-led coalition were conducting airstrikes over Raqqa and its countryside to eradicate ISIS. Support for these strikes, during which civilians become "collateral damage," have been strong in many countries where people have been shocked by the brutality of ISIS in the Raqqa province (and elsewhere). Yet, the methods and ideology of ISIS can be compared to other conquerors, and perhaps especially those used by Tamerlane and his troops in the 14th century who sacked Raqqa on their way from Baghdad to Aleppo, Damascus, and Anatolia. Hundreds of thousands of people were beheaded and women were carried off as slaves. Christians and Jews were hunted and killed as infidels and Muslims were killed when said not to be righteous enough. The methods used were of course meant to strike terror and intimidate all in their way.

Finding, in the terminology of Halbwachs, historical memories of brutality, terror, and bloodshed is thus not very difficult in contemporary Syria or Raqqa. For that reason, it is exceedingly important to underline that the peaceful co-existence and intermingling of conquerors and those conquered, eventually leading to the blurring of the two, is an equally, or more than equally, salient aspect of human history.

In the province of Raqqa, memories of hospitality and openness discussed above capture an image of everyday living together (cf. Rabo, 2011, p. 123). They constitute what I want to call *conviviality from below* to differentiate it from the kind of historical commemoration fostered from above. Such fostering of common memories – such forgetting of historical processes – is, of course, done by every aspiring political movement and every nationalist regime in an attempt to forge enthusiasm for common goals or to legitimize the current rule. The Syrian Ba'th party was no exception. In the beginning of the 1970s, when the huge Euphrates land reclamation and irrigation scheme was launched, the regional agricultural history was used by the Syrian authorities (cf. Ababsa, 2009, p. 185). With the help of the ruling Ba'th party, it was said, dry and unproductive lands would once again flourish and feed a large population. The Euphrates Scheme would become the motor of Syria's development and a magnet to repopulate the region. Yet, these bombastic proclamations neither stopped the drought nor the ensuing flight of rural people from the region prior to the uprising in 2011. The official use - abuse really - of history instead made people in the region blame the ruling party and the regime for the situation. The territorial claim of ISIS is infused with references to Islamic history. The link between Raqqa and Baghdad when Haroun ar-Rashid was caliph is obviously not unimportant. Still

though, if the alleged glories of that period are not re-emerging, then the claim will be weakened by those who have embraced it.

Using history, cultivating memories, and setting up commemorative performances and rituals from above is thus a doubled-edged sword. The outcome cannot be predicted by the powers that be. In a detailed probing of memory work in post-Soviet Ukraine, Yuliya Yurchuk underlines the complexity and lack of coherence in these processes. She found that people grappled with ways of finding a pre-Soviet Ukrainian history of World War II through an intensive interaction between private and public as well as local and national encounters involving both grassroots and bureaucrats. Examples from Lebanon and Iraq illustrate two very different, albeit equally problematic, ways to manage memories of wars and conflict.

In Iraq, as discussed by Dina Rizk Khoury in her book on war and remembrance in Iraq, the state had a monopoly on memoralization during and after the long war with Iran. Heroic (and masculine) memories were produced by the Ministry of Culture and Information for propaganda purposes and distributed to the public (Khoury, 2013, p. 185). After the invasion of the US-led forces in 2003 and the rapid devolution of the state and its institutions, there were no attempts in Baghdad or in Arbil "to develop a war narrative in a manner that could forge a pluralistic, non-authoritarian, national consensus on the legacies of Iraqis' encounter with violence" (ibid:245). But alternative media public debates on both the Iran-Iraq and the Gulf Wars are available and proliferating. These debates, however, are divisive and foster a discourse of conflict and division instead of one of conviviality and co-existence. The Lebanese war memoralization looks to a completely different direction with its long history of fragmentary politics and where sectarianism is built into the political system.

On February 3, 2013, the French channel TV5 aired the program Maghreb Orient Express devoted to discussing two new documentary films about Lebanon, Frédéric Laffont's *Liban, des guerres et des hommes*, and Joana Hadjithomas' and Khalil Joreige's *The Lebanese Rocket Society* with the three filmmakers and with photo-journalist Chérine Yazbeck (see Bahous et al., 2013). Laffont said that he was shocked when he realized that there was still no school material teaching school-children about the civil war between 1975 and 1990. He wanted to give a voice to ordinary Lebanese people and their memories of this period. Yazbeck insisted that the people of Lebanon are in a state of collective and permanent amnesia. Joreige, on the other hand, said that neither amnesia nor memories was Lebanon's problem; on the contrary, history was. "There is no official history of the war. No one has been made accountable for what happened during the war and a general amnesty was given to all combatants after the signing of the peace agreement in Taif in 1990," he said. Yazbeck underlined that although all Lebanese people and all families have their own

history of the war, an intimate history at that, a common history is rejected. Still, she also wondered if the general Lebanese public wanted to know what really happened during the war, stating that for many people, it might be too painful to relive history.

Educational researcher Munir Bashshour (2003, p. 167) noted that more than a decade after the Lebanese civil war ended and after the Taif agreement, the different Lebanese groups could still not agree on how to write their history. Efforts to unify the curricula went to no avail. More than a decade after Bashshur's research, this is still true. There is "no history" after the Lebanese civil war in the schoolbooks used in public schools. In many private schools, the modern history of Lebanon is simply avoided. The country has a long history of fostering citizens who are able to "combine a very parochial and narrow outlook on Lebanon with an open and inclusive outlook on the world outside the country" (Bahous et al., 2013, p. 74). This opens for extremely competing memories and political claims on the part of various militant groups and various political parties, as well as among citizens at large.

The Iraqi and Lebanese cases remind us that remembering and forgetting are never neutral processes, but are always linked to relationships of power. Memory, K. M. Fierke writes, "is less an extension of power than its constitutive condition" (2014, p. 791).

Conclusion: Cultivating Memories of Belonging and Conviviality

Memory should be historicized, Lambek and Antze remark in agreement with Pierre Nora. There are, he claimed "*lieux de mémoire*, sites of memory, because in the modern world there are no longer *milieux de mémoire*, real environments of memory" (Nora, 1989, p. 7). Instead forgetting and ignorance are being cultivated. With this being said, Antze and Lambek also remark that Nora romanticizes the crisis of real environments of memory. It is unlikely, they write, that "there ever was a homogenous *milieux de mémorie*, worlds of pure habit" (Lambek & Antze, 1996, p. xv) in which everything was self-evident and transparent. It is trivial, according to Fabian, to note that memory is selective (2007, p. 96). "No story can tell it all. If it could it wouldn't be a story" (Fabian, 2007, p. 98). Though it is important not to encourage an idealization in the memory work on pre-2011 Syria, it is equally important to encourage the pursuit of threads of the past that help make sense of the present. Both researchers and interlocutors need to reactivate and cultivate memories. Since 2013, I have not been able to talk to Amina, Najma, Khadija, or any other of my close friends (and simultaneously "informants") in Raqqa or the village. I have not been able to follow their fates and have only vague news of their whereabouts on which to cling. This terrible lacuna in my memory work has clearly shaped the way I have re-assessed, re-used, and re-membered material collected during the course of more than three decades.

Memories of the past can be an unbearable burden. Hence, memory work might also entail the work of forgetting, as alluded to by Yazbeck above. This is also echoed by Yurchuck, who discusses the difficulties in Ukraine in managing painful memories and problematic knowledge of war atrocities during World War II. Her discussion is relevant for Syrians today.[2] Can memories of conviviality from below be found and developed as a prerequisite for processes of reconciliation in the province of Raqqa and elsewhere in Syria? Can memories of peaceful co-existence and the historic intermingling of conqueror and conquered, settlers and already settled be cultivated unencumbered by historical memories forced from above, or by a structural forgetting which negates the experiences of ordinary people? I have to hope that this is indeed possible. Conviviality from below does not mean that people "have to love one another, but they have to accept that they share certain spaces" (Rabo, 2011, p. 145).

In the recent past, Raqqa natives and villagers, as discussed in this text, have experienced movement, settlement, being uprooted, putting down roots, and being uprooted again. They have experienced change, stability, and intense violence. In order to be a real provincial native, in the memories of my informants, you had to have roots in the region, had to have family living there, or be descended from someone who "belongs." To acquire such belonging or forming such roots seemed next to impossible. But actually, it was not. When I first came to Raqqa in the late 1970's I was told that real native townspeople did not marry into the families from Sukhne or Aleppo who had settled in the city. Three decades later, however, it was not unusual to hear that such marriages took place. "But are they not outsiders?" I asked one of Amina's daughters a few years ago. "No," she answered, "they have lived here a very long time. They are not natives, but they have formed roots here and now they belong."

To form roots, people have to commit themselves, or at least not be unwilling, to take part in such a process. At the same time, they have to be welcomed, or at least accepted, when doing this. To move, to uproot oneself, and to be mobile is as basic a human activity as putting down roots. For many people, uprooting is a source of liberation and a move away from economic hardship, political oppression, and smothering family relations or, as today in Syria, from violence and armed conflict. For some, uprooting is a means for putting down new and fresher roots somewhere else. It is this duality and their entailing conflicts that we can highlight to hopefully support developments of conviviality for Syrians in the coming decades.

2 Peace and reconciliation efforts are becoming an important research topic in many academic disciplines. For an overview of anthropological studies of national reconciliation processes, see Wilson (2003).

References

Ababsa, M. (2005). *Privatisation in Syria. State farms and the case of the Euphrates Project* (European University Institute Working Papers RSCAS no 2005/02). Retrieved from http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/2789/05_02.pdf

Ababsa, M. (2009). *Raqqa. Territoires et pratiques sociale d'une ville syrienne* [Raqqa. Territories and social practice of a Syrian town]. Beyrouth, Liban: Institut français du Proche-Orient.

Aita, S. (2007). L'Économie de la Syria peut-elle devenir sociale? Vous avez dit: 'Économie sociale de marché'? [Can the Syrian economy become social? You have said: 'The market's social economy'?]. In B. Dupret, Z. Ghazzal, Y. Courbage & et M. al-Dbiyat (Eds.), *La Syrie au présent. Reflets d'une société* [Present day Syria. Reflections of a society] (pp. 540–579). Paris, France: Sindibad, Actes Sud.

Antze, P., & Lambek, M. (1996). Introduction. In P. Antze & M. Lambek (Eds.), *Cultural essays in trauma and memory* (pp. xi–xxxviii). New York, NY: Routledge.

Bahous, R., Nabhani, M., & Rabo, A. (2013). Parochial education in a global world? Teaching history and civics in Lebanon. *Nordidactica, 1*, 57–79.

Berliner, D. (2005). The abuses of memory. Reflections on the memory boom in Anthropology. *Anthropological Quarterly*, *78*(1), 197–211.

Chatty, D. (1986). *From camel to truck. The Bedouin in the modern world*. New York, NY: Vintage Press.

Connerton, P. (1989). *How societies remember*. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.

Connerton, P. (2009). *How modernity forgets*. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.

Coser, L. A. (1992). Introduction: Maurice Halbwachs 1877-1945. In M. Halbwachs (Ed.), *On collective memory* (pp. 1–34). Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press.

Fabian, J. (2007). *Memory against culture. Arguments and reminders*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Fierke, K. M. (2014). Who is my neighbour? Memories of the holocaust/Al Nakba and a global ethics of care. *European Journal of International Relations*, *20*(3), 789–809.

Gorgas, J. T. (2007). Les Kurdes de Syrie de la 'dissimulation à la 'visibilité'? [The Kurds of Syria. From concealment to visibility]. *Revue des Mondes Musulmans et de la Méditerranée, 115-116*, 117–133.

Halbwachs, M. (1992). *On collective memory*. Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press.

Hannoyer, J. (1980). Le monde rural avant les réformes [The rural world before the reforms]. In A. M. Bianquis & O. Carré (Eds.), *La Syrie d'Aujourd'hui* [Today's Syria] (pp. 273–95). Paris, France: Centre national del la Recherche Scientifique.

Khalaf, S. (1981). *Family, village and the political party. Articulation of social change in contemporary rural Syria* (Doctoral dissertation, University of California).

Khawaja, M. (2002). *Internal migration in Syria. Findings from a national survey*. Oslo, Norway: Fine Arts for Ocala.

Khoury, D. R. (2013). *Iraq in wartime. Soldiering, martyrdom, and remembrance*. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.

Kienle, E. (Ed.). (1994). *Contemporary Syria. Liberalization between Cold War and Cold Peace*. London, UK: British Academic Press & I. B. Tauris.

Lewis, N. N. (1987). *Nomads and settlers in Syria and Jordan, 1800-1980*. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.

Meyer, G. (1982). Umsiedlungsprobleme des Syrischen Euphrat Projects [Resettlements problems in the Syrian Euphrates Project]. *Geographische Rundschau, 34*(12), 553–567.

Meyer, G. (1984). *Ländliche Lebens- und Wirtschaftsformen Syriens im Wandel* [Rural forms of life and economy in a changing Syria]. Erlangen: Selbstverlag der Fränkischen Geographischen Gesellschaft in Kommission bei Palm & Enke.

Müller, V. (1931). *En Syrie avec les bédouins. Les tribus du désert* [In Syria with the bedouin. The desert tribes]. Paris, France: Librairie Ernest, Leroux.

Nora, P. (1989). Between memory and history. Les lieux de mémoire. *Representations, 26*, 7–24.

Petran, T. (1972). *Syria*. London, UK: Ernest Benn Limited.

Rabo, A. (1986). *Change on the Euphrates, villagers, townsmen and employees in Northeast Syria*. Stockholm: Stockholm Studies in Social Anthropology.

Rabo, A. (1997). Att röra på sig och att rota sig. Migrationsdebatter i Raqqaprovinsen i norra Syrien. In L.-E. Åse & T. Lundén (Eds.), *Mellanöstern. Mellan öst och väst* (pp. 68–81). Stockholm: Svenska Sällskapet för Antropologi och Geografi.

Rabo, A. (2010). To roam or to be rooted? Movement, mobility and settlement in northeast Syria. In N. Naguib & B.de Vries (Eds.), *Movement of people in time and space: Heureux qui comme Ulysses a fait un beau voyage* (Happy the one who likes Ulysses has made a beautiful trip pp. 49–67). Bergen, Norway: Uni Global, University of Bergen.

Rabo, A. (2011). Conviviality and conflict in contemporary Aleppo. In A. Longva & A. S. Roald (Eds.), *Religious minorities in the Middle East. Domination, Self-Empowerment, Accommodation* (pp. 123–147). Leiden, Netherlands: Brill.

TV 5 Monde. (February 3, 2013). *Maghreb Orient Express*.

Warriner, D. (1957). *Land reform and development in the Middle East. A study of Egypt, Syria, and Iraq*. London, UK: Royal Institute of International Affairs.

White, B. T. (2011). *The emergence of minorities in the Middle East. The politics of community in French Mandate Syria*. Edinburgh, UK: Edinburgh University Press.

Wilson, R. A. (2003). Anthropological studies of national reconciliation processes. *Anthropological Theory*, *3*(3), 367–387.

Yurchuk, Y. (2014). *Reordering of meaningful worlds. Memory of the organization of Ukrainian nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army in Post-Soviet Ukraine* (Stockholm Studies in History 103). Stockholm: Department of History Stockholm University.

MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL OF REFUGEE STUDIES

Araştırma Makalesi

Bir Denetimler Dünyasına Cevap: Suriye'den Lübnan'a Giden Filistinli Mültecilere Yönelik Araştırmalarda Sömürülmekten Kurtaran Bir Araç Olarak Sözlü Tarih

Mette Edith Lundsfryd[a]

Öz

Bu makale, sabit bölgesel alanlar olarak geleneksel sınır kavramının geçerliliğini sorgulamaktadır. 2011 yılında Suriye'den Lübnan'a kaçan ve hâlâ Lübnan'da tabiiyetsiz şekilde yaşayan sekiz Filistinli mültecinin anlatılarını, bir yöntem ve eleştiri olarak sözlü tarih vasıtasıyla inceledim. Sözlü tarih, geçmiş ve güncel olayların anlatılarına erişim imkânı sağlayan metodolojik bir güce sahiptir. Bu anlatıların bir kısmı, 1948 yılında halkın Filistin'den toplu şekilde tahliye edildiği Nakba/Nekbe (felaket [günü]) olayını mevcut Suriye kriziyle ilişkilendirmektedir. Bu güncel Suriye krizi de Suriye'den gelen Filistinliler tarafından yeni ve süregelen Nakba/Nekbe şeklinden algılanmaktadır. Bu anlatıların sahipleri sınır geçmeyi sıklıkla kendi gerçekliklerinin nüfuz eden bir parça olarak tecrübe ederler. Bu gerçeklik ayrıca sınırların tabiiyetsiz insanların hayatları üzerinde empoze ettiği tehditlerin bir sonucu olan "sosyal ölüm" şeklinde tanımlanabilir. Bu hikâyelerin bir sınırlar dünyasına cevap sunarken ulus devlet kaynaklı sabit alanlar olarak sınırlar düzenine meydan okuduğunu iddia etmekteyim. Öz düşünümsellik, bölüşülmüş otorite ve ilişki sürdürme stratejilerini kullanarak bir Avrupa ülkesi pasaportu bulundurma ayrıcalığı gibi bir ayrıcalığa sahip olmanın, coğrafi bölgeler arasında belgeyle geçiş yapma tecrübesine sahip olmanın bir denetimler dünyasına cevap yolu olmasını tartışmaya açıyorum.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Suriyeli Filistinliler • Tabiiyetsizlik • Sınırlar • Sözlü tarih • Nakba/Nekbe (Felaket) • Zorunlu göç

a (✉) Mette Edith Lundsfryd (Doktor adayı), Department of Sociology, University of Leicester, Bankfield House 132 New Walk Leicester LE1 7JA, United Kingdom. Eposta: mettelundsfryd@gmail.com

Başvuru: 12 Kasım 2016
Revizyon Gönderimi: 20 Aralık 2016
Kabul: 10 Şubat 2017
Online First: 15 Eylül 2017

ISSN 2149-4398 • **eISSN** 2458-8962
DOI 10.12738/mejrs.2017.2.1.0110 • Kış 2017 • 2(1) • 73–95

MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL OF REFUGEE STUDIES

Research Article

Speaking Back to a World of Checkpoints: Oral History as a Decolonizing Tool in the Study of Palestinian Refugees from Syria in Lebanon

Mette Edith Lundsfryd[a]

Abstract

This article questions the validity of conventional notions of borders as fixed territorial areas. Through oral history as a method and critique, I examine the narratives of eight persons who are Palestinian stateless refugees from Syrian who have escaped to neighboring Lebanon since 2011. Oral history has a methodological strength that allows access to narratives of past and present events, some of which link the mass eviction of people from Palestine in 1948 – known as *Al-Nakba* (the Catastrophe), to the current-day Syrian crisis, which is perceived by Palestinians from Syria as a new and ongoing *Nakba (al Nakba al mustamirrah in Arabic)*. The narrators of this often experience border crossing as a pervasive part of their reality one that can be described as "social death," a result of the limitations imposed by borders on the lives of stateless people. I argue that the accounts presented speak back to a world of borders whilst challenging the nation-state driven order of borders as fixed spaces. Through strategies of self-reflexivity, shared authority and maintaining relations, I open a discussion of how to use privilege, for example the privilege of possessing a European passport, and having the recourses to document experiences across geographical areas, as a way of speaking back to a world of checkpoints whilst advocating a process of research decolonization.

Keywords

Palestinians of Syria • Statelessness • Borders • Oral history • Al-Nakba • Forced migration

a (✉) Mette Edith Lundsfryd (PhD candidate and Graduate Research Assistant) School of Media, Communication & Sociology, University of Leicester, UK. Email: mels1@le.ac.uk

Received: November 12, 2016
Revision received: December 20, 2016
Accepted: January 10, 2017
Online First: September 15, 2017

ISSN 2149-4398 • **eISSN** 2458-8962
DOI 10.12738/mejrs.2017.2.1.0110 • Winter 2017 • 2(1) • 73–95

In this article I interrogate the validity of conventional notions of borders as fixed territorial areas. Through oral history as method and critique, I examine the narratives of Palestinian stateless refugees from Syria who have escaped the current-day Syrian crisis to neighboring Lebanon since 2011. In particular, I reflect upon the consequences of a worldwide phenomenon of discrimination against people who have crossed borders as forced migrants. In order to do so, I focus solely on Palestinians from Syrian, a population that is often neglected in the frenzy of media and scholarly interest concerning refugees from Syria. Palestinians from Syria have escaped war-torn Syria to neighboring countries such as Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey since 2011 along with Syrian nationals and other such minorities as Syrian Kurds, Iraqis based in Syria, and Assyrians. Between December 2012 and April 2014, at least 53,070 Palestinians from Syria sought refuge in Lebanon. The United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) estimates that in May 2014 approximately 42,000 Palestinians from Syria remain in Lebanon (UNHCR, 2015; UNRWA, 2014a, 2014b). Estimates from the Beirut-based Palestinian Refugee Portal tells us that as of November 2016 at least 45.000 Palestinians from Syria are in Lebanon, (November 2016). In comparison, nearly 17,000 Palestinians from Syria are registered in Jordan. Jordan officially closed its borders to Palestinians in the spring of 2012. Lebanon and Turkey followed suit in 2014 (UNHCR, 2015). Palestinians from Syria have, as all forced migrants from Syria, sought refuge in neighboring areas including, Iraq, the West Bank, Gaza, the Golan Heights, Turkey, Egypt, and beyond (UNRWA, 2014c). Yet, Lebanon remains the country with the highest number of registered Palestinian Syrians. Since, however, many Palestinian from Syrian are not registered, these figures do not show the entire picture.

In the mist of the current-day Syrian crisis, stateless Palestinian refugees from Syria find themselves in a vulnerable situation with only few parallels. This would include the stateless Kurdish-Syrian population (see Eliassi, 2016). While the entire Syrian population suffers from the violence in the country and the hostility towards them in welcoming societies and multiple parallels of hardship have been created as a consequence of the on-going war, the situation of Palestinians from Syria in Lebanon remains unique due to their immobility, and their rightless and stateless situation (Qandil, 2013; Sayigh, 2013). Their situation is rightless in the sense that they enjoy no rights of protection as refugees from the international society (UNHCR and aid agencies or NGOs, other than the UNRWA) or the nation-state of Lebanon, no civic rights, and no rights to return to their place of origin (this will be explained further in the section "Understanding the Protection Gap").

In order to conceptualize their situation, I look at the circumstances of Palestinian Syrians through the concept of "social death" (also known as "civic death") whilst linking scholarly discourses about social death to the narratives that I uncovered

through oral history. I use the concepts "radicalized rightlessness" and *social death* to describe the consequences of processes of racialization (Cacho, 2013). Scholars such as Sherene Razack have analysed the categorically different treatment of immigrants and refugees with Muslim backgrounds in Western law through the lens of Giorgio Agamben's "state and camps of exception" (Razack, 2008). I argue that "racialized rightlessness" and "social death" captures more precisely than "states of exception" the situation of Palestinians in Lebanon and leaves room to show that discrimination is multilevelled both in Western and non-Western societies. "Racialized rightlessness" is constructed through historical processes of legitimating a mode of racial determination through law practices: internationally, nationally and locally. "Social death" is a condition constructed by the deprivation of the right to have rights and by the use of racism as a "killing abstraction" – meaning that measures which can kill, are used against specific ethno-racially determined groups (Cacho, 2013 p. 7).

As defined by Orlando Paterson (1982), social death is a state of social negation, depersonalization, and non-being (Dance, 2016). Social death can be further understood as "ineligibility to personhood" – something that happens *before*, *during* and *after* border crossing (Cacho, 2013, p. 8) and that becomes representative of lives not worthy of grievance (Butler, 2014). Hence, this is an analysis of the effects of the mechanisms of state control, the politics of citizenship, and the exclusion of populations, which I examine through the narratives of the Palestinians from Syria that I encountered during my extensive research in Lebanon and on the Syrian/Lebanese frontier. For that purpose, I use oral history as a decolonizing tool whilst arguing that borders and territoriality are concepts used in commonsense ways in everyday discourses, yet they must be challenged in this period of immense transition. In the practice of decolonial research we as scholars (and part of a privileged established industry) should be frank about the before, during and after research procedures we practice, while being critical of the processes of racialization, sexualization and othering created within the institutions we work for. More than that as oral historians we must include the narrators in our interpretation of recordings and prioritize the narratives of those, whose histories have been silenced by racial and Orientalizing discourses. In that sense, my analysis is situated within an already existing critical literature on *re*conceptualizing borders and on racialization of disadvantaged populations (for example Al-Hardan, 2016; Cacho, 2013; Dance, 2016; De Genova & Peutz, 2010; Gregory, 2004; Megoran, 2006; Razack, 2008; Salih, 2016; Steinberg, 2009; Tawil-Souri, 2015).

Based on interviews with eight individuals collected during field work in Lebanon in the spring of 2014 (Lundsfryd, 2015), this study contests and renegotiates conventional notions of borders as fixed territorial areas, arguing for a more fluid distinction between "hard" and "soft" borders (see Tawil-Souri, 2015). Borders are

not simply neutral physical dividers, but interactive, reactive spaces that have the power to transform those who are crossing them and living within them. Through new systems of control, borders have become more diffuse and, because of that, also all the more pervasive. Yet the main argument of this article is that for people who have been stripped of their civic rights and who carry stateless legal identification documents borders are always already experienced as pervasive.

In the reminder, I discuss the problem of what is called "the protection gap" perhaps better described as the international community's on-going failure to guarantee the access to safe territory and international protection of Palestinian refugees. I follow with a description of oral history as a methodology whilst discussing its advantages as a method for studying the juxtaposition between the victims of forced migration and border crossings. I also discuss some of the approaches used in the collection of my data and, in particular, how to access oral histories. Subsequently, I present a summarized sample of some of the narratives I have encountered in my study of border crossings whilst introducing the narrative of Palestinians who have been forced out of Syria. I conclude by arguing that the accounts of victims of forced migration presented *speak back* to a world of borders whilst challenging the nation-state driven order of borders as fixed spaces.

Understanding "the Protection Gap"

One phrase echoed through the narratives of my participants was their experience of the world as "a world of checkpoints." At large, the phrase refers to border policies that act as pervasive power tools that have physical, mental, and social effects. For the participants in my research, borders did not seem to be limited to the fixed spaces of public international border crossing. Rather, borders both in Syria and in Lebanon were the spatial markers, which divided "us" from "them" As Walid, one of the many Palestinians from Syria I met, explains:

> I escaped Syria to get away from the checkpoints and the roadblocks of the Syrian regime. Away from the fear of being captured. What I found in Lebanon is a world of checkpoints and constant fear of detention and deportation to Syria.

The narrator, using the pseudonym Walid, is a young man born in 1988 in Khan Es-Sheih.[1] Educated as a computer technician, Walid left Syria on foot one early November morning in 2013 due to the risk of being captured by the Syrian regime following his participation in anti-regime activities since February 2011.

1 Khan Es-Sheih is a town 27 km southwest of Damascus. In 1949 the town took its form through hosting Palestinian refugees in tents. In 2011, some 20,000 registered Palestinian refugees lived in the area. Today the town is labelled "inaccessible "and "a place of active conflict" (UNRWA, 2016). In the fall of 2016, the remaining civilians in the town suffered under a governmental imposed siege and heavy Russian bombardments (Palestinian Refugees Portal, 2016; Rollins, 2016).

In order to understand this situation, I investigate the lived experiences of people trying to navigate the legal labyrinth that Palestinian refugees in the "Near East" (UNRWA[2]-area[3]) must endure under the threat of deportation for those who do not meet the status of refugee and are then sent back to war zones (De Genova & Peutz, 2010). The legal framework is relevant for the study of border crossing since illegibility to protection and much of the discrimination directed toward Palestinians is at least partly caused by the positioning of legal frameworks. Legal experts have dubbed the matter "the protection gap" (Akram, 2011; Knudsen, 2007) that is fostered by a limiting international human rights framework (Feldman & Ticktin, 2010; Moyn, 2012).

The protection gap refers to the failure of the international community to guarantee access to safe territory and international protection of Palestinian refugees (Qandil, 2013). It stems from the on-going failure of the repatriation of Palestinians to Palestine after 1948, that is, the failure to meet "the right of return" (Akram, 2011). UNRWA, the UN agency responsible for interpreting the situation of Palestinians in the Near East, was formed in December 1949, but it lacks a *protection* mandate (Chatty, 2010). In theory, UNRWA helps to provide for the material needs of refugees and does not offer legal protection (Akram, 2011). The United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine (UNCCP) was the only UN agency with an actual protection mandate written into its principles by UNGA in 1950 (Custer, 2011, p. 47). Nevertheless, financial cuts post-1952 and the reductions of donors' support made the UNCCP unable to function. Although this did not take away the protection mandate from the UNCCP, a consequence of the cutbacks was that, to this day, no effective agency has a protection mandate in place (Akram, 2011). The protection gap builds on the dual exclusion clauses implicit in the 1951 Refugee Convention (RC) established with the United Nations Higher Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The exclusion clauses of Article 1(2) (i) deprives stateless Palestinian refugees from legal protection both by the UNHCR and also by the 1954 Convention of the Status of Stateless Persons (CSSP), since the conventions cease to apply to persons whom are receiving protection or assistance from agencies other than the UNHCR (El-Malek, 2006, p. 194). As Palestinians in Lebanon and Syria receive assistance from UNRWA – another agency of the UN – they enjoy no protection status from the UNHCR. Also, it is prescribed in the UN body that under the international human rights law, Palestinian refugees may only seek repatriation to the territories internationally recognized to be under the authority of the Fateh led Palestinian Authority or to their birthplace in what is today Israel, not asylum in a third country (Allan, 2014, p. 169). Hence, by law, Palestinian refugees cannot be a part of the RC or the CSSP, even though

2 United Nations Relief and Work Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA)
3 Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and the Occupied Territories of Palestine.

Palestinians constitute one of the largest stateless refugee populations worldwide (UNHCR, 2014; UNRWA, 2014d).

All this leaves the responsibility of protection to the national and local hosting communities. However, Palestinians in Lebanon, whether from Syria or Lebanon itself, suffer from local discriminatory practices. For example, Lebanon refuses to abide by the Casablanca Protocol of the League of Arab States from 1965, which should guarantee Palestinians equality in employment, freedom of movement between Arab states, the right to be issued travel documents, freedom of residence, and rights to leave and to return (Knudsen, 2007). Whilst Lebanon prohibits the naturalization of Palestinians, Israel rejects their return. The Palestinian Authority legally grants repatriation to a Palestinian state, but only within the 1967 borders. Finally, one cannot return to the warzone that is Syria whilst Europe has become a *de facto* fortress (Allan, 2014; Andersson, 2014).

In recent history, entry, and visa regulations for Palestinian refugees from Syria into Lebanon have been arbitrary and since 2011, there have been incessant *ad hoc* regulations. For instance, the entry ban and visa regulations - known as the closing of the border - launched by the Lebanese authorities in May 2014 were solely targeting Palestinian Syrians (Amnesty International, 2014; Human Rights Watch, 2014). Such discriminatory policies play a large role in the narratives I encountered during my research which are somewhat encapsulated in the idea that for Palestinians from Syria, life is "a world of checkpoints."

Since August 2013, Palestinian Syrians could only enter Lebanon if they had a valid airplane ticket out of Lebanon within 24 hours or were lucky enough to be granted a 15-day tourist visa. However, the tourist visa applied another hardship since it contests the refugee status. After 15 days, one needed to go to the Lebanese General Security (LGS) to renew the visa. Many feared this procedure for the imminent danger of being imprisoned and/or deported, as a result of having their visa extension denied. Only a few refugees were arbitrarily issued a three-month visa. However, today this visa is no longer issued to Palestinians from Syria. This denies Palestinians who are still in Syria access to Western Embassies in Lebanon, from where they can apply for family unification and visas, and access to safe territory. As of August 6, 2013, Lebanon implemented a pushback policy by denying Palestinian Syrians the right to enter Lebanon (Qandil, 2013). In May 2014, the LGS changed their procedures and now to have the visa issued, Palestinians from Syria were asked to pay around 17 US Dollars more for a visa than Syrian nationals. The visa was issued for 48 hours only, which means that the majority, in the eyes of the authorities, would be "illegal aliens" within 48 hours and would consequently be eligible for deportation.

Oral History as Methodology

Oral history is an ethnographic method that takes advantage of both recent and distant history in order to help interpret the present. The techniques of interpretation involved in oral history originate in archival practices aiming to contest conventional grand-narrative history writing (Portelli, 1991; Shopes, 2013). This is proven relevant in the on-going silencing of Palestinian history (Sayigh, 1994). Oral history does not seek representativity. Rather, it seeks to inject history with the subjective complexity of life experiences. It entails collecting information on the specific events, experiences, memories, and ways of life of those whose stories are often omitted from mainstream historical accounts of events, such as the subjective experiences of stateless persons, refugees, undocumented migrants, people of color, transgender individuals, and working class women (Minister, 1991). I subscribe my work to a recent version of oral history more closely connected to advocacy than to archival work that defends the use of oral history as a decolonializing tool (Al-Hardan, 2015, 2016; Doumani, 2009; Khalili, 2007; Sayigh, 2014).

The research design has developed through encounters with literature, pilot-testing, exchanges with scholars, human rights experts, activists, peers, and participants, as well as through ethnographic observations. Before embarking on field trips to Lebanon, I conducted a pilot oral history recording session in Sweden.[4] Through the preliminary recordings, the emic-category of *pervasiveness of borders* occurred. These early interviews led me to focus on the subjective experiences of discriminatory border policies.

I chose this path out of a desire to follow a decolonizing and deterritorializing methodological approach to the study of border crossing experiences. The individuals, whose voices are echoed here, are subjects of a colonial history, a contemporary "coloniality" as a stateless community of individuals. Famously, Edward Said offered a strong critique of the discourse of orientalism and pinpointed an obligation inherited from centuries of superior Western power/knowledge production about "the other" (1978, p. 52). The obligation is to contest colonizing research practices with a commitment to a critical epistemology of decolonization and reflexive methodologies (Al-Hardan, 2014).

Driven by the participants' strengths and capacities to resist their current "racialized rightless," "social death" (Cacho, 2013; Patterson, 1982) and "stateless" circumstances (Arendt, 1951), the "situated knowledge" collected was shared through combining researcher and participant-ascribed categories (Haraway, 2003, p. 34). The circular process of combining researcher and participant-ascribed categories took shape in practice after collecting and transcribing the oral histories. I asked the narrators to

4 Initial recordings were conducted with 25 years old Mahmoud and his parents.

help me select the most central ideas, stories, and quotes in their accounts. That way, I avoided taking the powerful position of selecting what has importance and what does not. In the process, it was also very beneficial to have the narrators re-explain parts of their stories to me. Still, I was in control of the final editing of the research excerpts. It is thus with my full awareness of the inescapable patterns of powers embedded in my research that I present the narratives in this paper with an aim of revealing and also providing a venue to speak back to these very patterns of power that give us uneven privileges and our current world of checkpoints.

Collecting oral histories. The strategies used to access the narrators were through the use of a personal network established in Lebanon and Syria, in camp and non-camp settings, during visits I made between 2011 and 2014. The eight main narrators were encountered through networks and three gatekeepers: one in a refugee camp setting, one in a local grassroots organization, and one through private networks. I conducted the oral history recordings, rapport building, and observations in areas where Palestinians from Syria have settled, mostly pre-established Palestinian refugee camps, squats, and private homes. Through periodic fieldwork and volunteer work in these areas since 2011, I had an already established network and knowledge about the camps and the conditions of Palestinians in Lebanon in general. All communication was conducted in spoken colloquial Arabic - the mother tongue of the narrators and therefore, I required no assistance from an external interpreter. Through methods of shared authority (Frisch, 1990), I invited the narrators to co-interpret the recordings. Through asking individuals what they think is important that others be told about their experience, an inter-subjective process paved the way for choosing the main subjects of analysis, i.e. experiences of pervasive borders and the ongoing Nakba.

The narrators chose the time and locations of recordings. This gave them control, which in turn created trust in the otherwise insecure and hostile setting of the refugee camps. Although oral history emphasizes conducting face-to-face individual interviews, this was at times impossible due to the circumstances of camp and family life. Most of the camp dwellers have one or two rooms in their houses. Often the bedroom room is made into a living room during the day where piles of mattresses gather in the corner. Therefore at times, entire families were together in one room for the recording session or for one of my numerous visits and most often the women stayed inside because of their more vulnerable situation.

I was momentarily dubbed as "an insider" by the participants, amongst other signs showed through them by calling me *khayta* (sister). Nonetheless I am a privileged outsider and there will always be a sense of otherness toward me. The privileged position of being a white female scholar with a European passport imposed certain responsibilities on me toward my participants. The narratives I am about to present

need to be understood in the light of the participants' emphasis on certain aspects about me based on their understanding of my interests and how I framed my questions (Allan, 2007).

Through informed consent, the narrators were guaranteed anonymity and the right to withdraw from the study at any time. Anonymity was secured through pseudonyms. However, by request of participants themselves, I kept the names of their places of residence in Syria and their families' origin in Palestine, since these places have significant meaning for the narrators. In that sense, the omission of place names would be yet another step toward the silencing of Palestinian narratives. The narrators of this study were born, grew up, and lived until their escape in Yarmouk Camp[5] placed in the Southern part of Damascus and the Khan Es-Sheih Camp southwest of Damascus. Both areas have since 2014 been labeled by UNRWA as "not accessible" due to siege and violence in addition to lack of water, food, and electricity (UNRWA, 2014). As for the rest of Syria, the situation in both places has deteriorated. Yarmouk Camp is today a battlefield between the militant groups known as ISIL and al-Nusra, who are fighting amongst the remaining civilians in the camp (Strickland, 2016). Khan Es-Shieh camp still experiences massive shelling and destruction and has been cut from Damascus by a government-imposed siege since June 2015 (Moghli, Bitarie, & Gabiam, 2015).

"A World of Checkpoints": Analyzing Oral Histories

Pervasive borders as markers of social death. Borders become pervasive not only as a metaphor in the mind of the narrators, but also as a concrete barrier since they are – a'la hawia (by legal identity) - always outside of the framework of the law. The Palestinian legal identity - al-fisha (the chip) - establishes specific sets of regulatory constraints on the living body that carries it. All narrators expressed the sentiment that "al filastinieen mamnuaa adtaeech" (the lives of Palestinians are forbidden). The institutionalized racism based on national, sectorial, and racial origin within the legal identity, or being forced not to have one, combined with the surveillance and checkpoint strategy applied by the Lebanese authorities are the main elements forming their pervasive border experiences. Balsam, a young Palestinian Syrian man born in 1986 who finished vocational training as an engineer assistant in Damascus, expressed the burden as follows:

> Palestinians are refugees. They do not have a passport. We do not have a Palestinian identity. We do not have personal national numbers. We only have the refugee cards which say that you are a Palestinian refugee in the eyes of UNRWA. That is my only identity. If

5 Yarmouk Camp was established in 1957 as an unofficial camp. Until 2012, it was a lively neighborhood of Damascus as well as the largest Palestinian community in Syria inhabited by more than 200,000 civilians, among which at least 148,500 were registered Palestinian refugees (UNRWA, 2016). Today, less than 3,000 civilians remain in Yarmouk Camp.

> someone asks me: are you a Palestinian from Palestine? I say yes, and then he says, what is your identity? And I say that is my identity. It's written on my Palestinian identity card. And then he says, but that is not your identity, where is your passport? And I say that I do not have a passport. A passport is muwaqqat (temporary) for Palestinian refugees. This is not a passport this is muwaqqat.

Legal identities create a person's bureaucratic label and determine their eligibility for services, or right to movement; all of which could mean the difference between life and death (Feldman, 2012). Social death in a Lebanese context is a result of carrying a Palestinian legal identity, and physical death is a possible result of the treatment one is subjected to due to that legal identity, e.g. through detention and deportation to Syria and due to personal qualities such as dialect, clothing, skin-color, and education. The narrators' stories work to illuminate circumstances in which unfolding "the good life" becomes forbidden through legal identities and ethno-racial targeting.

Experiences of Khanaq. The border crossing experiences are constructed out of what I label memories of the pre-crossing, crossing, and the post-crossing narratives. The three levels of storytelling are interwoven and at once connected to the near past and to collective memories of atrocities since 1948. When investigating border-crossings experiences, I found, that the narratives were connected to the memories of what was immediately left behind (e.g. family members, living places, significant objects and childhood memories). Moreover, the participants' narratives were built on experiences of how the road walked and the path ahead enclosed them, creating a rightless vacuum that most narrators articulated as a feeling of khanaq (strangulation). The experiences of Khaled illustrate this well. Born in 1964, Khaled, a father of three, gained a high school education and has since been engaged in political community work. He fled to Lebanon by car twice and crossed the official border crossing at Al-Masnaa in January and August 2013, since then he has been living in a camp in Southern Beirut. He was forced to leave his family in Syria since they could not pay for the entire families' life in Lebanon. He hoped to be able to reach Europe and seek asylum and be reunited with his family there. Khaled poignantly explained his experience of what he called "imprisonment in Lebanon."

> It's a bad and lamentable feeling to begin with. The freedom to move is one of man's most basic rights. When this basic right is taken away from you, you're actually being ripped of your humanity. What more can one say? You feel you've been imprisoned and you're being strangled.

The act of border crossing and the border control practices separated them from their families and loved ones. All narrators used the word *khanaq* as a metaphor describing their lived experiences. The word did not refer to physical strangulation, but was used instead to describe the feelings of distress caused by immediate material concerns, the lack of legal protection, and the experiences of regulated immobility all connected to the idea of social death.

A present history. By addressing experiences of border crossing into Lebanon, a gateway was opened to memories of life in pre-war Syria, and via the connection of these memories to life in, and displacement from, Palestine. Thus, when talking about the past, two levels of post-memory occurred. One was the memory of the narrators' own personal life in Palestinian communities within Syria and the other was the memory of the stories handed down by family members and the community about Palestine. In the recordings, the latter is manifested through the memories of the participants' parents and grandparents of Al-Nakba and other displacement stories since 1948.

Balsam's legal identity is labeled a "Palestinian refugee." However, he possesses both Palestinian and Syrian travel documents[6] and carries a Syrian passport marked with a ف (*fa*) for *filastinee* (Palestinian nationality). Balsam first attempted to escape Syria to Jordan in 2012, but was denied entry and then escaped to Lebanon and then from Lebanon by airplane to Jordan. However, his expired work visa forced him to return to Lebanon in January 2013.

During a one-on-one recording-session, Balsam told me about the name of the Palestinian community into which he was born in Syria. He did so while telling me about his own departure from the community of Khan Es-Sheih:

> I feel disconnected not just to Palestine, but also to my childhood, which was in Syria. Like the flower of my childhood has been killed. The area that we call Khan Es-Sheih, was an area called al-Khan. And what does Al-Khan mean? A long time ago, it was a place for merchants and travelers who came from Saudi Arabia, they came to Jordan and Palestine and then to Golan. From Golan they went to Khan before they reached Damascus. So Khan (which means an Inn) is a place you come and rest and the Khan is very old. There are still ruins of the old buildings of the Khan today. It was like a place to come and rest and take a break on the way to Damascus. It was a huge intermission area. There were stables for the cattle so they could eat and drink water. So during the break you could have lunch or whatever you like. So this was the meaning of Khan. And Sheih was a flower which existed in the area and its name was Sheih. So the name of the place was Khan to symbolize the existence of the ancient resting place, which was there. But as time went by, the place has disappeared. When my family was separated into two parts in Palestine, my mother's family went to Jordan and my father's new family went to Syria, in Golan. For two years they were in al-Ghazalia, al-Hemme, and al-Aal. Then they moved to an area called Al-'Artebeh. After Ghazalia… and then they went to the camp, to Khan Es-Sheih. This place was my childhood, and now they (the regime) killed the flower.

Balsam's narrative about Khan Es-Sheih tells us about the knowledge of history connected to the places of living and the places to which his family has been displaced. His story is at once described in a historical perspective that goes further back than

6 Balsam inherited his legal status from his grandfather who by chance received a Syrian passport when he escaped to Damascus during the Battle of the Golan Heights in 1973.

the current history of the Palestinian population in Syria. At the same time, it tells us about his current situation and feeling of being uprooted, his parents' separation under flight from Palestine to Jordan and Syria and his own connection to all of the places mentioned.

Another example of experiences of the past and of *Al-Nakba* can be seen in a conversation between Mahmoud and his father during their exile in Sweden. A 25-year old man born in Yarmouk Camp, Mahmoud studied law until he was forced to leave Damascus in 2011. Escaping Syria to Lebanon, he used a student visa to arrive in Sweden in 2013 where he enjoys political asylum today. During a recording, Mahmoud asked his father a seemingly simple question.

> Mahmoud: I always forget your age, dad. Or I imagine that you are 60 years old.
>
> Father: Officially, I am 68 years old, 67 in reality. In fact I don't know what my actual age is. Because families used to borrow kids from each other, so they could present them in front of UNRWA and receive relief, so I was borrowed many times.
>
> Mahmoud: Who borrowed you?
>
> Father: Many people from our neighborhood. We borrowed (kids) as well. We have a kid whom we "killed" on paper and later, it gave us a lot of headaches to let the kid "die" (I mean on paper). Your uncle, Abo Khaled, also borrowed a kid. Sometimes there was a direct borrow and other times there was a fake borrow.
>
> Mahmoud: What does borrow mean? What do you mean by borrowing a child?
>
> Father: For example, when there is a statistical mission by UNRWA, because in 1948 people were displaced, they had no documents or anything, UNRWA as you may know, was founded in 1951 and they wanted to distribute relief to people. How could they distribute relief to people? They have to do counting of some sort. They came to families and asked how many you had. I have five kids, I have four kids, I have … So if someone wants more rations, he borrows kids from the neighbors.
>
> Mahmoud: And he shows them to the UNRWA?
>
> Father: He shows them to the UNRWA (laughter).
>
> Father: Now, where is the problem? The problem is that you borrow those and receive relief money for them, but they grow up and according to Syrian laws, at the age of 18 they should go to military service, so they get trapped (nervous laughter).
>
> Mahmoud: They want to drag them to the army?
>
> Father: Therefore there are a lot of people who escaped their military service. You see? For example, the persons who are registered to be born in the 50s, they are supposed to join the army in the 70s, right?
>
> And since the 70s up until today (laughter) 45 years, those who couldn't get rid of the registration of their fakely bowered children have found another solution, like issue an official death certificate for him.

Mahmoud: Oh my God.

Father: Of course, so do you want the truth? Between the two of us, I don't know my real age, and this is the story, I was a borrowed child and my real birth certificate is long lost.

Mahmoud: But you were born in Oum Al Zainat, right?

Father: Yes, in Palestine, I am sure I was born in 1947.

Crossing border zones. At the borders, the participants' experienced acts of discrimination and harassment which were manifested through intersectional components and differed according to class, gender, age, profession, and social connections. Nonetheless, all shared the experience of being targeted due to national legal identity (Palestinian) and ethno-racial determination (Palestinian from Syria). Born and raised in Yarmouk Camp in 1986, Omar is a musician, dancer and actor. Before the conflict, he worked as a music and drama teacher at an UNRWA youth and women's center. Omar explained his experience as the border zone Al-Masna'a:

> There was discrimination against all Syrians and Palestinians alike because the border zone was very crowded. So because of the immense amount of people, there the Lebanese General Security would start shouting at the people words like "you animals" or curse as in "get in line you animals." I mean nasty words that should not be spoken. Regardless, of whether this treatment is fair, after you stand in line all the way to the window, you can see from the look on their faces that they do not like you or even want you to enter Lebanon.

In July 2013, Omar had to renew his Palestinian-Syrian documents since the LGS had destroyed his picture when issuing his visa permit – a discriminatory and allegedly unlawful tactic used by the LGS to "lawfully" deport persons, a practice that has also been documented by Amnesty International (2014) (Al-Akhbar, 2014). Omar was thus forced to return to the warzone.

In contrast to the description of the border zone, Walid's account tells us about the borders as a mountain and not as the controlled conventional borders zone. Walid escaped on foot, without a passport, and was smuggled to the Sheih Mountain border by the Free Syrian Army. His story mimics the disposition and performances of power that make borders and regulate behavior even when there is no border (Gregory, 2004). When I asked Walid about what happened at the border, he answered:

> There is no border. It's a mountain. There were Lebanese army checkpoints later on […]. We started to go down. The road was like this. Very steep! (Showing by hand gesture). This road is controlled by the Lebanese Army. The road was divided like this (Shows how the road splits into two paths). We, the young men, went this way […] to avoid the Lebanese Army and Secret Intelligence Services. We were something like 25 young men. The women and children went to the army post. So we didn't see them (the army). So this road was very horrible. The mountain was so steep. We arrived and were completely exhausted. […] If I had had any idea that the road from Syria to Lebanon was this, I would have stayed in Khan Es-Sheih, because the road was like dying. Death, death.

Walid's paperless and stateless legal status exposed him to possible death while his fear of the Syrian Army and the LGS forced him to actually risk death by attempting a clandestine escape. His narrative is a sign of the discrimination of border regulations that force individuals fleeing war to embark on extremely dangerous routes, whether by sea or land, to escape warzones.

The participants of my research told me that they had been either internally or externally displaced up to four times before reaching their current place of temporary residence. This tells us that escape and border crossing is not a simple linear process from A to B. Further, all participants mentioned that the first border crossed was at the outskirts of the camps (i.e Yarmouk camp or Khan Es-Sheih camp), which used to be their homes. The experience of border crossing is thereby extended in and beyond border territory, and the roadblocks and checkpoints inside an imagined geography are transformed to new imagined borders. Their accounts exemplify the complexity of border crossing, containing numerous confrontations with borders and boundaries inside geographies of states and at borderlines. The numerous displacements indicate that movement depends on the level of violence. Yet, movement involves both escaping death whilst staying close to one's home and family in order to enable return. In fact, this is what happened when Palestinians left their villages in 1948, as Nafez Nazzal's 1978-study shows–a validation of the experiences of an ongoing catastrophe.

Domestic Insecurity: "Let's stay between the walls." The following dwells on the daily struggles shown in post-crossing narratives and focuses on border regulations moving into private spaces. Both male and female narrators reported perpetual experiences of surveillance, which resulted in fear-regulated patterns of movement and behavior. Experiences of surveillance occurred when the border control mechanisms and performances of the Lebanese Army and the LGS moved beyond border spaces and into "places of living," such as private homes and close neighborhoods. The feeling also occurred at the inter-personal level when the narrators felt that other camp dwellers harassed them in their shelters.

For example, Omar expressed how the practices of the LGS created a constant presence of a furtive surveillance that has paralyzed him since the time he crossed the border. Likewise, the other male narrators explained their fear of walking on the streets outside of the camps due to checkpoint, violence, and secret police services. This taught me that when the experiences of border regulations moved into places of living, the narrators' behaviors were regulated as if they were physically at the borderline. Nonetheless, there was a significant difference in the experiences of my informants regarding discrimination and regulatory border experiences beyond borders. The differences were particularly accentuated among the female and male narrators.

A young woman born in 1984, Roula is a mother of five children, the eldest of which is a 16 year old. Roula is an elementary school graduate. Her husband and son, escaped the siege of Yarmouk camp to Germany via Turkey in 2012. Roula and her remaining four children escaped to Lebanon in April 2014 by car via the Al-Masnaa border crossing.[7] I wish to honor Roula's request to me to include a focus on her daily struggles and the borders that in her experience, start at the doorstep of her shelter. She told me:

> […] the most important thing is...to see the situation here in Lebanon and what they are doing to us now. How they are separating us. I feel I have a shrinking private space. The border is there (pointing at the door). The border is everywhere. I have my dad in Syria and he wants to come to Lebanon, but he doesn't know how. He went to the border and was sent back. He is in Yarmouk! They sent him back to Syria! He was not allowed to go to Lebanon!

Roula's quote indicates two things. First, the feeling of "a shrinking private space" and, second, the feeling Roula has is expressed in her being separated from her farther. The direct move in her account from her door to her father in Yarmouk camp indicates that he should be with her in her domestic space whereas multiple borders separate them. Their experiences must be problematized and understood through their particularities as war-refugees; stateless persons with low income, wives, and mothers unaccompanied by husbands and in one case, an unmarried teenage girl. The women are all living with specific social struggles based in poverty and ethno-racial labeling in a predominantly patriarchal society. This is exacerbated by the feeling of "a shrinking private space" resultant from all of the previously mentioned limitations of having a habitual everyday life and being exposed as deportable aliens.

The female speakers all expressed fear of being approached by unfamiliar males, both civilians of either Lebanese, Syrian, or Palestinian origin and by Lebanese or Syria intelligence personnel, both in the narrow streets of the refugee camp and in the city. This fear made Sarah, Roula's cousin, suggest *fa khalina bein al-khitaan. Ahsan!* (So, let's stay between the walls! It's better!) The fear stemmed from anxieties connected to the local community's perceptions of them (both women and men), as single mothers and women with no male caretaker in Lebanon. Secondly, the fear stemmed from the vulnerability of being a female Palestinian refugee from Syria. The women explained that they were subjected to such treatment because of misconceptions and were labeled as Syrian *sharamīt* (prostitute) by the people already living in the camp because of the way they wore their *hijab* (headscarves), the way they cleaned their houses, and their colloquial Arabic. Both civilians and intelligence personnel targeted them on the street. Since most of these experiences were sensitive, they were told to me in confidence and off the record and for this reason I will not share them here.

7 During the recordings she lived in a refugee camp in Sothern Beirut and was waiting for family unification with her husband and son in Germany. In the recording sessions with Roula the voices of Nariman, her 16-year-old daughter and Sarah her 32-year-old cousin (mother of two) are included.

Yet, I did record one of Nariman and Sarah's dialogs, which expresses the domestic insecurity they experienced.

> Nariman: Now, if I open the door a little, like this, they (the men) can look in and see me.
>
> Sarah: If this were to happen in Damascus and a man walked by, they would yell, "Close the door. Close the door. Close the door, oh sister." Out of respect. But here.... they say nothing ... and then they stare at us.
>
> Nariman: Yesterday we were having dinner. The door opened a bit and they were all looking at me. I was not wearing my scarf and did not have it near me and it was only a few seconds. They walked by and one looked like this at me (eyes wide open). And because of that I am very scared. I'm very scared here. Very much.

The women expressed severe worries for their children and their general domestic insecurity of living in camp conditions, and the continuation of daily small traumas following the traumas of the war in Syria. The women noticed their children incessantly biting their nails and fingers. Further, Sarah told me that her 3-year old daughter had suffered an accident in which she was burnt in her mouth by electric equipment hanging from the walls and lost the ability to speak. These types of accidents became cornerstones in the women's narratives since the surrounding community did not support their grievances, even though they may share similar insecurities in their own domestic lives.

Although the women did not mention experiences of "hard" border regulations, I see these women's fear to be a result of the regulations and their situation of immobility and their "stuckness" to be part of their on-going experience of border crossing, where Lebanon is their current transit point. The female voices show how borders are transformed into frontiers in life in a camp setting. The women feel the power of surveillance both through Lebanese regulations at checkpoints and agents on the streets, and also through male gazes into their living spaces. Both the male and female accounts reveal the insecurity and oppression, which is reinforced through intersections of age, gender, and societal position.

A lingering catastrophe. Several participants expressed how the scenes of the eviction from Palestine shared with them by grandparents, parents, and at commemorations (Khalili, 2007) revisited them at least once during their flight from Syria and while in Lebanon. The following extract from an interview I conducted with Khaled reflects how the repetitiveness of displacement interweaves the two historical events and the subjective experiences attached to them:

> My parents used to tell us about Palestine and the history of our village and how they left and what road they took on their journey. When I left the camp with my family back in 2012, when they were shelling and bombing us very heavily using the air force, families were fleeing by the thousands and I was looking at that scene and started remembering

> (silence) my mother and father when they told me how they left Palestine. […]. When we were leaving the camp by the thousands I remembered my parents when they were telling us about the days when they had left Palestine. That same scene was replaying and at the last moment when I was leaving the camp, I remember thinking whether or not I would return. But now I can see this crisis to be very long, and I may return to find nothing but ashes and no houses standing.

Like Khaled, Omar escaped the besieged Yarmouk camp to Lebanon, but was forced to return to Syria to renew his passport in June 2013. He left by car through the official border crossing at Al-Masnaa. Omar's interpretation of the event includes a distinction between what he calls the small and the big Nakba referring to the "small Nakba" as the one he experienced during the Assad regime's siege of Yarmouk Camp since 2012 and the "big Nakba" as the experiences of his grandparents who were displaced from Palestine in 1948. Other participants echo this and a similar distinction can be found in Sa'di and Abu-Lughod's *Nakba* (2007). Omar explained:

> […] the small Nakba is the siege on Yarmouk camp, the largest gathering of Palestinians. It really was a Nakba. I mean, it was a huge shock and a literal catastrophe because that camp was the biggest gathering of Palestinian refugees in the countries around Palestine. That camp was a place unlike any other camp. […]
>
> It really was our little Palestine from which we were demanding our return to Palestine. And it was threatened and targeted a long time ago. So I think what really happened in Yarmouk camp wasn't born all of a sudden. No, it was rather a planned scheme to hit the largest Palestinian gathering. The biggest proof of this is our current state of loss and spreading all over. […] By disabling this human energy, this energy was crushed, and the gathering destroyed. It was a real Nakba just like that of 1948, a small Nakba.

The *Nakba* is for the five narrators, both a past still present and a present given meaning through the past. It is ongoing, since there has been no return to Palestine and a result of the level of violence experienced through four generations. Al-Hardan likewise found how particular engagements with the past come to answer predicaments in the present (Al-Hardan, 2015). The pending solution, the perpetual experiences of displacement, border crossings, and the inherited statelessness cement the temporariness of Palestinian identity documents and is part of the experience of the *Nakba* as a present reality through re-lived memories and through seeing the horrific scenes of their families' past come true in front of their eyes. Thereby, "the catastrophe" is reawakened.

Conclusion: Can Oral History Let Us Speak Back?

The accounts presented in this article give us a sense in which we (the participants and myself) can perhaps *speak back* to a world of borders, challenging the nation-state order of borders as fixed spaces. My inquiry has, in part, been an effort to rethink and renegotiate the already existing ideas of borders and border-crossing experiences.

While the narratives of the participants also speak back to and challenge the European-led elitist political discourses on how refugees are "better served staying in the region" – since the narratives show that people are not better served with staying in the neighboring countries of Syria. I contest conventional dogmas of borders and suggest that border-crossing experiences are *de facto* pervasive for stateless and rightless persons. For Palestinians from Syria in Lebanon, borders construct *de facto* discriminatory power exercised through checkpoints, visa regulations, and *ad hoc* acts including arbitrary detentions and forced deportations to warzones. Furthermore, persons who are holders of Palestinian refugee legal identity documents experience their lives as forbidden, which I classify as experiences which lead to "social death," implying that their narratives are largely silenced and the tragedy that shapes their restricted lives as not worthy of grief. Yet I saw, like the accounts presented in this article show, that all narrators managed to continue life and maintain hope and resist the condition of social and civic exclusion.

I was left with great discomfort when I started writing down the narratives of the participants far away from the persons with the actual experiences I had captured. The fieldwork, my rich exchange with the participants as opposed to the process of essentializing "their voices" into a thesis made me curious toward my discomfort. Here, I was armed with all my methodological, ethical, and self-reflexive considerations, all the sound bites and notebooks, the ethical guidelines and oral history framework and still I felt I had no legitimate way of telling their stories. I know that I am not the victim of the discrimination of the borders that I have captured. Quite the contrary, I have benefited from my freedom of movement and no matter how much I wish to share my privilege with the participants of the study, I cannot. Am I then entitled to write about the racism of borders when it is not directed at me?

The answer is yes! I have to share the discomfort of a world where I can freely travel while my counterparts cannot. My position as a white, female scholar from wealthy Scandinavia (a destination region where hundreds of thousands have pled asylum) cannot be neglected. Only by becoming aware and by taking responsibility for the benefits I have, by seeing the true order of the world as ruled by the racist logic of nation states, can we – together - start to speak back to it in order to find new ways of existing and sharing.

Power relations between the participants and the researcher, are not undone by emphasizing researchers' privilege and power over the interpretation. Yet, by realizing the obligations, sharing privileges, which accompany power, and aligning with struggles of inequities, we can attempt to transform disadvantaged positions into more empowered ones. This includes maintaining relationships with participants and assisting in situations of border crossing also *after* the research has ended. And it includes calling out racial act of violence and hate wherever we witness it within our studies and our lives.

We have been made to believe in myths about "the weak sex," "the non-human other," "the orient," "the Harem," "the mystified," "the borders that separate us," and the hierarchies of power and knowledge as the "founding myth of original wholeness" (Haraway, 2004, p. 33; Lugones, 2010; Mernissi, 1994). Without a research philosophy that enables me to show how Palestinian-Syrian heritage historically has been racialized and sexualized through contemporary modes of gendered orientalism, while identifying the colonial relations of power it becomes difficult to show the double or triple binds of each particularity. This approach allows me to include a critical view of my own body-political-positionality and to show how it is possible to at once be oppressed (as a woman) and oppressor (as a white academic European) while being complicit in my own oppression (e.g. accepting wages of gender, being victim of gender based violence, gendered codes of strength and weakness, suffering from gender specific health issues) (Mendez, 2015, p. 51).

Al-Hardan emphasizes, "(t)hose of us who intend to research the colonized or stateless others from within imperialist states' academia while upholding decolonizing commitments have a decided disadvantage" (Al-Hardan, 2014, pp. 64–65). The disadvantage is implicit in the paradox of wanting to abide by decolonizing epistemologies knowing that the very structures we stand on are built on a claim about the "universal" right of a researcher to access knowledge and thus to move. We attempt to bridge this disadvantage by critical self-reflection. However, this will evidently not help dismantle the fabric of such inequalities. My freedom to *exit* as well as my privilege to cross borders and the language-barrier are the three poignant signifiers of my outsider-position. This limited my ability to comprehend circumstances of persons who cannot leave and who carry histories of four generations of displacement, despite my efforts. Yet, my privileged position gave me the power to maintain my relationship not only with all the narrators to this day, but also their friends and families whom I have assisted on their way to safer territory. I can never speak with *their voices*, since their subjugation is displayed by my very presence and freedom to *exit* (Spivak, 1995, p. 28). *Their voices* have been selected by me, distorted through me, and transformed in my interpretation and are *no longer* theirs. Still, our numerous encounters taught me to let the narrators *speak back* through me to a world of borders, which denies them protection while ever delaying their right to return to Palestine.

References

Akram, S. M. (2011). Myths and realities of the Palestinian refugee problem: Reframing the right of return. In S. M. Akram, M. Dumper, M. Lyrik, & I. Scobble (Eds.), *International law and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. A right-based approach to Middle East peace* (pp. 13−45). New York, NY: Routledge.

Al-Akhbar. (2014, June 16). Palestinians deported to no-man's-land between Lebanon and Syria. *Al-Akhbar*. Retrived from http://english.al-akhbar.com/node/20194

Al-Hardan, A. (2014). Decolonizing research on Palestinians: Towards critical epistemologies and research practices. *Qualitative Inquiry, 20*(1), 61−71.

Al-Hardan, A. (2015). Al-Nakbah in Arab thought: The transformation of a concept. *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East*, *35*(3), 622−638.

Al-Hardan, A. (2016). *Palestinians from Syria: Nakba memories of shattered communities*. New York, NY: Columbia University Press.

Allan, D. (2007). The politics of witness: Remembering and forgetting 1948 in Shatila Camp. In A. H. Sa'di & L. Abu-Lughod (Eds.), *Nakba: Palestine 1948 and the claims of memory* (pp. 253−282). New York, NY: Colombia University Press.

Allan, D. (2014). *Refugees of the revolution. Experiences of Palestinian exile*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Amnesty International. (2014). *Denied refuge. Palestinians from Syria in Lebanon.* London, UK: Author.

Andersson, R. (2014). *Illegality Inc. Clandestine migration and the business of bordering Europe.* Oakland, CA: University of California Press.

Arendt, H. (1951). *The origin of totalitarianism*. New York, NY: Meridian Books.

Butler, J. (2014, October 14). *The 2014 Edward Said memorial lecture: What is the value of Palestinian lives* [Video]. The Jerusalem Fund & Palestine Centre. Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D8W-LkPbJvc

Cacho, L. M. (2013). *Social death. Racialized rightlessness and the criminalization of the unprotected.* London, UK: New York University Press.

Chatty, D. (2010). *Displacement and dispossession in the modern Middle East*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Custer, S. Jr. (2011). United Nations Relief and Work Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA): Protection and assistance to Palestine refugees. In S. M. Akram, M. Dumper, M. Lyrik, & I. Scobble (Eds.), *International law and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. A right-based approach to Middle East peace* (pp. 45−69). New York, NY: Routledge.

De Genova, N., & Peutz, N. (Eds.). (2010). *The deportation regime. Sovereignty, space and the freedom of movement.* London, UK: Duke University Press.

Dance, L. J. (2016, January). *Difference and deviance and threat, oh my! Social death and media discourses about marginalized youths in Sweden and the U.S.* Paper presented at Akademisk Studenterkursus. Copenhagen, Denmark.

Doumani, B. (2009). Archiving Palestine and the Palestinians: The patrimony of Ihsan Nimr. *Jerusalem Quarterly, 36,* 3−12.

Eliassi, B. (2016). Statelessness in a world of nation-states: The case of Kurdish diaspora in Sweden and the UK. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, *42*(9), 1403−1419.

El-Malek, L. (2006). Palestinian refugees in international law: Status, challenges, and solutions. *Immigration, Asylum, and Nationality Law, 20*(3), 179−196.

Feldman, I. (2012). The challenge of categorising: UNRWA and the definition of a "Palestine refugee." *Journal of Refugee Studies, 25*(3), 387−406.

Feldman, I., & Ticktin, M. (Eds). (2010). *In the name of humanity. The government of threat and care.* London, UK: Duke University Press.

Frisch, M. (1990). *A shared authority. Essays on the craft and meaning on oral and public history*. Albany, NY: SUNY Press.

Gregory, D. (2004). *The colonial present.* Hoboken, NJ: Blackwell Publishing.

Haraway, D. (2003). Situated knowledge: The science question in feminism and the privilege of partial perspective. In Y. S. Lincoln & N. K. Denzin (Eds.), *Turning points in qualitative research: Tying knots in a handkerchief* (pp. 21−46). Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira Press.

Haraway, D. (2004). *The Haraway reader*. New York , NY: Routledge.

Human Rights Watch. (2014). *Lebanon: Palestinians barred, sent to syria*. Retrieved May 6, 2014 from http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/05/05/lebanon-palestinians-barred-sent-syria

Khalili, L. (2007). *Heroes and martyrs of Palestine*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Knudsen, A. (2007). *The law, the loss and the lives of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon* (Chr. Michelsen Institute Working Papers, 2007/1).

Lugones, M. (2010). Towards a decolonial feminism. *Hypatia*, *25*(4), 742−759.

Lundsfryd, M. (2015). *A world of checkpoints. Border crossing experiences of Palestinian refugees from Syria in Lebanon* (Master's thesis). Retrieved from http://lup.lub.lu.se/student-papers/record/5159346

Megoran, N. (2006). For ethnography in political geography: Experiencing and re-imagining Ferghana Valley boundary closures. *Political Geography, 25*(6), 622−640.

Mernissi, F. (1994). *Dreams of tresspass: Tales of a Harem girlhood.* Cambridge, MA: Perseus.

Minister, K. (1991). A feminist frame for the oral history interview. In S. Gluck, & D. Patai (Eds.), *Women's words: The feminist practice of oral history* (pp. 27−42). New York, NY: Routledge.

Moghli, M. A., Bitarie, N., & Gabiam, N. (2015, October 19). *Palestinian refugees from Syria: Stranded on the margins of law*. Retrieved from https://al-shabaka.org/briefs/palestinian-refugees-from-syria-stranded-on-the-margins-of-law/

Moyn, S. (2012). *The last utopia. Human rights in history*. London, UK: Harvard University Press.

Nazzal, N. (1978). *The Palestinian exodus from Galilee*. Beirut, Lebanon: Institute of Palestine Studies.

Palestinian Refugees Portal. (2016). Retrieved on 10/24/2016 from http://refugeesps.net/

Patterson, O. (1982). *Slavery and social death: A comparative study*. Cambridge, UK: Harvard University Press.

Portelli, A. (1991). *The death of Luigi Trastulli: Form and meaning in oral history*. Albany, NY: SUNY Press.

Qandil, M. (2013). Palestinian refugees fleeing Syria: Restricted access to safe territory and protection in the Middle East. *Journal of Palestinian Refugee Studies, 3*(2), 33−38.

Razack, S. (2008). *Casting out: The eviction of Muslims from western law and politics*. Toronto, Canada: University of Toronto Press.

Rollins, T. (2016, October 18). Palestinian refugee camp in the line of fire. *Deutsche Welle*. Retrieved from http://www.dw.com/en/palestinian-refugee-camp-in-the-line-of-fire/a-36074975

Salih, R. (2016). Bodies that walk, bodeis that talk, bodies that love: Palestiniansn women refugees, affectivity, and the politics of the ordinary. *Antipode.* Advance Online Publication. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/anti.12299

Sa'di, A., & Abu-Lughod, L. (Eds.) (2007). *Nakba: Palestine, 1948, and the claims of memory*. New York, NY: Colombia University Press.

Said, E. (1978). *Orientalism*. New York, NY: Random House.

Sayigh, R. (1994). *Too many enemies. The Palestinian experience in Lebanon*. London, UK: Zed Books Ltd.

Sayigh, R. (2013). *The price of statelessness: Palestinian refugees from Syria*. Retrieved May 15, 2013 from http://al-shabaka.org/price-statelessness-palestinian-refugees-syria?page=show# footnoteref3

Sayigh, R. (2014). Oral history, colonialism, dispossession, and the state: The Palestinian case. *Settler Colonial Studies*, *5*(3), 193−204.

Shopes, L. (2013). What oral history is, and isn't. In N. K. Denzin & Y. S. Lincoln (Eds.), *Collecting and interpreting qualitative materials* (pp. 135−170). Los Angeles, CA: Sage.

Spivak, G. C. (1995). Can the subaltern speak? In B. Ashcroft, G. Griffiths, & H. Tiffin (Eds.), *The postcolonial studies reader* (pp. 28−37). London, UK: Routledge.

Steinberg, P. E. (2009). Sovereignty, territory and the mapping of mobility: A view from the outside. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 99*(3), 467–495.

Strickland, P. (2016). ISIL and Nusra put Yarmouk civilians in line of fire. *Aljazeera* Retrived April 15, 2016 from http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/04/isil-nusra-put-yarmouk-civilians-line-fire-160414065149261.html

Tawil-Souri, H. (2015). Between digital flows and territorial borders: ICTs in the Palestine-Israel-EU matrix. In R. A. Del Sarto (Ed.), *Fragmented borders, interdependence and external relations: The Israel-Palestine-European Union triangle* (pp. 107–126). London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9781137504142_6

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. (2014). *Who is stateless and where?* Retrieved September 12, 2014 from http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c15e.html

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. (2015). *Refugees from Syria: Lebanon*. Geneva, Switzerland: Author.

United Nations Relief and Works Agency. (2014a). *Syria regional crisis response 78*. Retrieved September 22, 2014 from http://www.unrwa.org/newsroom/emergency-reports/syria-regional-crisis-response-78

United Nations Relief and Works Agency. (2014b). *PRS in Lebanon*. Retrieved from http://www.unrwa.org/prs-lebanon

United Nations Relief and Works Agency. (2014c). *Syria regional crisis response – December 2014 midyear review.* Retrieved September 12, 2014 from http://www.unrwa.org/sites/default/files/syria_regional_crisis_response_midyear_review_2014.pdf

United Nations Relief and Works Agency (2014d). *UNRWA figures*. Retrieved from http://www.unrwa.org/sites/default/files/2013042435340.pdf

United Nations Relief and Works Agency. (2016). *Syrian crisis and Palestine refugees*. Retrieved October 24, 2016 from http://www.unrwa.org/syria-crisis#Syria-Crisis-and-Palestine-refugees

MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL OF REFUGEE STUDIES

Özgün Makale

Devlet Korkar Muhacir Sıralanır: Göç Kategorilerini Değerlendirmede Bir Yöntem Olarak Tarihsel Analiz*

Ella Fratantuono[a]

Öz

Bu makale, göç rejimlerinin tarihlerinin, kurumlar ve yasal kategoriler tarafından zorunlu göç çalışmalarında kullanılan kavramların üretilme biçimlerini aydınlatabileceğini iddia etmektedir. 1860'da Muhacirin Komisyonunun kurulmasının akabinde Osmanlı Devleti, muhacirlik konusunu muvakkat bir mesele olmaktan çıkarıp göçü ve yerleşimi merkezî yönetim yoluyla düzenlemeye başlamıştır. Osmanlıca muhacir kelimesinin tercümelerinde göçmen (migrant), nüfus azaltıcı (emigrant), nüfus arttırıcı (immigrant) ve mülteci (refugee) ifadelerinin hepsi yer alır. Terimin anlamındaki bu belirsizlik onun tarihsel kullanımının maddi önemi ile uğraşmayı gerektirir. Çağdaş çeviriler, hareket koşullarını vurgulamakla birlikte göçmen tecrübelerini belirlemek noktasında göçmen nüfusun iç bölümlemelerine dayalı Osmanlı idari kategorileri de aynı derecede önemlidir. Bu makalede Osmanlı Muhacirin Komisyonunun kurumsal tarihini, organizasyon yapısını ve politikalarını inceleyerek yönetimin oluşmasının göçmen nüfusta cinsiyet, yaş, sınıf ve din temelinde nasıl alt kategoriler oluşturduğu görülebilecektir. Göç yönetiminin tarihsel analizi, Osmanlı göçmen teşekkülünün süreçlerini araştırmak için daha net bir çerçeve sunar ve zorunlu göç konusunu çalışan uzmanların göç kategorilerinin evrimini ve devam eden etkisini daha derinlemesine görmelerini sağlar.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Yönetim • Göç rejimleri • Göçmen kategoriler • Damgalama • Osmanlı İmparatorluğu

* Bu çalışma 2015 yılında İstanbul İsveç Araştırma Enstitüsü tarafından İsveç Büyükelçiliğinde düzenlen "Forced Migration & Resilience: Past & Present in the Mediterranean" başlıklı konferansta sunulmuştur.

a (✉) Ella Fratantuono (Dr.), Department of History, University of North Carolina at Charlotte, Charlotte, NC USA. Eposta: efratant@uncc.edu

Başvuru: 18 Kasım 2016
Revizyon Gönderimi: 29 Aralık 2016
Kabul: 14 Şubat 2017
Online First: 15 Eylül 2017

ISSN 2149-4398 • **eISSN** 2458-8962
DOI 10.12738/mejrs.2017.2.1.0107 • Kış 2017 • 2(1) • 97–115

MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL OF REFUGEE STUDIES

Original Article

State Fears and Immigrant Tiers: Historical Analysis as a Method in Evaluating Migration Categories*

Ella Fratantuono[a]

Abstract

This article argues that histories of migration regimes can illuminate ways in which institutions and legal categories produce concepts used in studies of forced migration. Following the development of the Immigrant Commission (Muhacirin Komisyonu) in 1860, the Ottoman State shifted from addressing the issue of immigration on an ad hoc basis to organizing migration and settlement through a central administration. Translations of the Ottoman term "muhacir" include migrant, emigrant, immigrant, and refugee. The ambiguity of this term requires engagement with the material significance of its historical usage. Contemporary translations highlight conditions of movement, but Ottoman administrative categories based on internal divisions within the immigrant population were equally important in determining migrant experiences. Through exploring the institutional history, organization, and policies of the Ottoman Immigrant Commission, this article considers how the development of administration created sub-categories within the migrant population based on sex, age, class, and religion. Historical analysis of migration administration offers a more precise framework for investigating processes of Ottoman immigrant incorporation and provides researchers of forced migration insight into the evolution and persisting impact of migration categories.

Keywords

Governance • Migration regimes • Migrant categories • Labeling • Ottoman Empire

* An earlier version of this paper was presented at "Forced Migration & Resilience: Past & Present in the Mediterranean," a conference held at the Swedish Research Institute in Istanbul, April 2015.

a (✉)Ella Fratantuono (PhD), Department of History, University of North Carolina at Charlotte, Charlotte, NC USA. Email: efratant@uncc.edu

Received: November 18, 2016
Revision received: December 29, 2016
Accepted: January 14, 2017
Online First: September 15, 2017

ISSN 2149-4398 • **eISSN** 2458-8962
DOI 10.12738/mejrs.2017.2.1.0107 • Winter 2017 • 2(1) • 97–115

In the second half of the nineteenth century, millions of Muslims migrated from former Ottoman lands, fleeing an encroaching Russian Empire in the North Caucasus and Crimea, on the one hand, and nationalist struggles in the Balkans, on the other.[1] This mid-nineteenth-century influx of refugees into the Ottoman Empire was not the first time the state had welcomed large groups from elsewhere, nor was the immigrants' large-scale settlement the first attempt by Ottoman bureaucrats to employ population politics to facilitate state security. Despite these historical precedents, officials did not create an independent institution for migration administration until January 5, 1860, in response to mass migrations following the Crimean War. The establishment of the Immigrant Commission (*Muhacirin Komisyonu*) signaled a shift in official strategy. Rather than relying exclusively on local and regional arrangements, the Commission approached immigration as an issue deserving centrally coordinated management. This centralized administration was intended to facilitate immigrant incorporation through enumerating, categorizing, and systematically placing newcomers.

Studies of forced migration and resettlement often employ the term refugee as a static analytical category. Rather than a neutral concept based on defining movement, "refugee" is a term attached to the distribution of rights and resources. As such, the term gains meaning in relation to state and international migration regimes. Both migration regimes and categories have developed over time. Historical studies of emergent and changing migration regimes offer a method to analyze the production and material consequences of migrant classifications.

The Ottoman term *muhacir* was used interchangeably to indicate immigrants and what contemporary parlance would distinguish as refugees, asylum seekers, or IDPs (Kale, 2014, p. 267). The term retained its broad applicability throughout the late nineteenth century, but the development of centralized Ottoman migration administration lent new significance to the concept of *muhacir*. Following the establishment of the Immigrant Commission, laws and state strategies structured elements of newcomers' arrival, placement, and daily experiences within the empire. Whereas the label *muhacir* could apply to any immigrant, with the creation of a centralized administration, rights to entry and aid were allocated according to signifiers such as sex, age, class, and religion. These subdivisions within the category affected interactions among policies, officials, and newcomers.

1 Historians have struggled to agree upon precise figures, but perhaps 223,000 Tatars left the Crimea for the Ottoman Empire during this era, and between 1861 and 1866 more than a million Circassians departed from the Caucasus (Karpat, 1985, pp. 67–69). Following the Russian-Ottoman war of 1877-1878, one and a half to two million immigrants fled from the Balkans and Caucasus (Karpat, 1985, p. 70; Kasaba, 2009, pp. 117–118). Another 640,000 arrived following the 1912-1913 Balkan Wars (Tekeli, 1994). Aside from those migrating immediately after these main conflicts, several hundred thousand more immigrants arrived in the Ottoman Empire around the turn of the century.

The rhetorical ambiguity of the term *muhacir* speaks to ongoing discussions in the field of Refugee Studies. Early in the development of the discipline, Zetter (1988; 1991) outlined the material importance and outcomes attached to the act of labeling types of movement. More recently, scholars have confronted the analytical shortcomings of the category of refugee, which reflects a policy-oriented status rather than an empirical condition. Although descriptions of the international refugee regime typically take the 1951 Refugee Convention as their starting points, assessments of the historical origins of the international refugee regime have critiqued the contemporary framework through highlighting alternative state and non-state responses to population displacement (Elie, 2010; Karatini, 2005). This historical approach traces the origins of the political and analytical separation of refugees and migrants while also commenting on how this separation can undermine refugees' long-term economic and social outlooks (Long, 2013).

Discussions regarding labeling underline ways in which the political nature of the term refugee creates meaning through the rights it engenders vis-à-vis other migrants (Bakewell, 2011; Scalettaris, 2007). Labels of forced migration are related not only to categorizations of movement by scholars and states, but also to the distribution of resources and rights extending far beyond the immediate circumstances of arrival. This paper applies this insight in investigating how the creation of migration administration contributed to creating meaningful political and economic distinctions among newcomers in the Ottoman Empire. Historical analysis of evolving migration regimes highlights the related history of the concept of refugee and its implications for resettlement and incorporation.

Within the Ottoman context, the flexible nature of the term *muhacir* has led researchers to retroactively engage in the work of categorization. Given the economic oppression, religious violence, forced resettlement, and policies of expulsion underlying mass migrations in 1860-1865 and 1877-1879, historians have traditionally applied the label refugee in a reflexive manner to describe almost all nineteenth-century Muslim immigrants. Nevertheless, close evaluations of the conditions of migrant departure from the Russian Empire highlight complex and varying reasons for mobility, 'mixed flows,' circular and return migration, and elite movement (Meyer, 2007; Williams, 2000). Reassessment of the circumstances of departure has added nuance to the prevailing categorizations of both the major episodes of mass migration and smaller-scale movements occurring over multiple decades. Yet, this scholarship has by and large failed to depict the state's administrative approach as equally important in considering the outcomes of these migrations. In short, this discussion continues to focus on distinguishing migrants based on their experiences and motivations for departure rather than explicitly engaging with what the term *muhacir* signified in the developing political and organizational strategies of an

evolving migration regime. Following the creation of the Immigrant Commission, such laws and settlement tactics as tiered systems of rights and aid structured elements of newcomers' arrival, placement, and daily experiences. Researchers should therefore examine classifications emerging within aid and settlement policies to grapple with meaningful differences in status within the larger category of Muslim immigrant.

The late-nineteenth-century Ottoman Empire presents a useful example to assess the development of a sophisticated migration regime in response to large-scale population movements. During this era, Ottoman leaders launched a series of economic, administrative, legal, and political reforms intended to increase the power of the central government, augment the productivity of the population, and encourage affiliation with the state. The creation of the Immigrant Commission reflected broader changes in the relationship between state entities and Ottoman subjects. This article explores the formation of migration administration through a qualitative historical analysis of state-generated sources. In particular, I assess state ideals of organization and migrant settlement, considering how the development of migration administration contributed to a more sophisticated immigration regime ultimately activated by officials, migrants, and others.

Just as state and international migration and refugee regimes are the outcomes of historical processes, so too are the labels emerging from those regimes. Through incorporating historical analysis of developing regimes, researchers of forced migration can better assess the evolution and implications of non-static, context-specific categories. Qualitative analysis is a traditional methodological approach in history writing. In allowing researchers to evaluate the evolution of mobility regimes and labels, it remains an essential way to approach forced migration in the Mediterranean. After assessing the context, institutional history, and organizational ideals of a developing Ottoman migration administration, I will conclude by evaluating this methodology and suggesting other approaches to exploring emergent Ottoman migrant and refugee regimes.

Context

Ottoman demographic anxieties and trans-imperial population politics. The history of Ottoman migration administration is best understood within larger trends in the empire's management of its population and ongoing concerns about the state's economic welfare and security. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire faced manpower shortages and lacked intensive cultivation of its arable land, and Ottoman officials viewed increasing the population as a route to improved defensive capacity and economic development. Ongoing concerns about population and territorial losses throughout the first half of the nineteenth century

underlay the empire's liberal migration regime, epitomized in a post-Crimean War invitation to settlers from Europe and America. This invitation promised religious freedom, choice land, and tax exemptions to all who could prove that they had means and were willing to pledge allegiance to the sultan (Karpat, 1985, p. 62). Following the Crimean War, the empire continued to lose land and subjects. As a result of the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877-1878 and the Treaty of Berlin, the empire ceded two-fifths of its territory and 5.5 million people (Shaw & Shaw, 1997, p. 191). The outcome of the Treaty of Berlin exacerbated Ottoman economic concerns. Faced with the threat of national separatist movements and foreign intervention, the empire shifted to a less liberal immigration policy in the last decades of the nineteenth century. Non-Muslim migrants, particularly those arriving in large numbers, were more frequently denied entry by the Ottoman state (Kale, 2014, pp. 252–271).

Strategic interest in population management was not unique to nineteenth-century immigrations. As early as the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, both the Ottoman and Russian Empires attempted to settle nomads as a component in establishing and safeguarding their borders (Kasaba, 2009, 65–70). Aside from sedentarization, population removal and colonization became increasingly visible tactics of state policy. Throughout the eighteenth century, Ottomans and Russians engaged in acts of "demographic warfare," described by Mark Pinson (1970, p. 1) as exchanges "of populations, used to bolster the position of one state in territories either threatened by or recently acquired from the other state." Through these informal population exchanges, Christians and Muslims swapped positions along the changing Ottoman-Russian border.

The extent of Tatar and Caucasian migrations in the 1860s took the Ottoman Empire by surprise. The ideal immigrant described in the 1857 invitation had a certain amount of wealth, which had to be proven to the Ottoman consul in the country of application (Karpat, 2002, p. 786). In contrast, the Muslim immigrants were an intense drain on the Ottoman treasury, requiring assistance for transport, temporary and long-term housing, provisions, and farming supplies. Concerns about the cost to the central treasury, particularly when migrants remained in the capital, contributed to decisions to move migrants to the provinces as quickly as possible and remained a constant concern in addressing potential corruption (Y.PRK.KOM 3.24, 1881; Y.PRK.MYD 3.11, 1883).[2] Though the Muslim migrants generally required

2 Primary sources in this paper are from the Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi (The Ottoman Archives of the Prime Minister's Office, hereafter 'the Ottoman Archives'). Abbreviations for collections used within the text refer to Bab-ı ali Evrak Odası Evrakı (BEO), Dahiliye Nezareti Mektubi Kalemi (DH.MKT), İrade Dahiliye (I.DH), İrade Meclis-i Mahsus (I.MMS), Meclis-i Vala Evrakı (MVL), Yıldız Sadaret Hususi Maruzat Evrakı (Y.A.HUS), Yıldız Perakende Evrakı Dahiliye Nezareti Maruzatı (Y.PRK.DH), Yıldız Perakende Evrakı Komisyonlar Maruzatı (Y.PRK.KOM), and Yıldız Perakende Evrakı Yaveran ve Maiyyet-i Seniyye Erkan-ı Harbiye Dairesi (Y.PRK.MYD). Ottoman sources listed sometimes appear with dates from the *Hicri* calendar. In such cases, I have included both *Hicri* and Gregorian calendar years.

such assistance, they still offered essential and potentially immediate internal and external security benefits. Migrants were used as colonizers on border regions as an ongoing component of demographic warfare. They also became a crucial tool in the effort to sedentarize nomads and an essential component in the extension of Ottoman central control over its provinces, as the Immigrant Commission deliberately settled immigrants in internal frontier zones on lands confiscated from nomadic pastoralists (Cuthell, 2005, p. 17; Kasaba, 2009, pp. 104–109; Rogan, 1999, p. 85). Economic success was an idealized component of immigration policy, but the sheer number of refugee arrivals and the relative low-cost and low-time commitment of settlement for security purposes determined initial state responses.

Following the Treaty of Berlin, the distribution of groups within the Ottoman Empire became as essential to security as the colonization of border regions. The Russian-Bulgarian success in creating an autonomous Bulgaria was realized through the creation of a Christian majority via expulsions of Muslims during the 1877-1878 War, and this lent a new urgency to establishing numerical dominance throughout the empire. The Treaty of Berlin required Ottoman reform in its six eastern provinces, and specifically mandated increased protection and representation for Armenian populations. While Ottomanism, or equality among ethnicities and religious groups, remained official policy, the threat of European intervention in areas with a large proportion of Christians lent migrants an important role in increasing the Muslim percentage of the population throughout Anatolia. This was a well-known policy within the bureaucracy by the last decades of the nineteenth century. For example, in 1890, officials in Muş, in Eastern Anatolia, noted that the primary reason for settling migrants in the area would be to equalize the distribution of Christians and Muslims, as there were currently much more of the former (I.DH 1185.92756, 1307/1890). Another specifically noted the imperial order encouraging the increasing of the Muslim population, and reported the decision of the Council of Ministers to settle migrants from the Caucasus in Erzurum, Van and Hakkari (Y.A.HUS 314.13 1312/1894). Both the threat of European intervention on behalf of Christian communities and the growing proportion of Muslims as a result of the immigrations encouraged Ottoman pan-Islamism, or the use of Islamic symbols to strengthen internal cohesion and loyalty to the state. Caring for Muslim migrants remained an important component of state legitimacy as derived by the role of the Sultan-Caliph, to the extent that a later iteration of the Migration Commission was named The High Islamic Immigration Commission (*Muhacirin-i İslamiye Komisyonu Alisi*), under the leadership of Sultan Abdülhamid II (r. 1876-1909) (Karpat, 2002, p. 697).

The Ottoman state's initial response to the refugee influx was framed by security and economic concerns, but settlement strategies and aid policies were also conditioned by the state's modernizing reforms. Migration administration became intertwined in

Ottoman efforts to craft a healthy, productive, and loyal populace. Following the *Tanzimat* era (1856-1876), rank and file bureaucrats subscribed to the belief that the state could organize outcomes of social and economic well-being for its subjects (Reinkowski, 2005, pp. 195–214).[3] During both the *Tanzimat* and the reign of Sultan Abdülhamid II, standardizing curricula, initiating a quarantine administration and sanitation regulations, developing a systematic census, and founding vocational orphanages were components of state centralization and endeavors in social engineering (Rogan, 1996; Yosmaoğlu, 2006).

Centralized migration administration arose during an era of ongoing population anxiety and efforts to organize development by the modernizing state. The extent of forced migration in the era, economic limitations, and security concerns contributed to a shift toward less liberal immigration policies. As a result, the economic promise of self-sufficient immigrants invigorating the Ottoman countryside was traded for the anticipated stability of a Muslim immigrant population. Under these circumstances, officials developed strategies to efficiently organize immigrant settlement and reduce overall cost to the state. Budgetary concerns also radically changed the institutions attached to administration itself. Throughout the fifty year period following the Crimean War, the Ottoman migration administration gained and lost members and appeared and disappeared as an independent organization in response to fluctuating numbers of arriving refugees and financial constraints. These fluctuations are themselves essential in considering outcomes of migrant settlement, as the lack of stability within migration administration contributed not only to an inability in successfully organizing migrants on arrival, but also to long-term complications in migrant placement.

Institutional history of Ottoman migration administration. Prior to the Immigrant Commission, migration remained an issue handled primarily at the local level. City governments and village communities cared for migrants fleeing the Crimean War. The central state issued directives as needed to border provinces, and migrants themselves applied to the state for assistance (Kocacık, 1980, p. 157). The state shifted toward centralized policies with the creation of the Immigrant Commission in response to the growing refugee crisis following the Crimean War.

The tasks of the Immigrant Commission were to organize the dispersal of individuals arriving in Istanbul, to collect information about the migrants, to advertise

3 The *Tanzimat*, meaning reorganization, was a nineteenth-century reform period. During this era the Ottoman state launched a series of economic, administrative, legal, and political reforms intended to increase the power of the central state over its provinces, augment the productivity of its population, and encourage greater affiliation with the state through egalitarian citizenship. Examples of these reforms include reorganizing regional administrative boundaries, standardizing education, and restructuring property law. These reforms continued under the reign of Abdülhamid II.

the need for donations for the migrants, to distribute these donations, and to publish the names and contributed sums of those giving assistance (Eren, 1966, pp. 54–61; Saydam, 1997, 105–106). Aside from the central institution in Istanbul, ministers were dispatched to areas of intense migrant arrival and settlement, and branches of the Immigrant Commission were also set up in major centers like Trabzon and Samsun. While this system of dispatching officials allowed for flexibility in the state's response to newcomers, it also reflected a broader lack of anticipation and administrative groundwork prior to migrant arrival, a key reason why some refugees remained tragically stranded in temporary housing for months.[4]

Once the number of immigrant arrivals abated in 1865, budgetary concerns contributed to the decision to dissolve the independent committee and split its responsibilities among several ministries. The complete termination of the commission was short-lived, as ongoing complications related to migrant aid and settlement encouraged the reestablishment of the commission, although it was dissolved again in 1875. The influx of migrants following the 1877-1878 war renewed pressure to establish specific institutions to organize migrant aid and settlement, and the Immigrant Commission reemerged as the Immigrant Administration in 1878 (Saydam, 1997, pp. 114–118). Several other organizations were created and dissolved as the Ottoman Empire faced intermittent immigrations caused by invasions, insurrections, and instability in the Balkans, Caucasus, and elsewhere. Institutions formed after the Balkan Wars (1912-1913) coordinated administration of all mobility in the empire, encompassing the organization of migrant settlement, the prevention of emigration from Ottoman lands, and the settlement and education of nomadic groups (Dündar, 2001, p. 60; Kocacık, 1980).

The basic course of migration administrative institutions in the Ottoman Empire reflected responses to mass influxes. Even though state officials recognized that the process of organizing and successfully settling migrants was a task that extended beyond the first few months of intense migrant arrival, its organization was repeatedly responsive only to new numbers. The lack of stability in these institutions meant that the efforts of the Immigrant Commission and later bodies were by no means the exclusive determinant in forced migrants' experiences within the Ottoman Empire, but the gap between policy ideals and outcomes was also the space within which migrants and others engaged with the state.

Administrative organization and state goals. Despite the changing quantity of personnel and bureaucratic infrastructure, state institutions for migration

4 Numerous migrant petitions asking to be removed from temporary settlement note delays of months and years, particularly after the 1860s migrations (for example see MVL 511.127, 1283/1866; MVL 533.109, 1284/1867; MVL 562.9, 1284/1867).

administration remained fundamental in arranging arrival and settlement in both Istanbul and the provinces. Directives describing organization and settlement policies accompanied the creation and subsequent changes of migration institutions. Even though modifications in bureaucratic structure and variations in allocated funding likely undermined the ability of officials to follow through with their mandate, sets of instructions give a sense as to how the administration was intended to function. These directives reveal the development of tiered systems of assistance and contextualize the terms with which migrants and officials engaged with settlement and aid policies. Though policies for migrant assistance, administrative goals, and plans for carrying out migrant settlement were not always actualized, they offer a foundation for assessing migrants' relationship to the state and their ongoing experiences within the empire.

Central directives offer an idea of the organization, roles, and extent of migration administration. As noted above, the abrogated Immigrant Commission was reestablished as the Immigrant Administration (*Muhacirin İdaresi*) following the population upheaval caused by the 1877-1878 War. Instructions in 1878 laid out the structure of the Immigrant Administration. These instructions directed general affairs and all issues regarding migrants to an umbrella organization, the General Administration for Migrants. This organization was comprised of two main branches, the *İdare-i Umur-u İskaniye* (Settlement Affairs Administration) and the *İdare-i Umur-u Hesabiye* (Accounting Affairs Administration). Aside from its twenty municipal offices, the institution also included an office devoted to issues of migrant health. Government administrators and reputable individuals from local and migrant communities manned the headquarters and various offices. The instructions specified that all components of the organization were to be assembled each day (I.MMS 59.2786 1295/1878. A transliterated version of the document is also available in Eren, 1966, pp. 96–113).

The fundamental responsibility of Settlement Affairs was to streamline the transfer of immigrants to the branch offices and districts beyond Istanbul by providing detailed information regarding the migrants who would be sent to the provinces. This information encompassed numbers of individuals, their places of origin and intended settlement areas, and calculations of the aid they would require from each appropriate branch office. Settlement Affairs organized and paid for migrant passage to their area of dispersal as well as organized provisions for the trip. It also covered the expenses of those being housed temporarily and coordinated provisions for those who were not yet registered. Settlement Affairs was also tasked with generating a complete monthly register showing the amount of provisions, neighborhood of settlement, and names of those receiving rations. This information was then submitted to the General Administration (Articles 35-40).

The main occupation of the Accounting Affairs Administration was to produce, organize, inspect, and analyze counterfoils and registers of migrants' daily stipends, food allowances, and other expenses. The branch was also to investigate and aggregate state expenditures for migrants who had already arrived in the empire. Based on the number of instructions issued in regard to the accounting administration, it is clear that levels of expenditures were seen as a matter of concern. The details provided to the branch reflected an overall effort to battle corruption on the part of officials and fraud on the part of migrant recipients of aid. This is unsurprising given the limited finances of the state, existing corruption within the Ottoman bureaucracy, and the high levels of fraud plaguing the previous commission's aid effort (Saydam, 1997, pp. 111–112). Tactics to combat corruption included holding scribes accountable for any sort of inconsistency found within the registers, forbidding erasure and mandating all mistakes be struck out and rewritten, and clearly stating the proper disposal of all redeemed provisionary vouchers. In terms of addressing potential fraud on the part of the migrants, the instructions stipulated that in the case of any lost vouchers, migrants could receive another document only after the local government investigated the situation. If the lost voucher reappeared, it would not be credited. All vouchers were to be stamped prior to distribution by the General Administration, the local imam or *muhtar* (district headman), or the correct office or branch (I.MMS 59.2786: articles 19-32).

Another key directive, issued in 1899, focuses on the process of migrant settlement in the provinces and more clearly illustrates the relationship between the central and provincial administration alluded to in earlier directives. These instructions offer insight into an extensive network of commissions at various levels of state organization. Each provincial center hosted a commission, and sub-committees in each *liva* (administrative district) and *kaza* (sub-district) coordinated with the office in the provincial center. The commissions were integrated into the structure of the community through their membership. Aside from an appointed official and scribe, the commissions were comprised of one salaried official from the provincial center, one from the municipal council, the necessary number of scribes recruited from the area, and several distinguished and public-minded individuals from the community (Y.PRK.DH 2.93 1305/1899. A transliterated version of the document is available in *Osmanlı Belgelerinde Kafkas Göçleri* (Türkiye Cumhuriyet Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü, 2012, pp. 148–170).

Within this widespread and multi-tiered system, officials saw information and communication as key to creating a rapidly responding organization. Efforts to enumerate migrant populations were an essential component of the administration's responsibility at all levels. Settlement commissions and branch offices composed detailed registers of migrant names, origins, sex, and trade. Neighborhood administrative commissions catalogued the aid given to migrants until they became self-sufficient. Administrators in areas of migrant departure facilitated speedy

settlement through communicating numbers and projected arrival times to receiving areas ten to fifteen days prior to migrant arrival (Articles 15 & 19). The effort to accelerate settlement arose from recognition of the dangers of delay, as several items within the directive sought to avoid interruption and hasten the pace at which issues moved through the bureaucratic structure. Delayed responses were a matter of life and death throughout the newcomers' arrival, transfer, and settlement, and administrators boarded migrants in guesthouses as soon as possible to protect them from the elements as they awaited settlement (Articles 5, 7 &17). Information was also essential in facilitating easy passage and tactics to address migrant sickness. Migrants too sick for travel and their families would be temporarily detained. In the event that households had to move on without the patient, officials prepared a list showing the location and time of the migrants' departure as well as information regarding where they would be settled. Administrators placed this list among the sick migrant's personal effects to facilitate family reunification after patient convalescence (Article 16).

Individuals from receiving communities were integral to the structure of the local commissions and migrant transport, and officials anticipated and required the assistance of community members throughout the settlement process. Despite the urgency with which information, decisions, and supplies were to be communicated, officials recognized migrant transport would be held up at various stages. Just as concerns about corruption arose from previous experience, the concern with delay and realistic recognition that immediate settlement was impossible likely arose in response to the difficulties of previous immigration episodes. Administrators knew immigrants would arrive in such numbers as to preclude immediate settlement, and so assigned communities to host their share of newcomers. These same communities assisted the migrants by employing them and building their houses. Local notables and wealthy, civically minded "patriots" were responsible for hiring and hosting the newcomers and providing the materials for building migrant houses (Article 29). Administrators also realized migrants would not be capable of producing enough as farmers in the first year of settlement, and mandated that the people of the area help them in sowing and preparing the land (Articles 25, 26, & 30).

Aside from revealing the intended organizational structure of the migrant administration, directives offer insight into ideals regarding the distribution of aid to migrants. These ideals structured migrants' opportunities within the Ottoman Empire based on migrants' individual and personal characteristics, establishing a system of differentiated resources for categories internal to the broader label of migrant/refugee. For example, officials sought to encourage immigrants' economic stability according to migrant resources, ability, and physical capacity. First, migrants were split according to their ability to fund their own travel and settlement. This defrayed

the overall cost of migrant care for the state, but it also allowed richer migrants freedom to relocate to preferred locations such as Istanbul. Second, directives reveal strategic attempts to facilitate settlement based on skill sets. The state intended to settle most migrants on farms, and settlers were to be given a certain amount of land, a pair of oxen, farming implements, and sowing seed. Conversely, religious leaders and those who practiced handicrafts were to be settled in towns and receive a cash payment in lieu of oxen and farming implements (Y.PRK.KOM 1.26, 1295/1878. See also I.MMS 60.2859, 1295/1879).

Aside from separating migrants according to skill set, officials also differentiated newcomers according to physical capacity. The writers of the 1878 directive note that it was necessary to provide assistance to those men who had neither family nor refuge and who lacked the strength for manual labor. However, they also expected there would be some for whom light work was a possibility, and various state offices were to inform the migration commission of any openings in order to facilitate the employment of those men. Physical capacity was also a determinate of settlement location. Individuals who were left without family or who were unable to work were to be settled in more desirable areas such as the Black Sea coast and Aydın and Hüdavendigar provinces (I.MMS 59.2786, Articles 14 and 15).

Economic categories contributed to gendered distribution of aid. The 1878 instructions made special note of the treatment of women. Similar to men who lacked the strength for labor, women, particularly those who had been exposed to violence or left without immediate relatives, and orphans would continue to be cared for by the state. Those women who had not settled with relatives were to be found protectors from either migrant or local communities and employed in sewing uniforms for the army (Article 13). Of course, age also determined the allocation of aid. Another directive from 1878 specified adults in need would receive one and one-half pounds while children up to age ten would receive about three-fourths of a pound of daily bread provisions (Y.PRK.KOM 1.26).

Tiered systems of assistance offered a way to defray overall expenditures on migrant aid. They also served as a tactic in creating stability and reducing unanticipated movement in cities and settlement areas. Ottoman officials were concerned with the potential disruption caused by mobile or unattached populations. In the eighteenth century, Ottoman officials were anxious about the potential of itinerants and internal migrants to destabilize Ottoman cities. Likewise, during the *Tanzimat era*, officials increased the extent of the pass system, outlawed vagrancy, and expanded the orphanage system (Başaran, 2006; Herzog, 2011; Maksudyan, 2011). Providing aid to the unemployable or to single women reduced the likelihood of ongoing mobility by those groups. Aside from preemptive actions to maintain stability, the 1878

instructions also included tactics to reduce unwanted migrant movement throughout the empire, particularly after settlement. Measures included penalizing those who returned to Istanbul and those who moved illegally throughout the provinces. In both scenarios, migrants found outside their assigned locations would be refused transport and rent assistance and have their stipends abrogated (I.MMS 59.2786, Articles 7-18). Other measures obliquely emphasized the power of state officials to determine and fix migrant mobility, referencing the tendency to disperse migrant settlement and the state's right to return an immigrant to his or her country of origin (Articles 44-47).

State directives offer a sense of the extent of the project prompted by migrant settlement and provide several snapshots of Ottoman organizational and settlement ideals. Although these directives do not capture local and regional modifications that must have occurred in the course of their implementation, these documents highlight several issues. The directives merge immigrant history with the era's broader trends through underlining the growing connection between the center and the provinces during the late Ottoman Empire. Just as infrastructure such as telegraphs and railroads added to the institutional power and visibility of the state, migration administration established the state and its projects outside of Istanbul. The conveyance and settlement of large groups of people exemplified this era of increased interconnectivity. Settling migrants in less populated provinces or changing the ethno-religious balance of particular regions is reminiscent of traditional Ottoman tactics like the *sürgün* or *derbend* systems.[5] In both, moving and placing people were tactics to extend state power; however, the vast scale of population movement in the nineteenth century and the Ottoman state's growing bureaucracy created greater change, assimilating both migrants and local communities. Individuals were incorporated into the state apparatus as civic-minded volunteers and local committee members. Carts and animals were commandeered from other areas to facilitate migrant transportation from ports, and in times when administrators or police were lacking, notables were required to accompany migrant caravans and facilitate further resource requisition along their route. Migrants' presence in areas required allocation of non-migrant individuals' time, labor, and resources.

Even as the institutional and administrative presence of the state increased, this reliance on the participation of non-officials opened the terms of migrant settlement to negotiation by state officials, migrants, and local actors. Analysis of the directives reveal negotiated policy shifts, accumulated experience arising in the course of the administrative endeavor, and the terms actors used in navigating

5 *Sürgün* was an Ottoman policy requiring long-distance migration by groups. It was used both as a punitive measure and a method to colonize newly conquered territories. The *Derbend* system was a communication-security tactic in which the Ottoman state settled nomadic tribes and other mobile groups along roads and passes (Kasaba, 2009, p. 18, 71).

settlement outcomes. Migrants, officials, and others' engagement with Ottoman migration administration contributed to the characteristics of its evolving migration regime. For example, early directives describe the ideal environmental attributes of designated settlement areas, a concern echoed in the 1889 instructions, which note migrant villages should be established in elevated areas near water and forests and in locations conducive to agriculture (I.DH 460.30579 1277/1860 and Y.PRK.DH 2.93: Article 27). Hasty settlement, corruption, and reduced availability of decent land meant these characteristics were frequently disregarded, and so environmental characteristics were often the terms through which both migrants and state officials evaluated settlement locations in the 1860s and 1870s. In particular, lamenting poor soil quality or an insalubrious climate offered an effective strategy for migrants requesting resettlement (See for example MVL 527.75, 1284/1867; MVL 511.40, 1283/1866; BEO 138.10299, 1310/1893; DH.MKT 332.24, 1312/1895). Aside from assessing the environmental drawbacks of their settlement locations, petitioners requested resettlement by referencing the policy of differential settlement for migrants with special skills, while those who were settled as farmers reminded officials of the state's obligation to provide seed and farming implements (Migrant petitions are widely available within the MVL collection. For examples related to employment and agricultural needs see 403.9, 472.64, 508.109, 609.42).

The process of resource distribution made administrative categories meaningful for both migrants and the state. Through evaluating several directives, I have sought to analyze the migration regime developed in the late Ottoman Empire and to highlight categorical distinctions created as migrants and administrators interacted with policy. The Ottoman state pursued a less liberal migration regime following 1878, reflecting security concerns and the utility of Pan-Islamism as an organizing principle (Kale, 2014). Nevertheless, the creation of a tiered system of assistance within the state's migration regime generated meaningful divisions beyond religious categories. Newcomers recognized and activated these divisions in articulating claims to rights and resources.

Methodological Perspective

In this article I applied an historical, qualitative approach, examining the evolution of a migration regime primarily through uncovering state organizational ideals for migration administration. The use of an exclusively qualitative approach to state documents has several well-known shortcomings, most obviously the one-sided perspective they afford. Incorporating migrant petitions provides a limited view of the contributions of non-state actors to the development and enacting of policy; however, petitions available in the central archive still reflect only those issues recognized and preserved by officials. Moreover, relying solely on instructions

issued from the center to assess migrant administration allows for unexplored divergences between central policy and its local outcomes. For example, officials engaged in a long-term effort to settle migrants from the Caucasus in the empire's Eastern provinces. Nevertheless, Chochiev and Koç's (2006) evaluation of Ottoman, Russian, and British sources reveals that Russian and Armenian concerns and the difficult environmental and economic features of the region limited successful settlement. Similarly, despite instructions to establish local immigrant commissions in areas of migrant settlement, further research may reveal that this mandate was inconsistently applied. Considerably more research should be conducted to evaluate the Ottoman Empire's success in establishing administrative infrastructure; however, the distance between policy and application in the late Ottoman Empire should also be recognized as an important feature of the empire's evolving migration regime. The gap between administrative ideals and local outcomes created a space in which officials and newcomers negotiated the relationships between migrants and the state.

What other approaches might further contribute to an understanding of the development and outcomes of the Ottoman Empire's migration regime? While it has proved notoriously difficult to establish accurate estimates of immigrant numbers, there are several bodies of sources that could allow for quantitative analysis of the development and activities of Ottoman migration administration. Digitization efforts within the Ottoman Archives should encourage the accumulation of data. For example, the recently digitized collection of the records of the Immigrant Commission (BOA. DH.MHC) contains several thousand documents, including tabulations of immigrant arrival and dispersal from Istanbul, hospitalizations, and orphan populations. Both the records of the Immigrant Commission and certain collections within the Yildiz Palace archive (especially Y.PRK.KOM and Y.MTV) offer the potential to track the expenditures of central and regional migrant administrative institutions, including through examining reports with names and positions of salaried employees. Ottoman provincial almanacs (*salname*) also offer information regarding membership of provincial and local Immigrant Commissions. Developing quantitative data from these collections would offer a route to comment on the physical manifestation of the state-migrant relationship. Mapping and other data visualization could reveal patterns of distribution of resources such as land, educational institutions, and health infrastructure. A series of layered maps depicting migrant settlement, integration, resource petitions, and resource deployment across multiple times and scales could render images of immigrant networks of information and migrant movement and generate visual insight into state goals and migrant responses. These visualization strategies could further contextualize the study of Ottoman immigration within a wider history of bureaucratic change and state centralization through directly comparing settlement strategies and assimilative tactics for immigrant and non-immigrant populations.

Conclusion

In this paper, I have evaluated the formation of a historical migration regime through analyzing the organizing principles and material changes anticipated by the creation of centralized migration administration within the Ottoman Empire. The history of the Immigrant Commission and its later iterations offers a key route to understanding migrant-state interactions, as some of the clearest indications of state ideals are articulated through the administration's legal foundations. The Ottoman state grappled with questions of security and resource scarcity in response to large numbers of forced migrants, and in doing so it developed policies that conditioned the terms of immigrant entry and settlement.

In the six decades following the Crimean War, as many as five million individuals migrated to the Ottoman Empire (Karpat, 2002, p. 691). Scholars have used the term refugee in describing certain episodes of mass forced migration during this era. In labeling migration, historians should consider both conditions of movement and administrative categories. The concept of refugee refers more directly to individuals' legal status rather than to their conditions of movement. As such, the term refugee offers little insight into migrants' experiences in the Ottoman Empire after arrival. As historians address the numerical and chronological breadth of this vast movement, research categories based on religion, ethnicity, place of origin, and location of settlement are all useful approaches in revealing outcomes of Ottoman policies and components of migrant experiences. Nevertheless, the state's differentiation of the immigrant stream in order to account for limited funds created a system of sub-divisions with material outcomes for migrants themselves. In considering the significance of the category of *muhacir*, historians should recognize the potential influence of these administrative classifications chosen by the state as a tactic in population management, especially as the development of these policies affected the terms migrants and officials used in contesting settlement outcomes.

Historical case studies offer insight into the production of legal statuses, and historical analysis offers a method to more precisely engage with the context-specific implications of scholarly and state categories of mobility. Through assessing the historical development of migration regimes, researchers of forced migration can better evaluate the significance of state-generated categories, consider how legal institutions produce concepts like refugee, and explore the evolution and persistence of classifications.

References

Bakewell, O. (2011). Conceptualising displacement and migration: Processes, conditions, and categories. In K. Koser & S. Martin (Eds.), *The migration-displacement nexus: Patterns, processes, and policies* (pp. 14–28). Oxford, UK: Berghahn Books.

Başaran, B. (2006). *Remaking the gate of felicity: Policing, social control, and migration in Istanbul at the end of the 18th Century, 1789-1793* (Doctoral dissertation). Available from ProQuest Dissertations and Theses database. (UMI No. 3240069)

Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi [The Ottoman Archives of the Prime Minister's Office]. Istanbul, Turkey.

Chochiev, G., & Koç, B. (2006). Some notes on the settlement of Northern Caucasians in Eastern Anatolia and their adaptation problems (The second half of the 19th century to the beginning of the 20th century). *Journal of Asian History*, *40*(1), 80−103.

Cuthell, D. C. (2005). *The Muhacirin Komisyonu: An agent in the transformation of Ottoman Anatolia, 1860-1866* (Doctoral dissertation, Columbia University, Columbia, NY).

Dündar, F. (2001). *İttihat ve Terakki'nin Müslümanları İskan Politikası (1913-1918)* [Union and Progress' settlement policy of Muslims]. Istanbul, Turkey: İletişim Yayınları.

Elie, J. (2010). The historical root of cooperation between the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and the International Organization for Migration. *Global Governance, 16*(3), 345−360.

Eren, A. C. (1966). *Türkiye'de Göç ve Göçmen Meseleleri* [Migration and migrant issues in Turkey]. Istanbul, Turkey: Nurgök Matbaası.

Herzog, C. (2011). Migration and the state: On Ottoman regulations concerning migration since the age of Mahmud II. In U. Freitag, M. Fuhrmann, N. Lafi, & F. Riedler (Eds.), *The city in the Ottoman Empire: Migration and the making of urban modernity* (pp. 117−134). London, UK: Routledge.

Kale, B. (2014). Transforming an empire: The Ottoman Empire's immigration and settlement policies in the 19th & early 20th centuries. *Middle Eastern Studies*, *50*(2), 252−271. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00263206.2013.870894

Karatini, R. (2005). How history separated refugee and migrant regimes: In search of their institutional origins. *International Journal of Refugee Law 17*(3), 517−541. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jrl/eei019

Karpat, K. (1985). *Ottoman population 1830-1914: Demographic and social characteristics*. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press.

Karpat, K. (2002). *Studies on Ottoman social and political history: Selected articles and essays*. Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill.

Kasaba, R. (2009). *A moveable empire: Ottoman nomads, migrants, and refugees*. Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press.

Kocacık, F. (1980). Balkanlar'dan Anadolu'ya Yönelik Göçler (1878-1890) [Migrations from the Balkans to Anatolia]. *Osmanlı Araştırmaları*, *1*(1), 137−190.

Long, K. (2013). When refugees stopped being migrants: Movement, labour, and humanitarian protection. *Migration Studies, 1*(1), 4−26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/migration.mns001

Maksudyan, N. (2011). Orphans, cities, and the state: Vocational orphanages (*Islahhanes*) and reform in the late Ottoman urban space. *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, *43*, 493−511. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0020743811000638

Meyer, J. (2007). Immigration, return, and the politics of citizenship: Russian Muslims in the Ottoman Empire, 1860-1914. *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, *39*(1), 15−32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017.S0020743806391027

Pinson, M. (1970). *Demographic Warfare: An Aspect of Ottoman and Russian Policy, 1854-1866* (Unpublished doctoral dissertation). Harvard University, Cambridge, MA.

Reinkowski, M. (2005). The state's security and the subject's prosperity: Notions of order in Ottoman bureaucratic correspondence (19th Century). In H. T. Karateke & M. Reinkowski (Eds.), *Legitimizing the order: The OttomanrRhetoric of state power* (pp. 195−214). Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill.

Rogan, E. L. (1996). Aşiret Mektebi: Abdülhamid II's schools for tribes (1892-1907). *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, *28*(1), 83−107. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0020743800062796

Rogan, E. L. (1999). *Frontiers of the state in the late Ottoman Empire: Transjordan, 1850-1921*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Saydam, A. (1997). *Kırım ve Kafkas Göçleri (1856-1876)* [Crimea and the Caucasus migrations]. Ankara, Turkey: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi.

Scalettaris, G. (2007). Refugee studies and the international refugee regime: A reflection on a desirable separation. *Refugee Survey Quarterly, 26*(3), 36−50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/rsq/hdi0241

Shaw, S., & Shaw, E. Z. (1997). *History of the Ottoman Empire and modern Turkey* (Vol. 2). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Tekeli, İ. (1994). Involuntary displacement and the problem of resettlement in Turkey from the Ottoman Empire to the present [Special issue]. *Center for Migration Studies*, *11*, 202–226. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.2050-411X.1994.tb00808.x

Türkiye Cumhuriyet Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü. (2012). *Osmanlı Belgelerinde Kafkas Göçleri* (Vol. 1) [Caucasian Migration in Ottoman archives]. Istanbul, Turkey: Başbakanlık Basımevi.

Williams, B. (2000). Hijra and forced migration from 19th century Russia to the Ottoman Empire: A critical analysis of the Great Crimean Tatar emigration of 1860-1861. *Cahiers du Monde Russe*, *41*(1), 79−108.

Yosmaoğlu, İ. (2006). Counting bodies, shaping souls: The 1903 census and national identity in Ottoman Macedonia. *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, *38*(1), 55−77. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0020743806412253

Zetter, R. (1988). Refugees and Refugee Studies: a Label and an Agenda, Editorial Introduction. *Journal of Refugee Studies 1*(1), 1−11. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jrs/1.1.1

Zetter, R. (1991). Labelling refugees: Forming and transforming a bureaucratic identity. *Journal of Refugee Studies*, *4*(1), 39−63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jrs/4.1.39

MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL OF REFUGEE STUDIES

Özgün Makale

Longue Durée Boyunca Zorunlu Göç: 1858-2015 Arasında Doğu Anadolu'da Toprak, Yerinden Edilme ve Tazmin

Matthew Goldman[a]

Öz

Zorunlu göç konusunda araştırma yapanlar genellikle mevcut krizlere odaklanırlar ve vaka analizlerinde nispeten kısa zaman dilimlerini seçme eğilimi gösterirler. Ancak, kısa zaman aralıklarındaki vakaları ele almak çatışma, ayrılma, geri dönme ile konutun, arazinin ve mülkün tazminini etkileyen önemli temel konuları belirsizleştirebilir. Bu makale, geniş zaman dilimlerine odaklanıp geçici etkilere daha az dikkat gösterildiğinde zorunlu göçü etkileyen nedensel mekanizmaların daha kolay belirlenebileceğini iddia etmektedir. Bu çalışma Güneydoğu Anadolu'da konutun, arazinin ve mülkün tazminini ve geri dönüşü etkileyen problemlere yönelik bir vaka incelemesidir. Uzun bir zaman dilimini seçerek 19. yüzyılın ortalarındaki tapu kadastro modernizasyonunun başlangıcından günümüze kadar yerel seçkinlerin devletin yasal kurumlarına dâhil edilme biçiminin arazi kullanımında uzun vadeli yapısal sorunların yanında çatışma, topraktan kopma; konutun, arazinin ve mülkün tazminini karmaşıklaştıran sorunlar yarattığını savunmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Metodoloji • Onarıcı adalet • Tapu kadastro modernizasyonu • Mülkiyet hakkı

a (✉) Matthew Goldman (Dr.), İstanbul İsveç Araştırma Enstitüsü, İstiklal Caddesi 247, Tünel, Beyoğlu 34433 İstanbul. Eposta: goldmm@uw.edu

Başvuru: 18 Kasım 2016
Revizyon Gönderimi: 29 Aralık 2016
Accepted: 15 Şubat 2016
Online First: 15 Eylül 2017

ISSN 2149-4398 • **eISSN** 2458-8962
DOI 10.12738/mejrs.2017.2.1.0108 • Kış 2017 • 2(1) • 117-134

MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL OF REFUGEE STUDIES

Original Article

Forced Migration over the Longue Durée: Land, Displacement, and Restitution in Eastern Anatolia, 1858-2015

Matthew Goldman[a]

Abstract

Researchers in forced migration studies usually focus on current crises and tend to adopt relatively short timeframes for case studies. And yet, studying cases within narrow timeframes can obscure important underlying issues impacting conflict, flight, return, and restitution of housing, land, and property (HLP). This article argues that using broad time frames and paying closer attention to temporal effects can help us identify underlying causal mechanisms impacting forced migration. It presents a case study of problems affecting return and restitution of HLP in southeast Turkey. Adopting a long-term time frame, it argues that the mode of incorporating local elites into state legal institutions from the beginning of cadastral modernization from the mid-19th century to the present day have created long-term structural problems in land tenure that not only provoke conflict and flight, but also complicate restitution of HLP.

Keywords

Methodology • Restorative justice • Cadastral modernization • Property rights

a (✉)Matthew Goldman (PhD), Swedish Research Institute-Istanbul, Istiklal Caddesi 247, Tünel-Beyoğlu, Istanbul 34433 Turkey.
Email: goldmm@uw.edu

Received: November 18, 2016
Revision received: December 29, 2016
Accepted: January 15, 2017
Online First: September 15, 2017

ISSN 2149-4398 • **eISSN** 2458-8962
DOI 10.12738/mejrs.2017.2.1.0108 • Winter 2017 • 2(1) • 117–134

Academic work in the field of forced migration studies typically focuses on recent and current crises, and with good reason. Since forced migration studies emerged as a distinctive academic field in the 1980s, researchers have aspired to have a meaningful impact on policy and practice. They not only study those suffering from forced displacement, but also advocate for their rights and seek ways to improve their conditions (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, Loescher, Long, & Sigona, 2014; Harrell-Bond, 1986). And yet, the fierce urgency of the now should not lead us to neglect the study of earlier episodes of conflict and forced migration, nor should it prevent us from viewing current events as the outcomes of processes unfolding over long periods of time.

Elie (2014) and Marfleet (2007; 2013) have noted that the field of forced migration studies is often criticized for being "ahistorical," and they urge scholars to adopt more historical approaches in their studies of forced migration. In this article I support this call to focus more on history, but also go a step further by inviting forced migration researchers to engage more fully with *temporal effects*, or causal factors that have a specifically temporal element. This not only entails expanding the time frames used to study subjects in forced migration, but also means paying close attention to underlying causal mechanisms with a temporal component, such as slow-building *longue durée* effects, critical junctures, and path dependency.

Such concepts are derived from the social science school of historical institutionalism (North, 1981; Pierson, 2004; Steinmo, Thelen, & Longstreth, 1992; Thelen, 1999). This school of thought sees strategic interaction in political life structured by both formal and informal institutions - "the humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic, and social interactions" (North, 1991, p. 97). It argues that institutions are created or reshaped at periods called *critical junctures*—moments when actors find the radical reconstruction of the rules of the game both possible and desirable, often due to war, crisis, the founding of a new state or organization, or some other major event. These new institutions then tend to persist over time due to self-reinforcing effects, such as a stronger party using its strength to continuously readjust these institutions in its favor. A common theme in such research is that institutions often outlive their "sell by" date, persisting even when they no longer offer an optimal means for problem-solving or achieving Pareto efficient outcomes. Thus, studies of institutional dysfunction —a painfully relevant subject in forced migration studies— often benefit from a historical institutionalist approach.

This article applies a historical institutionalist approach to explain problems affecting recent attempts to restore housing, land, and property (HLP) to internally displaced persons (IDPs) in southeast Turkey. It notes that recent attempts to restore HLP have coincided with a cadastral modernization program sponsored by the World Bank. Unfortunately, neither the plans for restitution nor the cadastral modernization

program seem to have taken account of the underlying structural problems of the land tenure regime in this region. Projects to promote return have fared poorly while violent land conflicts have emerged as a result of the issuing of new land titles under a cadastral modernization program that seeks to allocate lands without providing adequate conflict resolution mechanisms. Given that this region is a post-conflict region where state authority is often challenged, locals are armed, and violence is a common solution to disputes, such omissions have led to grave problems for human security and have failed to successfully promote restorative justice.

The remainder of this article is divided into four main parts. The first elaborates on the importance of temporal effects in social science research. It identifies a few subjects from the field of forced migration studies that would benefit from a focus on temporal effects and suggests ways that research designs could incorporate them. The second section addresses the importance of land tenure regimes and property rights for understanding forced migration, return, and the restitution of HLP. This section argues that although cadastral modernization projects of the past two decades hold great importance for many issues affecting forced migration and restorative justice, they have not received the scholarly attention they deserve. The third section presents a case study of southeast Turkey in the 21st century, a region that had recently seen the conclusion of a major conflict (which has since restarted as of 2015) and some efforts to restore HLP to the mostly Kurdish local IDPs who had left farms and villages for the cities of Turkey. This has not gone particularly well, with attempts to retake HLP sometimes even resulting in bloody feuds over land claiming dozens of victims. This was due in part to lack of security over land rights, lack of authority of local courts, ongoing influence of local elites over land tenure, and incentives to use self-help (violence) rather than state law to resolve conflicts. The fourth main section explains the dysfunctions in the land regime of southeast Anatolia through a look at history, arguing that the problems today have their roots in the Ottoman 19th century, when the central state made alliances with local elites in order to win their support for military campaigns and local security. This created a self-reinforcing sequence wherein state officials agreed to share power with local elites, local elites used this power to acquire more land, cultivators were displaced from their lands or forced into exploitive labor relationships, displaced or exploited cultivators rebelled, and, returning to square one, the state would re-enlist local elites to quell the rebellion.

Temporal Effects and the Study of Forced Migration

Expanding the time frames we use to analyze issues related to forced migration can reveal underlying processes that an exclusive focus on shorter-term case studies might obscure. The political scientist Paul Pierson addressed these methodological issues in his book *Politics in Time* (2004), an influential work that argued for the importance of

time frames in social science research and encouraged scholars to reflect on temporal effects in research design. In seeking to explain political phenomena, we are forced to make difficult choices. Not only must we select the outcomes in which we are interested and define them, we must also select the possible causal factors to be examined and the scope of the study, including the population, the geographic area, and the scale of time. Pierson argues that social science researchers pay insufficient attention to the scale of time, focus on short-term cases at the expense of long-term cases, and often fail to account for important temporal effects in their exploration of causal factors. For example, there are *longue durée* effects - processes that unfold slowly over time, such as demographic, socioeconomic, and ecological changes - that can critically impact the phenomena that social scientists wish to explain.

By adjusting the time frames and the sorts of causal factors we examine, social scientists can produce very different answers to the same questions. For example, suppose a researcher wants to explain why a left-wing candidate triumphed over a right-wing incumbent in a certain election. A researcher focusing on this election alone might conclude that this outcome was due to the candidate's charisma, style of campaigning, mode of fundraising, or a particular scandal that occurred during the campaign. A longer-term study, however, would reveal that the electoral district had been steadily drifting leftwards for decades, in itself the result of long-term demographic and socioeconomic changes leading the voters to increasingly prefer candidates promising to deliver a stronger social safety net. In this case study, the left-wing victory seems less the result of the candidate's particular characteristics or the unique characteristics of this one campaign, but rather a more likely outcome for *any* candidate offering the more left-wing platform. Of course, observing these slow, *longue durée* trends would not allow us to predict just when such an office might flip from a right-wing incumbent to a left-wing challenger, whether it were to occur in this election or the next. Yes, contingencies will always be present. But what this long-term approach does provide is a much fuller explanation for the phenomenon that we wish to explain while also telling us something meaningful about the likelihood of left-wing candidates winning in the future.

Many important subjects in forced migration studies lend themselves to study through such a politics in time approach. For example, a number of works have studied the UNHCR, seeking to determine the extent to which the organization possesses bureaucratic autonomy or is ultimately subject to the interests of the states that support it (Betts, 2013; Betts & Loescher, 2011; Barnett & Finnemore, 1999, 2004). Adopting long-term time frames can help us better understand the ways in which the UNHCR has been able to develop its own autonomous power as a player in the international refugee regime, which in turn would allow us to better evaluate its ultimate impact as an institution.

As Carpenter (2001) argues, bureaucratic autonomy can look very different depending on whether one analyzes a case in the short term or the long term. A principal-agent model using a narrow time frame may give us the impression that the principal (such as a state making demands on an international organization or an elected politician making demands of a state bureaucrat) has been successful in persuading the agent to follow its orders. But, by viewing the same case in the longer term, a researcher may see that over time, the bureaucracy has been the main actor shaping the agenda, using its expertise and professional reputation to alter the preferences of the states or elected officials. Such a longer-term study would turn the results of the short-term study on its head, revealing that over time, the bureaucrats themselves, rather than being passive agents, exerted much power over their supposed principals (Carpenter, 2001; Pierson, 2004).

Such an approach could help illuminate the nature of the "push and pull" between the UNHCR and individual states over policies toward refugees and asylum-seekers. In a study of the UNHCR's role in Burma and Bangladesh in the early 1980s, Barnett and Finnemore (2004) argued that the UNHCR had developed its own bureaucratic autonomy, taking the initiative in choosing how to assign refugee status to Rohingya asylum-seekers. Betts (2013, pp. 50–51), however, finds that UNHCR missions in Angola, Botswana, Kenya, South Africa, Tanzania, and Yemen have taken the back seat to the individual states in the process of determining who is to be granted refugee status. A longer-term study of the struggle over determining refugee status since the UNHCR' founding in 1951 could shed more light on this issue by illuminating the long-term impact of the UNHCR on states' practices of assigning refugee status to asylum-seekers.

In another study, Betts (Betts & Loescher, 2011) examines four donor conferences convened by the UNHCR between 1980 and 2005 in an attempt to investigate whether the UNHCR has been successful in persuading wealthy Northern states to contribute more burden-sharing to refugee relief efforts in the global South and, if so, by what means. Betts found that the UNHCR was not very effective when it relied on humanitarian norms alone to elicit state contributions for the support of refugees in the places where they were hosted in the global South, such as sub-Saharan Africa or Central America. Over time, UNHCR officials discovered that wealthy states in the global North were much more responsive to arguments that appealed to their self-interests based on the issues of security, trade, and limiting informal migration. However, in making these arguments the UNHCR also managed to develop a measure of autonomy and, hence, power in shaping states' reactions to forced migration crises. The UNHCR developed a reputation for expertise in these matters, successfully convincing officials from donor states that money spent to help refugees close to their temporary homes in the global South would prevent them

from trying to move to the global North and causing an immigration and security problem for the wealthy Northern states. By examining the pattern of bargaining and contestation between the UNHCR and individual states over a broader time frame, this study tells us much about the strategic interactions between the UNHCR and its donors and reveals ways in which the UNCHR has both succeeded and failed in developing its own autonomous institutional power.

Additionally, the concepts of path dependency and institutional inertia can be very useful for understanding the pathologies of the UNHCR and the global refugee regime itself. The United Nations passed the 1951 Geneva Convention on Refugees and established the UNHCR at a very specific historical instance. World War II had just ended and the Cold War had just begun. Influenced by both the horrors of the Holocaust, which targeted victims based on ethno-religious criteria, as well as the outflow of dissidents seeking political asylum from the Soviet Union, this agreement committed states to offer protection to those escaping state persecution based on their ethnic, religious, or political identities. This case can be seen as a classic critical juncture, a moment in which a durable set of institutions is formed in response to a specific crisis. The ongoing failures of the institutions produced by this critical juncture seem to make a strong case for institutionalist arguments, which see institutions as persisting past their "sell-by" date and contributing to suboptimal outcomes.

The limitations of this notion of asylum in terms of protecting human rights were made clear by subsequent waves of forced migration, with millions of people fleeing not targeted persecution by states, but rather famine, warfare, economic crisis, and other calamities depriving them of basic human rights. Betts (2013) has argued that we should replace the concept of *refugee*, which refers to those subject to targeted persecution by states because of their identity or political beliefs, with that of the *survival migrant* - someone who is forced to cross an international border in order to achieve basic human rights and security, whether because of persecution, war, ecological, and/or economic crisis in their home country. He notes that as climate change renders more areas uninhabitable and affects food yields in agricultural regions, the concept of survival migration will become increasingly relevant for managing international migration flows.

In a way, maintaining the 1951 legal concept of the refugee may benefit states by restricting their obligations to care for those fleeing their home countries, allowing them to spend less on humanitarian aid and reduce the number of survival migrants they accept into their countries. However, the fact that the 1951 Convention and the international refugee regime it anchors have so drastically failed to offer minimum protections to the millions of desperate asylum-seekers has come to haunt these states in today's refugee crisis. Thousands of survival migrants have taken matters into their

own hands and made their way to Europe via land and sea routes, overwhelming the border controls and causing a political crisis within the EU.

A final insight of the politics in time approach worth considering is that asymmetries in political power are often self-reinforcing over time. Actors holding political power at an early period often manage to change the formal and informal rules of the game to ensure that they and their successors will have more power in the future. Over time these power imbalances become routinized, leading the actors involved to tacitly accept the power relationships and cease contesting them directly (Pierson, 2004, pp. 36–37). Such an awareness of the self-reinforcing mechanisms of political power over time could, for example, help researchers investigate how and why refugee communities show variation in their efforts to contest political and economic exclusion in countries where they are hosted but have not been granted rights of citizenship. This could be used to better understand the political activism of long-term refugee populations lacking citizenship rights such as Palestinian refugees in Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria since the exodus of 1948 or Afghan refugees in Iran and Pakistan since the 1980s.

The remainder of this article will examine the self-reinforcing nature of political power in governing local property rights to land and its impact on efforts to promote return and the restitution of HLP to refugees and IDPs. Before turning to the empirical case study examining these issues in southeast Anatolia over the past century and a half, the following section describes the challenges that can arise when states or international organizations seek to resolve disputes over HLP in regions where land tenure regimes are contested or localized.

Cadastral Modernization, Land Regimes, Return and Restitution of HLP

Since the mid-2000s, international law has increasingly sought two solutions to forced displacement. First, it has increasingly emphasized the return of refugees and IDPs as the sign of a successful conclusion to a violent conflict or political crisis. Second, it has sought the restitution of HLP. This has been expressed in the Principles on Housing and Property Restitution for Refugees and Displaced Persons (also called the Pinheiro Principles) of 2005 and reaffirmed when the UN General Assembly adopted The Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law in 2006.

These new commitments to the restitution of HLP occurred at the tail end of a broader global process emphasizing the importance of property rights for the world's poor and disadvantaged (de Soto, 2000; Payne, Durand-Lasserve, & Rakodi, 2009). By the 1990s, breakthroughs in information and geographic information system (GIS)

technologies revolutionized states' abilities to map land and store records of property ownership. At the same time, the wave of neoliberal economic thought increasingly pushed development agencies to promote well-regulated formal property rights in land. Since then, cadastral modernization - the technological and administrative upgrading of state maps and legal records of land ownership - has spread like wildfire throughout much of the world. The World Bank and other development agencies have made cadastral reform a top priority. For example, in Turkey's neighborhood alone the World Bank has supported cadastral modernization projects in Russia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia, Croatia, Macedonia, Romania, Bulgaria, Ukraine, and Serbia (World Bank, 2008, p. 3).

Unfortunately, today many international agencies and states tend to treat land tenure issues as strictly legal-technical matters, even in regions where conflicts are ongoing or have recently been concluded. They thus fail to provide mechanisms to adequately manage land conflicts. In transitioning from a land rights system based on legal pluralism or (neo-) traditional land tenure practices to a Roman Law-style system of strong property rights enforced by the central state, inevitable questions arise concerning the issuing of title: Whose claims to the land are to be honored and whose are to be rejected? How will this be adjudicated? How will collective land ownership practices be converted into the exclusive land rights conferred by title under Roman law?[1] How effective will state courts be in adjudicating cases that were previously decided not by the state, but by local elites or communities through local, non-state modes of law or in collusion with state officials embedded in local networks?

Ideally, the creation of comprehensive new property rights systems should serve to reduce the amount of violent conflict, supplanting extra-legal violence with the rule of law as the means of resolving disputes over land. However, the state awarding exclusive rights of ownership to one party or another can also exacerbate conflict where the rule of law is weak, local actors are armed, and institutions for conflict resolution, be they state courts or local adjudication mechanisms, are ineffective. Such is often the case in post-conflict situations (Trczinski & Upham, 2014). Land tenure reform often entails invalidating previously-issued land titles as new titles are issued, which potentially leads to conflict between parties bearing titles to the same areas of land or titles that are ambiguous in specifying the areas of the land owned. Cadastral modernization also typically entails state efforts to replace local forms of land management with expanded central state control. This can lead to problems in regions where the state is attempting to extend its legal-administrative power over land tenure for the first time, or where such power has previously been weakened, as is often the case after the outbreak of violent conflict.

1 Ostrom and Cole (2012) have pointed out that there have always been limits to the "absolute" nature of property rights under Roman law since Justinian's code was formulated in the 7th century CE.

Southeast Anatolia: Cadastral Reform and Restorative Justice in the 21st Century

In 2008, Turkey began the implementation of the Land Registry and Cadastre Modernization Project. Sponsored by the World Bank, this project aimed to complete the cadastral process begun in the mid-19th century under the Ottoman Empire: the mapping of all the lands under the state's jurisdiction and the recording of all ownership rights. It spent some 210 million USD to update the technologies for cadastral surveying and the storing of information and represents, in many ways, a vast administrative improvement over the system that preceded it. It has greatly speeded up the process of accessing cadastral records and obtaining title documents. Landowners can now use the internet to obtain a record of their *tapu senedi*, or land title, in hours rather than the days or weeks it took under the old system (World Bank, 2015).

Unfortunately, despite these achievements, the cadastral modernization project has proceeded without acknowledgment of the issues of conflict and restorative justice that affect southeast Anatolia. The World Bank's Project Appraisal Document (2008) shows a limited awareness of the issues that would arise from the cadastral reform. For example, nowhere in this document is there recognition that since 1984 Turkey has experienced war between the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), the Turkish state, and local state-allied militias and landowners, a conflict that has resulted in over a million displaced persons and over 40,000 deaths. This is despite the fact that such violence invariably has a transformative impact on land tenure relations, complicating the process of post-conflict return and threatening to reignite concluded or abated conflicts (McCallin, 2012; Unruh & Williams, 2013).

There is evidence that the application of the cadastral reform program has resulted in, or at least contributed to, outbreaks of violence over land. While there is no detailed statistical information on the trends in land violence in Turkey, reports in the Turkish media indicate that violent land disputes are increasing because of the lack of adequate arbitration mechanisms and policing to accompany the cadastral reform program. An official from the land ministry anonymously told journalists from the daily newspaper *Milliyet* (Elebaşı katliam anlattı!) that the cadastral modernization process had caused an increase in violence in the East as those who had fled their lands earlier in the conflict were returning to find these lands occupied by those who remained.

The worst such case to date has been a massacre occurring at a village wedding in the province of Mardin on May 4, 2009 in which 44 members of a family were executed. Turkish officials explained that the conflict emerged from a dispute over lands taken over from IDPs during the Turkey-PKK conflict by members of the Village Guards, the local Kurdish militias raised by the Turkish state to assist it in its struggle with the PKK. These members of the Village Guards later received title to the lands from the state under the cadastral modernization program. The perpetrators

of the attack were the family of the former landowners who had fled their lands to escape the violence but had returned hoping to reclaim their HLP. A Turkish official surmised that the massacre of the family members was so thorough because the attackers hoped to wipe out any potential heir who might receive the lands upon the deaths of the current title-holders. Blaming the cadastral project for the massacre, this official added that a correction to the program be done immediately to prevent more such incidents from happening (Elebaşı katliamı anlattı! 2009).

The Land Regime in Southeast Anatolia: From the 1858 Land Code to the 21st century

The pathology of this system is not a new development, but rather has shown strong continuities over time, surviving even the transition from the Ottoman Empire to the Turkish republic. Today's Turkish state has, in essence, subcontracted its Weberian aspirations to a state monopoly over violence to local actors to help it in its quest to put down the PKK insurgency. In doing so, it has allowed these actors to acquire and keep lands that they have settled, sometimes using violence to do so - violence that the state perforce ignores. State courts, despite the pretense of apolitical bureaucratic impartiality, often cede to local actors in making decisions. Such decisions not only often lead individuals to use violence to reclaim lands, but also create more anger against the state and within communities in the Southeast.

In the 19th century, the Ottoman Empire carried out a wave of modernizing reforms aimed at strengthening the central state's authority and increasing its ability to extract revenue from agriculture. This included the 1858 Land Code, which sought to improve the state's ability to collect revenue from agriculture through strengthening the institution of the *tapu*, a legal document that functioned much like title deeds under Roman law, and the Department of Land Registry, or *Tahrîr-i Emlâk Nezâreti*, that began the process of surveying and recording usufruct-property rights (İslamoğlu, 2004; Shaw & Shaw, 1977). Although the Ottoman *tapu* did not grant absolute fee simple over the land owned, it did provide both usufruct rights and strengthened the possessor's ability to buy and sell those rights. Thus, although scholars have debated the extent to which the 1858 Land Code constituted a true turn towards private property in land (Arıcanlı, 1991; Owen & Bunton, 2000), it was certainly part of a broader process of extending state administration of land tenure that included the first modern cadastral surveys.

The success of these efforts was uneven throughout the geographic expanse of the Empire, with southeastern Anatolia posing a particularly difficult region for the extension of state administrative power over property rights. Southeast Anatolia was a mountainous borderland between the Ottoman and Persian empires, just south of the Ottoman-Russian border in northeast Anatolia. Low agricultural output, difficult terrain, and the relative autonomy of local elites increased the costs of extending the

state's administrative and legal institutions, making it more efficient to share power with the local notables rather than to rule directly. Local elites in the Southeast were seen as valuable assets in the effort to maintain the security of the border, as they could mobilize soldiers from their peasants and offer them to the Ottoman army as auxiliary forces in the fight against the Russians. Finding it difficult to conscript these peasants directly, the state instead accepted the aid of these local militias, legitimating the authority of the elites in the process (Klein, 2011; van Bruinessen, 1992).

The fact that the state chose to grant local elites much autonomy in exchange for military support did not mean that the new *tapu* system and cadastral surveys had no effect in the Southeast. Rather, local elites were able to augment their local power through the manipulation of the Ottoman state's new willingness to intervene in the realm of property rights, giving them the best of both worlds. They could appropriate land for themselves extra-legally and then acquire legal recognition of their property rights, backed up by state legal power. They could also use their local political power and influence with state officials, maintained through the threat of violence and the promise of bribery, to manipulate the granting of *tapu* to others. This increased their ability to act as adjudicators in local property disputes and paved the way for the legal pluralism that has persisted into the current day.

The pattern of turning a blind eye to the land grabs of local power holders in exchange for contributions to military campaigns became more pronounced with the founding of the *Hamidiye* corps in 1890. These irregular regiments, named for the Ottoman Sultan Abdulhamid II (r. 1876-1909), were loosely modeled on the Russian Cossacks. They granted the leaders of local militias military rank as *Hamidiye* officers, seeking to better incorporate them into the Ottoman military. This new status allowed them to use their connections with the state to further take advantage of the emerging property rights system. They could now use their influence over local judges and police to obtain *tapu* rights to more land, even taking over the lands of farmers able to produce their own previously issued *tapu*, which began to seem worthless in the hands of less well-connected actors. It increasingly appeared that the *tapu* granted secure property rights only to those with the local political and social power to have them enforced (Gözel, 2007; Kaligian, 2003; Klein, 2011).

This competition for land occurred in a region suffering from divisions based on language, religion, and, increasingly, ethno-national identity. The *Hamidiye* officers and local *agha*s and *sheikh*s were all Muslim, while many of the peasants and traders were Armenian and Syriac Christians. Land grabs targeted Muslim and Christian villagers alike, with Kurdish and Armenian peasants both suffering predation (Klein, 2011). However, it was the Armenians whose resistance found support from a broader nationalist movement that was emerging among Armenians in Ottoman, Russian, and

European cities at the time. These urban nationalist intellectuals established links with local Armenian peasants' resistance to land predation in the Southeast. The Young Turk revolution in 1908 led to new elections and optimism about the future of the Ottoman state. Armenian nationalists sought to cooperate with the new Turkish leadership to restore HLP to displaced Armenians. Unfortunately, the new government failed to follow through on its promises to successfully restore much of the lost HLP, whether due to the weakness of the local legal-administrative institutions or their growing indifference to the Armenians' grievances (Kaligian, 2003).

When World War I broke out and the Ottomans entered the war on the side of Germany and the Austro-Hungarians, the conflicts over lands in the Southeast fueled antagonisms and created the perception of a zero-sum conflict. In 1915, members of the Ottoman state and local forces began a genocidal program of violence, murdering and exiling Armenians, Syriacs, and Greek Orthodox Christians (Akçam, 2012; Suny, 2015), taking over the houses, lands, and properties of those killed or expelled. When the Turkish Republic replaced the Ottoman Empire in 1923, the new state was able to consolidate fairly effective rule over the western and central regions of the country. In the East, however, the pattern of power sharing with local elites persisted. Just as in the late Ottoman era, the new Turkish Republic saw the Southeast as a zone of insecurity. The Soviet Union continued to threaten the eastern borders just as the Romanovs had earlier. While Armenian nationalism was feared the most at the end of the Ottoman Empire, Kurdish insurrection became the new concern. An uprising in 1925 led to a major battle between the armies of the new Turkish state and Kurdish rebels, a fight that consolidated Turkish ethno-nationalism and the rejection of Kurdish identity at the heart of the new regime. In order to maintain state control over the Kurdish territories, the state came to make alliances with local Kurdish landholding elites willing to align themselves with Ankara. This entailed allowing them a great deal of local autonomy in exchange for their support. These patterns endured throughout the decades of the Turkish Republic and were recreated when violence erupted again in the 1980s.

Not surprisingly, when the fighting erupted in the 1980s the state turned to its traditional allies in seeking to put down the revolt - local landowning elites (Bozarslan, 2006; Romano, 2006). The Ottoman pattern was recreated, as Turkish leaders drew on familiar scripts to try to put down the insurgency, including offering more lands to its local allies and depriving actual or alleged PKK supporters of restitution of HLP lost in the conflict (Kurban, 2012). The startling success of the PKK led the Turkish military to carry out two classic counter-insurgency techniques leading to high levels of forced displacement. First, beginning in 1992 the Turkish state created a militia from local residents in the Kurdish regions, named the Village Guards system. As Kalyvas (1999, p. 266) has demonstrated using the Algerian example, the raising of militias to fight

insurgency creates a dangerous new dynamic in civil wars, noting that "militias almost always cause an escalation in violence" due to their embeddedness in local society, their superior information about the allegiance of civilians, and their penchant for expropriating the wealth and properties of other locals through the new opportunities opened up by the conflict. The second technique was the demographic reshaping of the insurgent region, which has led to the expulsion of hundreds of thousands of villagers from their homes and lands (Jongerden, 2007). Most of these refugees became IDPs within Turkey, while many were also able to emigrate or find asylum abroad. Kurban (2012) notes how many members of the Village Guards units were able to benefit from this policy, often obtaining access to the lands of those forced to leave.

The fighting has waxed and waned since the PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan was captured in 1999. From that time until the resumption of fighting in 2015, Turkish governments and the PKK have shown sporadic interest in solving the conflict through a negotiated political settlement. During this period there have been some attempts at the resettlement of refugees and programs trying to carry out some sort of restorative justice, such as a program in the province of Van (Yükseker & Kurban, 2009). But, as Kurban (2012) points out, these have benefitted members of the Village Guard units and their families while dispossessing those suspected of PKK membership or pro-PKK affinities. As of 2012, some 43% of applicants for restitution have had their claims rejected, a process that occurs without outside monitoring or possibility of appeal (Kurban, 2012, p. 5). This seems likely to have provoked more grievances and deepened the divisions in society.

In the summer of 2015, the Turkish military and the PKK once again resumed large-scale hostilities. Unlike the mostly rural conflict of the 1980s and 1990s, today's battles have been mostly fought in the cities of the Southeast, with great cost in lives. Downtown urban neighborhoods have been devastated in scenes reminiscent of the war across the border in Syria, while large numbers of non-combatants have also been killed in the fighting. IDPs from the villages or their descendants form the basis of these new urban PKK brigades (Jenkins 2015). In part, the intensity of this new round of conflict represents the failure to address the needs of IDPs. The state's practice of rewarding members of loyal militias with easy access to the lands of those who fled may have been effective in attracting and retaining the loyalty of militia members, but this also appears to have contributed to the ongoing willingness to fight on behalf of those dispossessed.

In conclusion, a hybrid formal-informal system has evolved over time since the first cadastral modernization project in the Ottoman Empire in the mid-19th century. Since that time the Ottoman state and, after 1923, the Turkish state have engaged in power-sharing with local elites in order to achieve state security objectives and put

down local rebellions. However, this has meant giving state allies the ability to claim land, which has in turn increased insecurity and grievances against the state, leading to rebellions that the state must again put down by once again subcontracting stately authority to local actors. The following chart illustrates this causal chain:

This occurs over time as a self-reinforcing process as described above in the section on temporal effects. An awareness of the long-term persistence of such a problem could have informed both the cadastral modernization project as well as efforts to promote restorative justice. Unfortunately, the failure to account for such dynamics or provide effective conflict resolution mechanisms for land disputes caused by the conflict has contributed to both bloody land conflicts such as the massacre in Mardin as well as the ongoing grievances experienced by many in the Kurdish minority today.

Conclusions

Forced migration researchers can serve a valuable function in calling attention to the impact of land tenure regimes on the issues of flight, return, and restitution. To do so, a greater focus on long-term processes and temporal effects is warranted. By viewing crises of displacement using longer time frames, we may better see how waves of conflict and flight exhibit cyclical qualities and how institutions, whether formal or informal, become self-reinforcing. In doing so, we may better understand the mechanisms provoking flight and complicating restorative justice projects.

Conflicts that lead to forced migration are often provoked and stoked by disputes over housing, agricultural land, and other forms of property. The possibilities for successful return and restitution of HLP are similarly contingent upon local land tenure regimes. Post-conflict transitional justice programs that attempt the restitution of HLP must thus incorporate a thorough understanding of local land tenure practices and property rights regimes. Understanding these regimes requires a long-term view, as they are often classically "sticky" local institutions resistant to change from outside the local community. Conflict tends to transform land tenure relations radically, as people flee their lands and others settle them in their absence. This often leads to more land conflicts when displaced persons attempt to return. Post-conflict areas also frequently suffer from weak rule of law, reducing the state's power to act as an arbiter in land disputes. During or after a conflict, many actors resent and mistrust both state institutions as well as local sources of political-legal authority.

Those who have acquired weapons and experience in their use during the conflict will be tempted to use them to settle land disputes, rather than relying on state or local powers (McCallin, 2012; Unruh & Williams, 2013).

Such conditions have certainly been present in southeast Anatolia. A durable solution to the conflict between the Turkish state, the PKK, and its rival militias must address the issue of HLP in a way that gives all actors an incentive to participate. Capacity building for state legal-administrative institutions is important, but of course, it cannot proceed without the compliance and trust of the local population. As Belge (2008) has shown in the case of "honor killings," Kurds in southeast Anatolia frequently wish they could obtain help from the Turkish police, yet feel alienated from the system while also fearing the backlash they would receive from Kurdish nationalists for appearing to collaborate with the Turkish state.

Underlying structural mechanisms affecting conflict and flight can persist for generations. As this article has demonstrated using the case of southeast Anatolia over the past 150 years, technologies have changed while many of the issues fueling conflict have remained the same. A focus on the *longue durée* reveals that the state practice of subcontracting its monopoly of violence to local actors became self-reinforcing over time, leading to surprisingly durable mechanisms structuring conflict and flight from the Ottoman 19th century up to the present day. Awareness of these mechanisms, based on formal and informal institutions, in turn should alert us to the risks of carrying out cadastral modernization and titling projects without also providing adequate dispute resolution mechanisms. As we consider the methodological tools at our disposal for studying forced migration, we should be aware that expanding our time horizons will not only provide us with insights about the past, but better inform our understandings of the present and prospects for the future as well.

References

Akçam, T. (2012). *Young Turks' crime against humanity: The Armenian genocide and ethnic cleansing in the Ottoman Empire.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Arıcanlı, T. (1991). Property, land, and labor in 19th-century Anatolia. In Ç. Keyder & F. Tabak (Eds.), *Landholding and commercial agriculture in the Middle East: Globalization, revolution, and popular culture* (pp. 123–135). Albany. NY: SUNY Press.

Barnett, M., & Finnemore, M. (1999). The politics, power, and pathologies of international organizations. *International organization, 53*(4), 699−732.

Barnett, M., & Finnemore, M. (2004). *Rules for the world: International organizations in global politics*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Belge, C. (2008). *Whose law? Clans, honor killings and state-minority relations in Turkey and Israel* (Doctoral dissertation, University of Washington, Seattle, WA).

Betts, A. (2013). *Survival migration: Failed governance and the crisis of displacement*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Betts, A., & Loescher, G. (2011). *Refugees in international relations*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

Bozarslan, H. (2006). Tribal Asabiyya and Kurdish politics: A sociohistorical perspective. In F. Abd Al-Jabbar & H. Dawod (Eds.), *The Kurds: Nationalism and politics* (pp. 130−147). London, UK: Saqi Press.

Carpenter, D. P. (2001). *The forging of bureaucratic autonomy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

De Soto, H. (2000). *The mystery of capital: Why capitalism triumphs in the West and fails everywhere else*. New York, NY: Basic Books.

Elebaşı katliamı anlattı! (2009, May 6). *Milliyet Gazetesi*. Retrieved from http://www.milliyet.com.tr/elebasi-katliami-anlatti--gundem-1091390/

Elie, J. (2014). Histories of refugee and forced migration studies. In E. Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, G. Loescher, K. Long, & N. Sigona (Eds.), *The Oxford handbook of refugee and forced migration studies* (pp. 22−35). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, E., Loescher, G., Long, K., & Sigona, N. (Eds.). (2014). *The Oxford handbook of refugee and forced migration studies*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

Gözel, O. (2007). *The implementation of the Ottoman Land Code of 1858 in Eastern Anatolia* (Doctoral dissertation, Middle East Technical University, Ankara, Turkey). Retrieved from https://tez.yok.gov.tr/UlusalTezMerkezi/

Harrell-Bond, B. E. (1986). *Imposing aid: Emergency assistance to refugees*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

İslamoğlu, H. (2004). *Constituting modernity: Private property in the East and West* (Vol. 5). London, UK: IB Tauris.

Jenkins, G. (2015). Erdoğan's war: The causes and consequences of the upsurge in Kurdish violence. *The Turkey Analyst*, *8*(15). Retrieved from https://www.turkeyanalyst.org/

Jongerden, J. (2007). *The settlement issue in Turkey and the Kurds: An analysis of spatial policies, modernity and war* (Vol. 102). Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill.

Kaligian, D. M. (2003). *The Armenian Revolutionary Federation under Ottoman constitutional rule, 1908-1914* (Doctoral dissertation). Retreived from Boston College Dissertations and Theses. (AAI3122101).

Kalyvas, S. N. (1999). Wanton and senseless? The logic of massacres in Algeria. *Rationality and Society*, *11*(3), 243−285.

Klein, J. (2011). *The margins of empire: Kurdish militias in the Ottoman tribal zone*. Redwood City, CA: Stanford University Press.

Kurban, D. (2012). *Reparations and displacement in Turkey: Lessons learned from the compensation law* (International Center for Transitional Justice [ICTJ] & Brookings-LSE project). New York, NY: ICTJ.

Marfleet, P. (2007). Refugees and history: Why we must address the past. *Refugee Survey Quarterly, 26*(3), 136−148.

Marfleet, P. (2013). Explorations in a foreign land: States, refugees, and the problem of history. *Refugee Survey Quarterly, 32*(2), 14−34.

McCallin, B. (2012). *Restitution and legal pluralism in contexts of displacement*. New York, NY: ICTJ/Brookings.

North, D. C. (1981). *Structure and change in economic history*. New York, NY: Norton.

North, D. C. (1991). Institutions. *The Journal of Economic Perspectives*, *5*(1), 97−112.

Ostrom, E., & Cole, D. H. (2012). *Property in land and other resources*. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.

Owen, R., & Bunton, M. P. (Eds.). (2000). *New perspectives on property and land in the Middle East* (Vol. 34). Cambridge, MA: Harvard Center for Middle Eastern Studies.

Payne, G., Durand-Lasserve, A., & Rakodi, C. (2009). The limits of land titling and home ownership. *Environment and Urbanization*, *21*(2), 443−462.

Pierson, P. (2004). *Politics in time: History, institutions, and social analysis*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Romano, D. (2006). *The Kurdish nationalist movement: Opportunity, mobilization, and identity*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Shaw, S. J., & Shaw, E. K. (1977). *History of the Ottoman Empire and modern Turkey: Volume 2: Reform, revolution, and republic: the rise of modern Turkey 1808-1975* (Vol. 11). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Steinmo, S., Thelen, K., & Longstreth, F. (1992). *Structuring politics: Historical institutionalism in comparative analysis*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Suny, R. G. (2015). *"They can live in the desert but nowhere else": A history of the Armenian Genocide.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Thelen, K. (1999). Historical institutionalism in comparative politics. *Annual Review of Political Science*, *2*(1), 369−404.

Trzcinski, L. M., & Upham, F. K. (2014). Creating law from the ground up: Land law in post-conflict Cambodia. *Asian Journal of Law and Society*, *1*(01), 55−77.

Unruh, J., & Williams, R. (Eds.). (2013). *Land and post-conflict peacebuilding*. Abingdon-on-Thames, UK: Routledge.

Van Bruinessen, M. (1992). *Agha, shaikh, and state*. Vauxhall, UK: Zed Books.

World Bank. (2008). *Project Appraisal Document* (Report No 43174-TR). Retrieved from http://www.worldbank.org/projects/P106284/turkey-land-registration-cadastre-modernization-project?lang=en&tab=documents&subTab=projectDocuments

World Bank. (2015). *Turkey and World Bank continue partnering for modernization of land management systems*. Retrieved from http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2015/10/15/turkey-and-world-bank-continue-partnering-for-modernization-of-land-management-systems

Yükseker, D., & Kurban, D. (2009). *Permanent solution to internal displacement: An assessment of the Van action plan for IDPs*. Istanbul, Turkey: Türkiye Ekonomik ve Sosyal Etüdler Vakfı.

YAZARLARA NOTLAR

Middle East Journal of Refugee Studies (MEJRS), değerlendirme süreçlerine alınacak çalışmalarda temel bazı kriterler aranmaktadır:

MEJRS'e gönderilecek çalışmaların;

- Mültecilik konusu ile ilgili nicel, nitel, tek-denekli veya karma araştırma deseni kullanılarak hazırlanmış olmasına,
- Mültecilik konusunda son dönem alan yazını kapsamlı biçimde değerlendiren literatür analizi, metaanaliz veya metasentez çalışması olmasına,
- Mültecilik konusunda pratik olarak uygulanabilecek model önerileri sunmasına dikkat eder veya benzeri özgün nitelikte yazılar olmasını talep eder.

Bu çerçevede *MEJRS* ileri araştırma/istatistik yöntem ve teknikleri kullanılan güncel çalışmalara öncelik tanımaktadır. Çalışmaların yöntembilim açısından yetkinlikleri kadar alana orijinal ve yeni katkı sunmaları da temel yayımlanma kriteridir.

Yayımlanmak üzere gönderilen çalışmalar öncelikle Editör tarafından amaç, konu, içerik, sunuş tarzı ve yazım kurallarına uygunluk yönünden incelenmektedir. Editöryal ön değerlendirmedeki genel eğilimler şu şekildedir:

✓ Nicel araştırmalar için;

- Tek sürekli değişken veya iki sürekli değişken barındırıp sadece veya ağırlıklı olarak frekans, yüzde, fark ve ilişki istatistiklerine dayalı çalışmalar, çalışmanın kapsamına göre değerlendirilmektedir.
- Tek sürekli değişken veya iki sürekli değişken barındırıp tekli veya çoklu regresyon, yol (path) analizi, cluster analizi gibi ileri istatistikler kullanılarak hazırlanan çalışmalara öncelik verilmektedir.

✓ Ölçme aracı geliştiren çalışmalar için;

- Sadece ölçme araçları geliştirmeyi raporlayan çalışmalar, geliştirilen ölçme aracının otantikliği, kapsamı, geliştirilen grubun niteliği, geçerlik ve güvenirlik işlemlerinin yetkinliği vb. ölçütler dikkate alınarak değerlendirilmektedir.
    - Geliştirilen ölçme aracını bir araştırmada kullanarak raporlayan çalışmalara öncelik verilmektedir.

✓ Deneysel araştırmalar için;

- Araştırma verileri nitel verilerle desteklenmiş deneysel araştırmalara öncelik verilmektedir.

✓ Nitel araştırmalar için;

- Nitel araştırmalar için araştırma sürecinin geçerlilik ve güvenirlilik koşullarının sağlanmış olmasına ve verilerin derinlemesine analiz edilmiş olmasına önem verilmektedir.

✓ Betimsel çalışmalar için;

- Dergide mültecilik ile ilgili temel sorunları ortaya koyan ve bunlara çözüm önerileri getiren analitik çalışmaların yayımlanması hedeflenmektedir. Diğer taraftan bu kapsama giren çalışmaların kitap bölümü tarzında olmaması beklenmektedir.

✓ Karma (mixed) desenli çalışmalar için;

- Karma desenle hazırlanan çalışmaların yayımlanma oranı daha yüksektir. Bununla birlikte karma çalışmalarda niçin ve hangi karma metodolojinin kullanıldığının tekniği ile beraber açıklanması beklenmektedir. Karma desenli araştırmalarda araştırmanın nicel ve nitel kısımları ayrı ayrı değerlendirilir. Nicel ve nitel kısımların ayrı ayrı yukarıdaki kıstasları karşılaması beklenir.

✓ Ayrıca;

- Alanda çok sık kullanılan ölçme araçlarına dayalı çalışmaların ve oldukça yoğun biçimde çalışılmış konularla ilgili araştırmaların yeni bir yönelim ortaya koymaları beklenmektedir.

- Yüksek lisans ve doktora tezlerine dayalı çalışmalarda tezin bütününün, tezde kullanılan bütün verilerin raporlanması, tezlerde dilimlenme yapılmaması beklenmektedir.

- Bütün araştırma türleri için verilerin güncelliğine önem verilmektedir. Araştırma verilerinin toplanması üzerinden 5 yıl veya daha fazla süre geçmiş ise araştırmaların güncelliğini kaybettiği yönünde görüş bildirilmektedir.

Editöryal ön değerlendirme sonucunda bir çalışma, genel kriterleri veya yukarıdaki kriterleri karşılamıyorsa, çalışmanın Yetkilendirilmiş Yazarına gerekçesi ile birlikte, çalışmasının hakem değerlendirme sürecine alınamayacağı yönündeki karar bildirilmektedir.

MEJRS'te yayımlanan makalelerin;

- Sorumluluğu yazarına/yazarlarına aittir. Yayımlanan yazılar, düşünsel planda dergiyi veya Uluslararası Mülteci Hakları Derneğini bağlamaz.

- Yayımlanan yazıların yayım hakları Uluslararası Mülteci Hakları Derneğine aittir.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR AUTHORS

Contributors submitting their work to *The Middle East Journal of Refugee Studies (MEJRS)* should be informed that articles should include the following:

- Quantitative, qualitative, or mixed research methods,
- Comprehensive literature reviews, meta-analysis, or meta-synthesis,
- Model proposals, clinical experimental research model, or original writings of similar quality.

MEJRS gives priority to current studies using advanced research and statistical methods and techniques. The Journal's main criteria for publication are original contribution to the field and competency in methodology.

Manuscripts are first assessed by the Editorial Board for purpose, topic, content, presentation style, and mechanics of writing. During this preliminary assessment, the Editorial Board guidelines are as follows:

✓ For Quantitative Research

- Quantitative research based on a single variable or that mainly analyses frequency, percentage, difference, and correlational statistics is usually assessed in a preliminary assessment according to its contents. Quantitative research including multiple regressions, path and cluster analysis, or other advanced research and statistical methods is given priority.

✓ For Studies Developing a Measurement Tool

- The authenticity, scope, quality of the group worked on, and efficiency of the reliability and validity of studies are taken into consideration to decide whether the measurement tool can be published independently.
- The Editorial Board encourages contributors to send their manuscripts if the developed measurement tool is used in a study in which the findings are reported.

✓ For Experimental Research

- Findings must be supported, detailed, and further elaborated on with qualitative data.

✓ For Qualitative Research

- The reliability and validity studies and in-depth analysis of the data is of utmost importance.

✓ For Descriptive Studies

- The journal aims to publish analytical studies identifying and proposing solutions to the key issues related to refugee issues. However, such studies should not resemble a book chapter based only on a literature review.

✓ Mixed Research Designs

- Such studies have a higher likelihood of being published. Mixed research design studies should justify why and how the author adopted the research design used. Qualitative and quantitative sections are analyzed separately and are expected to meet the criterion described above.

✓ Please Note

- The editors emphasize that MEJRS articles should not include studies based on very frequently used measurement tools or on research topics that have been overly examined, unless they propose an innovative approach to the topic in question.
- Manuscripts based on thesis-related research should include all data used in the thesis. *MEJRS* does not publish any article including unethical practices such as sliding.
- MEJRS believes that the data collection process for original research should have been done in the last 5 years.

Authors of manuscripts that do not meet the general publication criteria or the criteria specified above will be notified of the decision along with the reasons for it and will not proceed to the referee review process.

Authors bear responsibility for the content of their published articles.

- Authors are assumed to have conformed to an ethical code of conduct during research. Ethical problems that may arise after publication are binding for authors only.
- MEJRS is not responsible for the content and opinions expressed in the published articles and these do not necessarily reflect the opinions of The International Refugee Rights Association, being the author entirely responsible for the scientific content in the paper. The publisher/editor of MEJRS is not responsible for errors in the contents or any consequences arising from the use of information contained in it. The opinions expressed in the research papers/articles in this journal do not necessarily represent the views of the publisher/editor of the journal.
- Publishing rights of the manuscripts belong to The International Refugee Rights Association.
- Articles may not be quoted without citing MEJRS and the author(s).